PATTERNS OF POWER

Soviet Western Ukraine

Galicia and Volhynia

17 SEPTEMBER 1939 · 1 DECEMBER 1991

The Complete Study

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Held as tested, not revealed

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PREFACE AND OUTLINE

Front matter · how this study was made, the disciplines it holds itself to, and a map of its fourteen parts

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The collaboration

This is a case study in the *Patterns of Power* series, applying the series' framework to Soviet Western Ukraine — Galicia and Volhynia — from the entry of the Red Army on 17 September 1939 to the referendum of 1 December 1991. The framework is a lens for reading how any order of power is founded, dressed, and held: the floor of force beneath every order, the robe of doctrine laid over the floor to make the force cheap, the settlement that divides the spoils, the cost column in which each subject prices defection, the seam that manages the belief on which the whole depends, the default by which an elite coordinates without instruction, and — running through all of it — position logic, the proposition that rulers in like positions converge on like solutions because a position poses a problem with only a few good answers.

Western Ukraine was chosen because it isolates a variable no other case in the collection can reach. Every European conquest in the series tells a story about itself that is addressed to the metropole and is largely false to the people underneath — civilisation, protection, the burden — so that the collection has never been able to separate the effect of *having* a legitimating claim from the effect of that claim being a lie. Here the claim was addressed to the conquered rather than to the metropole, and it was substantially true. The Ukrainian lands were made one; the republic bore the nation's name; a peasant's son could be schooled in his own language and rise without a fee, a patron or a confession. What follows from a true claim, honestly performed for fifty years in front of the people best placed to audit it, is the thing this study exists to measure — and the answer turns out to be that it changes the price of the claim, the shape of what must be built to sustain it, and what is left standing afterwards, and

changes nothing whatever about the floor, the exit, the extraction, the default or the foreclosure of liberty.

The case also carries a second feature the collection had not had. The order this conquest met was itself a naturalised former conquest — and here it was two of them, being the same operation performed on two halves of one people a century apart. The Union of Brest of 1596 made a church; the Synod of Polotsk of 1839 unmade it across Volhynia, so completely that a century later a Volhynian's Orthodoxy was as unexamined as his handedness; and Galicia, under Vienna, escaped the operation until March 1946. The eve of this conquest is therefore not one baseline but a controlled pair, and much of what the study measures is the difference between them.

The study was built the way the series is built, one module at a time. The author brought the framework, the direction, and the judgement of the whole, and held the collaboration to its disciplines; Claude, Anthropic's model, did the research — verifying every load-bearing quotation, date, and figure by search against a source reproducing the primary text before any module was written — and produced the drafts, applying the framework module by module, each presented and confirmed before the next was begun. The framework's concepts are the series'; the Ukrainian application, and the refinements it yielded, are the work of the collaboration.

Its engine throughout is the method of information asymmetry, adapted to an order whose seam ran differently. In a European colony the gap to be shown is between what was said at the metropole and what was done in the colony. Here it is between what a doctrine said of itself and what its own instruments did — Lenin in 1909 quoting Engels that a police persecution of a Catholic church is Bismarck's folly, set beside the sobor of March 1946; Lenin in 1899 giving the three conditions of a corvée economy, set beside the labour-day minima of 1942; Article 125's guarantee of a free press by the supply of paper, set beside who held the paper. The study lays out the arithmetic and leaves the sum to the reader. It does not preach the conclusion.

The disciplines

Five rules govern every module.

Quotation. Public-domain primary sources — constitutions, decrees, party congress reports, diplomatic notes, doctrinal texts — are quoted exactly, at the length the

argument needs, because in a legal fiction the precise wording *is* the evidence. Modern copyrighted scholarship is paraphrased, briefly, and credited.

No fabrication. No quotation, date, attribution, or figure is ever invented or reconstructed from memory. What cannot be verified is dropped or flagged, never guessed. This case required that rule more than most: the deportation totals, the June 1941 prison killings, the insurgency's dead, the Volhynian massacres and the famine mortality are all given as ranges with the estimating institutions named, because every one of them is currently in use by more than one government in a war being fought over this ground. Where a figure rests on a single source, the module says so at the point of use.

Gravity without partisanship. Suffering is held with gravity, and the study refuses both flattery and demonisation — it names the legal fiction as fiction and explains the order's logic without excusing it. Its recurring watchword is *legibility is not pardon*. The corollary holds equally: the credit column is counted in full, and an order that deported two hundred thousand people by kinship also ended the periodic hunger mortality that had emptied these villages into Pennsylvania for two generations. Neither fact discounts the other.

Contribution. Every module returns a refinement to the framework, stated plainly in its closing section, rather than merely applying the framework to the case.

Held as tested, not revealed. The pattern is treated as something discovered and tested against the evidence, not handed down as doctrine — a lens laid over the record, a tendency and never a law.

What Soviet Western Ukraine added to the framework

Because this is the collection's case with a true robe and a maximised formation, it was able to name features the European colonies obscure. Chief among the refinements the study contributed: that where a territory contains an earlier conquest at a *later stage of the same operation*, the eve is not a baseline but a completed control; that the second floor's rule of liability is not one rule, and shifts on a dateable document from naming offices and grants to naming wives and brothers — a state that begins deporting relatives having conceded in its own drafting that what it fights is lodged in no institution it can close; that *restoration* is the only settlement fiction which manufactures no proprietor, and is therefore the only one that can be performed twice

and then reversed with nothing to revoke; that a true legitimating claim addressed to the conquered is not cheaper than a false one but far more expensive, because it can only be discharged by performance in the conquered's own institutions, and that the mechanism which makes the bill payable is to *permit the function and forbid the ownership*; that a formation survives assault to the extent its institution can shrink to household scale without ceasing to be itself, households transmitting practice but never allegiance; that where a state cannot circumscribe the terrain it circumscribes the *person*, whose signature is a population that can physically leave and has nowhere lawfully to land; that extraction systems sort first on whether the producer is *provided with* land or dispossessed of it, since a subsistence plot removes the extractor's only self-interested floor; that the durable form of information control is the deletion of a question rather than the suppression of an answer, because afterwards every measurement is accurate and every measurer honest; that what holds an appointed elite is the *non-portability* of what it holds, which makes individual defection impossible and collective abandonment free; that liberty's residue requires not that factions exist but that a defeated faction can survive its defeat; that a floor of force rests on the state's willingness to *own* the killing rather than its capacity to kill, so that the first disavowed order is the date the floor became unusable; that coordination which *skims* creates no metabolic debt and produces famine while it functions rather than when it is destroyed; and that the truth of a legitimating claim is an independent variable, altering the claim's price, shape and residue and nothing else at all.

The arc

A landscape opening and twelve modules, each with a framework function and its own evocative title.

Landscape — the two societies on the eve of conquest. **A Church for a Church.** A confessional line drawn across one people by two church settlements three centuries apart, and the operation of 1839 that moved a million and a half souls without changing a building, a calendar, a rite or a priest — leaving only a name in a litany, and taking completely.

1 — The Floor of Force. **Nine Hundred and Seventy-Two.** The entire military price of the territory, set against fourteen years of police operations that exceeded it by orders of magnitude; and the document of August 1947 on which the rule of liability changes from what a man had been to whom he was related.

2 — The Settlement. **All-People's Property.** Four declarations in a Lviv theatre whose terms had been fixed in Moscow three weeks earlier; 2.753 million hectares handed down and taken back; and a kulak defined into existence by a ceiling of seven hectares chosen in Kyiv.

3 — The Robe. **The Only True Way.** A claim addressed to the conquered and substantially true, paid for in a Ukrainian university within four months of the invasion — and the same programme dissolving the Shevchenko Scientific Society, Prosvita, Ridna Shkola and the co-operatives, because the claim permitted the function and forbade the ownership.

4 — Formation. **A Dish, a Goblet, a Jewellery Box.** The liquidation of a church of two and a half thousand parishes, and the one-room flat in Lviv from 1955 to 1969 in which the paten, the chalice and the tabernacle stood on a dresser among the ornaments — with Lenin's own text of 1909 naming the operation as Bismarck's folly.

5 — The Cost Column. **Nowhere to Arrive.** A peasantry that had answered its arithmetic by emigration for sixty years, a forest that stayed open the whole time, and a far side that closed; and the single lawful door of 1944, which a Greek Catholic could not use because the rite that made him Ukrainian disqualified the claim.

6 — Extraction. **Some Days of the Week.** One hundred and thirty-three days owed to the estate before 1848 and two hundred and twenty-five worked for the collective in 1954, in the same villages; the household plot as the half that fed and the half that could be shrunk; and the famine of 1946 that struck where the apparatus was densest.

7 — Information and Suppression. **The Museum of Antiquities.** The vanguard declining to stand down, in public, with a reason sited beyond the borders; a census annulled and its takers shot as saboteurs; and a confession removed from the register so completely that every subsequent count was accurate and returned zero for forty-three years.

8 — Elite Coordination and the Default. **Two Lists.** A position defined by being written down, a hierarchy in which rank is altitude in a filing system, and an elite that owned nothing it could carry out — which is why nobody defected for fifty years and everybody left in an afternoon.

9 — Plurality or Foreclosure. **Printing Presses, Stocks of Paper.** A constitution that locates the guarantee of a free press in the state's supply of newsprint; a Procurator-General reporting that there were in fact two criminal codes; and a man sentenced to

death for proposing to use the right of secession by the means the constitution named, who wrote the act that used it thirty years later.

10 — Change and Collapse. **Actions by Irresponsible Persons.** Tbilisi, Baku and Vilnius, and the disavowal that followed the first of them; the syndrome it left in the officer corps; and a plan to storm a parliament that existed, with the units to execute it, and was never signed.

11 — The Grim Accounting. **Trains Going Westward.** The columns of the dead and displaced, including the largest, which was made by neither party to this conquest; and a famine that ran the wrong way, sparing the province where the state's coordinating reach was least.

12 — Convergence and Divergence. **A Republic with a Name.** Where the case converges, where it genuinely differs, what its true robe isolates; and the strongest case that the whole account is a category error, stated in its own voice and answered with the rest of the arithmetic.

LANDSCAPE

A CHURCH FOR A CHURCH

Landscape: the two societies the Red Army entered in September 1939 — and the completed operation, a hundred years old, that had already made one of them.

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The line that ran through the middle

When Polish enumerators went out in December 1931 they asked two questions of every household — mother tongue and religion — and the answers, taken together, drew a border across the country that no map of the Second Republic showed. Nationwide, those who gave their language as Ruthenian were 96.5 per cent Greek Catholic and 3.2 per cent Orthodox; those who gave it as Ukrainian were split almost evenly, 52.4 per cent Greek Catholic against 46.6 per cent Orthodox. The split is not a curiosity of the returns. It is the seam between two territories that would, eight years later, be taken by one army in one week and administered as one thing.

South of that seam lay the four Galician voivodeships. In Stanisławów, 68.8 per cent of the population gave Ukrainian or Ruthenian as their first language and 73 per cent were entered as Greek Catholic or Orthodox, the great bulk of them the former. In Tarnopol the confessional return showed a Greek Catholic majority. North of the seam lay Wołyń, where something over two-thirds of the population was Ukrainian by mother tongue and where that population was Orthodox almost without exception. Two peasantries speaking the same language, farming similar ground, separated by a difference in which church buried them.

The census had its own way of handling the language, and it is worth pausing on, because the instrument was doing work. The form recorded *Ukrainian* and *Ruthenian* as two distinct mother tongues, so that in Tarnopol voivodeship 401,963 people were entered under one heading and 326,172 under the other — one population, appearing in the published tables as two, in a state whose administrators had reason to prefer the

smaller number. Nothing in the schedule was false. The categories were simply chosen by somebody, and the somebody was not the person answering.

The confessional line, though, was not a Polish artefact. It had been drawn by a state, on a date, by a named operation, and the operation is the reason this landscape is worth setting out at length rather than sketching.

Brest, and where it did not reach

The Union of Brest was concluded in stages across 1595 and 1596: the papal bull *Magnus Dominus* of 23 December 1595 accepted the Ruthenian bishops and their flock, and *Decet Romanum Pontificem* of 23 February 1596 guaranteed the terms on which they came. Those terms are a settlement in the ordinary sense — a schedule of what each side gave. The Kyivan hierarchy accepted the primacy of the pope, the Latin reading of the *filioque*, and purgatory. In exchange it kept the Eastern rite, the Church Slavonic liturgy, the married parish clergy, the Julian calendar, and the local election of bishops and of the metropolitan; and Rome undertook to press for the Ruthenian church's parity with the Latin church in the Commonwealth, including seats for its bishops in the senate.

The senate seats never came. The consideration on the Ruthenian side of that bargain was a promise the grantor was not in a position to deliver, and the bishops who signed discovered it within a generation, which is the ordinary fate of a clause that depends on a third party's goodwill.

The other thing to hold about Brest is where it did not reach. Galicia — the ground on which the Greek Catholic church would eventually become the most complete expression of a nation in Europe — was the last part of the Ruthenian church to accept the union, and accepted it nearly a century late: Przemyśl eparchy in the early 1690s, Lviv in 1700, the Lviv Stauropegial Brotherhood in 1708, and the Maniava skete not at all, that house holding out until Joseph II dissolved it in 1786. The church that a Galician villager in 1939 would have described, if asked, as simply the faith of his people had been resisted by his ancestors for a hundred years after it was signed elsewhere. A built thing had become the furniture of the room, and the resistance to its building had gone out of memory along with the builders.

Polotsk, 1839: the operation that worked

The partitions put the greater part of the Uniate parishes under Russian rule, and the Russian state set about undoing Brest almost at once — by mass reversions under Catherine in the 1790s, and then, after the November Rising, by a more patient method. The Pochaiv monastery, the great house of Volhynia, passed from Basilian into Orthodox hands in the early 1830s.

The patient method had an author. Iosyf Semashko, a Russophile Greek Catholic protopresbyter, submitted a paper to Nicholas I on 17 January 1828 setting out how the Uniate church in the empire might be returned to Orthodoxy by degrees. In 1833 he asked to be received into Orthodoxy personally and was refused, the Holy Synod judging him too useful where he stood. In 1835 a Secret Committee for the Uniate Confession was established, the Greek Uniate Ecclesiastical College was moved under the authority of the Orthodox Synod, and the four remaining eparchies were reduced to two. When Iosafat Bulhak, the last Uniate metropolitan, died in 1838, the hierarchy was left in Semashko's hands. He then collected statements from the parish clergy: 1,305 priests signed their willingness to join the Orthodox church, and 593 refused despite threats of arrest and exile. On 12 February 1839 the clergy assembled at Polotsk and adopted an Act of Reunion, which carried with it some 1,600 parishes and about 1.5 million parishioners into the body of imperial Orthodoxy.

What is worth attending to is not the coercion, which is documented and not in dispute, but the shape of the thing that was done, because it explains the outcome better than the coercion does.

The operation emptied nothing. The building stayed where it was and kept its iconostasis. The liturgy stayed in Church Slavonic and kept the Julian calendar, so the feasts fell on the days they had always fallen on. The parish priest stayed married, stayed in his house, and in the great majority of cases stayed the same man. Children were baptised as they had been baptised, couples were crowned as they had been crowned, and the dead were buried with the same words over the same graves. Every function that a household actually transmits to a child — a name-day, a fast, a Sunday, a funeral — went on being transmitted without interruption by exactly the people who had been transmitting it the week before.

One thing changed. In the litany, a different name was commemorated. The allegiance of the church was transferred from Rome to St Petersburg, and the allegiance

is the single part of the arrangement that had never lived in the household in the first place: it lived in a chancery, and it could be moved by moving a chancery.

By 1939 a Volhynian peasant was Orthodox in the way he was right-handed. He did not hold it as a position and could not have given an account of when it had begun, because within his family it had begun before anyone he had ever met. Three generations had been enough. This is what a completed replacement looks like once it is finished.

Vienna's investment, and what it made

Galicia went to Austria at the first partition in 1772, and the operation performed on Volhynia was therefore never attempted there — not from restraint, but because the acquiring state had no Orthodox church of its own to hand the population to, and a great deal of use for a Ruthenian clergy that owed it something.

The measures came quickly. In 1774 Maria Theresa decreed that the Uniates in her realm be called Greek Catholics, a change the Eastern-rite hierarchy had itself requested on the ground that the old word was used as a slur, and one intended to mark parity with the Latin rite. In the same year, or the next, a seminary for Greek Catholics was opened in Vienna at the church of St Barbara — the Barbareum — which ran until 1784 and was replaced by the Greek Catholic seminary at Lviv, founded in 1783. The Halych metropolitanate was restored in 1807 with its seat at Lviv. Imperial decrees of 1813 and 1816 confirmed the equality of the two rites in law. On the land, the same monarchs capped the corvée at three days a week and 156 days a year from a peasant household, and in 1848 the governor announced the abolition of serfdom in the province on 22 April.

What Vienna was buying is not obscure. A Ruthenian clergy that looked to the emperor was a counterweight to a Polish nobility that did not, in a province acquired as a slice of Poland and administered at first as one. What Vienna actually got was something else, and it got it because of a clause in the Brest settlement that nobody in 1596 had thought about in these terms: the Eastern rite kept a married parish clergy, and a married clergy has sons.

Within two generations the Greek Catholic priesthood was the only educated stratum among the Galician Ruthenians, and its sons — trained in seminaries the state had built, then moving out into law, medicine, teaching and journalism — became the

Ukrainian intelligentsia of Galicia. The national awakening began among seminarians: the Ruthenian Triad of Markiian Shashkevych, Yakiv Holovatsky and Ivan Vahylevych formed in the mid-1830s and published their vernacular miscellany *Rusalka Dnistrovaia* in 1837. By 1848 the province had a Ruthenian political body of its own. By the end of the century it had a press, a cooperative movement, a network of village reading rooms, and a church at the centre of all of it that had been built, at real expense, by an imperial treasury that had costed a counterweight and received a nation.

So: one church, two states, two policies, and by 1939 two populations who could not have told you why they differed, only that they did, and that it was how things had always been.

The nineteen months

There is an interval in the middle of this, and it matters more than its length suggests, because it is the only recorded instance of what the people of this ground did when the question was briefly theirs.

A Ukrainian National Rada constituted itself at Lviv on 18 October 1918 with the blessing of Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky. On the night of 1 November its members took the city by arms and proclaimed the West Ukrainian People's Republic, and other Galician towns came under its authority in the following days. Kost Levytsky formed a government on 9 November. The confessional composition recorded for the territory it claimed — something near 59 per cent Greek Catholic, 28 per cent Latin Catholic, 4 per cent Jewish — states its extent precisely: it was the Greek Catholic half's state, and Volhynia was not in it. On 22 January 1919, on Sofia Square in Kyiv, the Directory proclaimed the union of the two Ukrainian republics. By 16 July the Galician army had been driven back across the Zbruch.

The disposal took four more years and was made elsewhere. The Peace of Riga of 18 March 1921 divided Volhynia between Poland and Soviet Russia, with no Ukrainian party at the table. The Conference of Ambassadors of the Entente powers assigned eastern Galicia to Poland in March 1923, with a provision that the territory should be autonomous — a provision that produced no autonomy.

A difference kept up by administration

Warsaw inherited two Ukrainian populations that differed, and made policy to keep them differing.

The instrument was the Sokal border, an internal administrative line named for the town on the old Austrian-Russian frontier and separating Galicia from Volhynia. Its architect was Henryk Józewski, voivode of Volhynia. The Polish-Vatican concordat of 1925 restricted the jurisdiction of the Greek Catholic bishops to eastern Galicia; the Prosvita societies and the Ukrainian cooperative audit union were suppressed north of the line, confining their work to the south; and in their place the administration sanctioned regional Volhynian bodies, including a Volhynian Ukrainian Alliance that advocated loyalty and worked with the government. Józewski supported Ukrainian schooling and culture in Volhynia and marked Greek Catholic feasts, on a design in which a Ukrainian identity loyal to Poland in Volhynia would insulate that province from Galicia and radiate eastwards into Soviet Ukraine. The line's stated purpose, in the plainest description of it, was to stop the movement of Ukrainian publications and institutions from Galicia to the north-east.

South of the line, the arithmetic ran differently. In September 1930, following a season of sabotage against Polish property, police and army units entered sixteen counties of eastern Galicia in an operation the government called pacification. It ran from mid-September to 30 November. Villagers were confined to their houses while their homes were searched, floors and ceilings torn up, furniture broken and men beaten; the searches produced some 1,287 rifles, 566 revolvers and 31 grenades, alongside a great deal of damage to households that had none of these things. Prosvita reading rooms and cooperative stores were among the buildings specifically targeted. On 24 September the Ukrainian secondary schools at Ternopil, Drohobych and Rohatyn were closed and the Plast youth association was outlawed. Villages were made to pay special contributions and to quarter and feed cavalry. The death toll is contested and small: a Polish historian records none, one Ukrainian-American estimate gives seven, one Ukrainian nationalist historian gives thirty-five. Sheptytsky came to Warsaw on 3 October to protest, in an attempt to see Piłsudski that did not succeed; his pastoral letter on the matter was confiscated. The Ukrainian parliamentary representation moved in the Sejm in December for an inquiry, and a complaint went to the League of Nations.

Five years later the same state made a bargain. In March 1935 the Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance and the government reached an accommodation called Normalization: nineteen seats across the two chambers, the vice-marshalship of the Sejm for the UNDO leader Vasyl Mudryi, an amnesty for Ukrainian political prisoners, credits for the Ukrainian cooperatives, the elimination of Russophile representation, and the maintenance of the existing position in Ukrainian schooling. It was extended to Galicia and not to Volhynia, and UNDO's chairman Dmytro Levytsky resigned over that.

It did not hold. Piłsudski died in 1935. Józewski was removed from Volhynia in 1938 and his successor ended state support for Ukrainian institutions, with a recommendation that Polish officials cease using the words *Ukraine* and *Ukrainian*. The same year, in a revindication campaign that had run intermittently since 1919, administrative authorities pulled down over 127 Orthodox buildings in the Chełm region and Podlasie — a figure some accounts put above 150. That ground lies west of this study's territory, but it was the same state in the same year, and the Orthodox peasant of Volhynia could read it without assistance.

Beneath all of it lay the land. Military settlers, the *osadnicy*, had been planted in the eastern voivodeships from 1920, and the land reform, which increased the Polish share of ownership in the borderlands, was received by the minorities as what it was. In 1931 Lwów voivodeship recorded an illiteracy rate of 23.1 per cent — about the national average, and the lowest of the eastern provinces.

On 24 August 1939 the UNDO executive resolved unanimously to fulfil its civic duty to the Polish state, and on 2 September, from the rostrum of the Sejm, Deputy Speaker Vasyl Mudryi declared the loyalty of the Ukrainian population to Poland. He had chaired, in 1933, a Committee to Save Ukraine that organised famine relief for the Soviet republic across the border.

The state that crossed the border

Fifteen days before Mudryi spoke, the disposal had already been made. The secret additional protocol signed in Moscow on 23 August 1939 by Ribbentrop and Molotov, in Stalin's presence, provided in its second article: *"In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement of the areas belonging to the Polish state, the spheres of influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R. shall be bounded approximately by the line of the*

rivers Narew, Vistula and San. The question of whether the interests of both parties make desirable the maintenance of an independent Polish state and how such a state should be bounded can only be definitely determined in the course of further political developments. In any event both governments will resolve this question by means of a friendly agreement." The Soviet Union denied that this document existed for fifty years.

The state that would cross that line was eighteen months out of the Great Terror. In Soviet Ukraine, the purges of 1936–38 had halved the party's membership and 99 of the 102 members of its Central Committee had been shot; Pavel Postyshev and Stanislav Kosior, who had run the republic, were removed from their posts and executed.

And there had been, until the year before, a party whose entire programme was the thing about to happen. The Communist Party of Western Ukraine, founded in 1923 out of the Communist Party of Eastern Galicia, held as its position on the national question the incorporation of Western Ukraine into the Ukrainian SSR, and refused the formula the Polish party and the Comintern pressed on it — self-determination by the local population — on the ground that such a demand was not comprehensible to the Ukrainian masses. Its leadership had backed Oleksander Shumsky in 1927 and had been condemned for it. It was purged in the early 1930s and again in 1936–37. In 1938 the executive committee of the Comintern dissolved it, together with the Communist Party of Poland, on the stated ground that its leadership had been penetrated by provocateurs, and its cadres were destroyed.

The party that demanded the reunification of the Ukrainian lands was liquidated in 1938. The reunification was carried out in 1939.

Reading the eve against the framework

The standing instruction for an opening like this one is to establish that what the conqueror found was itself a former conquest that had reached the point of running on its own — that there is no aboriginal baseline anywhere, only earlier builds that took. This ground refuses to be read that way, and the refusal is the refinement it returns.

There is no single prior order here. There are two, and they are not different orders: they are the same operation at two stages. Brest built a church in the 1590s and it took, so completely that by the twentieth century its adherents experienced it as the

immemorial faith of their people and could not have named the century in which their own province had resisted it. Polotsk unbuilt that church in 1839 across the northern half of this ground, and *that* took too, so completely that a Volhynian's Orthodoxy was by 1939 as unexamined as a Galician's Catholicism. What the incoming state met in September 1939 was therefore not one naturalised conquest but a controlled pair: a completed replacement and an untouched original, run on one people, differing in one variable, with a hundred years on the clock.

That is worth more than a baseline, because it converts the eve into evidence. And what the completed case shows is that the successful replacement did not empty anything. It exchanged a church for a church and left every function staffed — the same rite, the same calendar, the same married priest, the same words over the same graves — changing only the allegiance commemorated in the liturgy, which is the one part of the arrangement that had never been carried by a household and could therefore be moved by moving an office. Where the exchange was complete, three generations sufficed. So the question to put to any assault on a formation is not whether the institution survived it, but which of the institution's functions the incoming order was equipped to perform in its place; and the proposition to be tested against everything that follows is that a formation is displaced function by function, never wholesale, and that whatever the new order cannot staff simply goes on running, because a child must be given an answer and will take the only one on offer.

One further description belongs here, and it is a description rather than a judgement. The instrument of 1839 was styled an Act of Reunion. That word does not name an acquisition. It names a return, and it places the acting state as the restorer of a condition that had been wrongfully interrupted rather than the taker of a thing presently held — which is a harder position to argue against than a conquest, because to contest it one must first contest a history. The word was *vossoedinenie*. It was available in Russian and Ukrainian alike, it was applied in 1839 to a church, and it was still in the vocabulary in 1939, when what was reunified was a territory.

A note on sources. The one document quoted here exactly is the secret additional protocol of 23 August 1939, given from the English text long in print in the American State Department's collection of the captured German foreign-ministry files and reproduced in the public domain; the terms of the Union of Brest are summarised from encyclopaedia accounts of the papal bulls rather than quoted from the bulls themselves, which I have not read in the original and should not be represented as having read. Everything else here is paraphrased from secondary and

reference works and credited as such: the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* for the Sokal border, the Pacification, the West Ukrainian People's Republic and the Communist Party of Western Ukraine; the *Encyclopædia Britannica* for the Habsburg church reforms and the interwar administration of Galicia; the published Polish census of 1931 as reported in reference summaries rather than consulted in the volumes; and a monograph on the Greek Catholic church and the Ruthenian national movement in Galicia, 1870–1900, for the late accession of the Galician eparchies to the union — a work whose authorship I have not confirmed and which I therefore do not name.

Contested figures are given as ranges with their sources attached. The Pacification's dead are recorded as none by Władysław Pobóg-Malinowski, as seven by Stephan Horak and as thirty-five by Petro Mirchuk, and the discrepancy tracks the historiographical position of each. The Orthodox buildings demolished in the Chełm region and Podlasie in 1938 are given as over 127 in one scholarly abstract and as more than 150 in others. The Conference of Ambassadors decision on eastern Galicia is dated variously to 12, 14 and 15 March 1923 in otherwise reliable accounts, and I have not resolved it. The Polotsk figures — 1,305 signatures, 593 refusals, some 1,600 parishes, about 1.5 million faithful — come from the standard narrative account and have not been checked against the Russian State Historical Archive holdings that account rests on; they should be treated as the received figures rather than as verified ones until they are.

Three limitations weaken parts of this and should be visible at the point of use. First, the 1931 census is disputed, with historians arguing that administrative pressure and respondent caution under-recorded non-Polish groups, and the apparent Polish plurality of Lwów voivodeship is partly an artefact of a boundary that included western counties now inside Poland; the county-level returns, not the voivodeship totals, are the honest unit. Second, almost every source on the Union of Brest and its undoing is written by someone with a confessional stake — the Ukrainian Greek Catholic church's own historical materials on one side, and on the other a Russian Orthodox theological journal whose account of 1839 describes it as a return to the Russian cultural world — and I have used both while trying to take from each only what the other does not contest. Third, this landscape rests entirely on English- and Ukrainian-language reference and secondary material; no archival document has been consulted directly, and the Ukrainian state archives, the Wilson Center's digital collection and the published Soviet-era decrees would sharpen almost every paragraph of it.

NINE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-TWO

Module 1: the floor of force — the conquest, and the three later applications of violence, counted apart from it and from each other.

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The first count

At three in the morning on 17 September 1939 the Polish ambassador in Moscow, Wacław Grzybowski, was brought to the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and read a note by the deputy commissar, Vladimir Potemkin. It stated that the German-Polish war had revealed the internal bankruptcy of the Polish state; that in ten days of operations Poland had lost her industrial regions and cultural centres; that Warsaw no longer existed as a capital; and that the Polish government had disintegrated and showed no further signs of life. From this it drew the operative conclusion, which Molotov repeated on the radio that day in the words the New York Times printed the following morning: *"The Polish state and its government have virtually ceased to exist. In view of this state of affairs, treaties concluded between the Soviet Union and Poland have ceased to operate."* Nor, the address continued, could it be demanded of the Soviet government that it remain indifferent to the fate of its blood brothers, the Ukrainians and Byelorussians inhabiting Poland, *"who even formerly were without rights and who now have been abandoned entirely to their fate. The Soviet Government deems it its sacred duty to extend the hand of assistance to its brother Ukrainians and brother Byelo-Russians inhabiting Poland."* For that purpose the Red Army had been ordered to cross the frontier and take under its protection the lives and property of the population of the western Ukraine and western Byelorussia.

Grzybowski declined to accept it. His reply, in the version recorded on the Polish side, denied every premise in order: that the head of state and the government remained

on Polish territory; that in any case the location of a government was not the test, since the sovereignty of a state exists as long as the soldiers of its regular army are fighting; and that what the note said about the minorities was nonsense, because Ukrainians and Byelorussians were at that moment fighting alongside Poles against the Germans.

Two army groups crossed that morning. In the north the Byelorussian Front under Kovalev; in the south, across the ground this study concerns, the Ukrainian Front under Marshal Semyon Timoshenko, with Nikita Khrushchev attached as its member of the military council. Estimates of the force committed across both fronts run from roughly 450,000 to something approaching a million men, with several thousand tanks and aircraft; the Polish forces facing east were the twenty-odd thousand men of the Border Protection Corps and whatever units the September campaign had left in the rear. Timoshenko ordered his command to reach the Kovel–Volodymyr-Volynskyi–Sokal line within three days and made it comfortably, covering some sixty miles on the first. Khrushchev's own recollection of the crossing was that they met no resistance. Lviv, invested from the west by the Germans since 12 September, was handed over to the Soviets on 22 September; Ternopil, Stanisławów and Łuck fell in the same days. Operations ended on 6 October.

The Soviet official return for the Ukrainian Front's part in this was **972 killed or missing and 1,741 wounded**. For both fronts together the official figure is 737 to 1,475 killed or missing and 1,859 to 2,383 wounded; other estimates raise the dead to 3,000 and the wounded to 10,000. Polish losses in fighting the Soviets are put at 3,000 to 7,000 killed and up to 20,000 wounded, with prisoners variously given as 200,000 to 250,000 and as high as 450,000 depending on whether interned men later released are counted. The Soviets recorded the capture of some 900 artillery pieces and a great deal else.

That is the entire military price of taking the territory. Everything that followed cost more, and none of it was done by the army.

How the taking was ratified

The instrument of consent was prepared before the consent existed. On 1 October 1939, three days after the frontier treaty with Germany fixed the new border, the Politburo in Moscow resolved that People's Assemblies should be convened at Lviv for Western Ukraine and Białystok for Western Belorussia, whose task would be to ask

Moscow to incorporate the territories. The request had thus been decided in the capital three weeks before anybody in Lviv was asked anything.

Elections were held on 22 October. Candidates were approved in advance by the provisional administration, one to a seat, many of them communists sent in from Soviet Ukraine; the compilation of the voters' lists was preceded by a mass collection of personal information about the population that in many cases resembled interrogation; and the voting was not secret and took place under NKVD supervision. The reported figures were participation of 93 per cent and support for the approved candidates of 91 per cent. The People's Assembly of Western Ukraine — some 1,482 or 1,484 deputies, of whom Poles made up around 3 per cent — met at Lviv from 26 to 28 October under the chairmanship of the philologist Kyrylo Studynskyi, passed a resolution of gratitude, requested admission to the Ukrainian SSR, and voted the nationalisation of banks, industry and housing. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR granted the request on 1 November and the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR on 14 November. On 29 November every former Polish citizen resident in the territory was made a Soviet citizen by decree.

There were seven weeks between the crossing of the frontier and the completion of the paperwork. The word used for what had been done to the territory was *vozz'ednannia* — reunification.

The second count: lists drawn before anyone was assessed

The larger application of force began four and a half months after the fighting stopped, and it was not directed at anyone who had fought.

Before dawn on 10 February 1940, in temperatures well below freezing, NKVD teams went to houses across the annexed provinces working from lists prepared in advance. The first wave took the military settlers — the *osadnicy*, veterans of the 1919–21 war granted land in the borderlands — together with foresters, forest workers, some railway and postal employees, and their families: wives, children, grandparents, whole households loaded into unheated goods wagons for the north of European Russia and the Urals. Figures for this wave run from about 140,000 to 220,000 people. A second wave followed on 13 April 1940, taking chiefly the families of men already arrested, executed or interned — women and children in the main — for Kazakhstan, at 300,000 to 330,000 people on the higher estimates. A third came at the end of June 1940 and

fell heavily on refugees who had fled eastward from the German zone, a great many of them Jews, who had made the mistake of registering to return home. A fourth ran in May and June 1941.

The totals are contested along a line that has not moved much in thirty years. The NKVD's own accounting gives some 330,000 to 350,000 deported from the annexed Polish territories in the four waves. Polish estimates, including those of the Institute of National Remembrance, run from 800,000 to over a million, and the figure of 1.2 million is in common circulation; the argument turns on whether the NKVD transport records capture individual arrests, conscriptions and the movement of prisoners of war, and on the treatment of those who died before registration at the destination. Separately, some 500,000 Polish citizens are recorded as having been imprisoned before June 1941, and about 22,000 prisoners of war and officials were shot in the spring of 1940 on the Politburo's decision, including a list of several thousand held in the prisons of the western Ukrainian oblasts.

What matters structurally is not the size of the range but the nature of the liability. Nobody on those February lists was taken for anything he had done after 17 September 1939. He was taken for what the previous state had made him: a settler on a grant, a forester in a state service, a policeman, a veteran of a war fought twenty years earlier. The category was conferred by the order the Soviets had just destroyed, and the operation was the systematic removal of the beneficiaries of that order's own settlement, carried out on paper drawn up before anyone in the territory had been individually assessed for anything.

The third count: the last week of June 1941

The German attack of 22 June 1941 found the prisons of the western oblasts full. Beria ordered that political prisoners who could not be evacuated be executed, and in the week that followed they were, at Lviv and across the provinces, as the administration withdrew eastward.

At Lviv the killing was done in the Brygidki prison, the prison on Łącki (Lontskoho) Street and the prison at Zamarstyniv; the museum on the Lontskoho site records 1,681 killed there, 971 at Zamarstyniv and 739 at Brygidki, and estimates for the city as a whole run from 3,500 to 7,000. At Lutsk around 2,000 were killed on 23 June; at Dubno 500 to 550 between 23 and 25 June; at Sambir some 500 to 700, including, on

the account of one museum, roughly 1,200 women in two cells destroyed by explosives on 26 June; at Zolochiv 650 to 720; at Berezhany at least 174 between 26 and 30 June. At Stanisławów bodies were found stacked to the ceiling in three basement cells. Estimates for the region as a whole range from the roughly 9,000 recorded in Soviet internal tallies for the Ukrainian SSR, through the 20,000 to 30,000 given in much of the Polish literature, to a scholarly range of 10,000 to 40,000, with some archival compilations settling near 24,000. Where ethnicity has been reconstructed, Ukrainians make up something near 70 per cent of the victims and Poles around 20 per cent.

This count belongs to a different kind from the other three. It was not planned in advance against a category; it was an evacuation problem answered with executions, and its scale was a function of how many people the previous eighteen months had put in the cells. Its immediate effect was to leave the bodies where the arriving Germans found them. They had them dug out and laid in rows for public viewing, and relatives came to search among them; and in Lviv in the first days of July, with the corpses on display, thousands of Jews were murdered in pogroms in which German units, Ukrainian nationalist formations and local crowds all participated, the scholarship differing on the weight to assign to each. Within a fortnight the same prisons appeared in German propaganda across occupied Europe.

The fourth count: the return, and the ten-year war

The Red Army came back into Volhynia in the winter of 1943–44 and into Galicia through the summer of 1944, and this time it found an armed opponent.

The Ukrainian Insurgent Army had formed in 1942–43 as the military wing of the Bandera faction of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists. Its record before the Soviet return includes the anti-Polish operation of 1943–45 in Volhynia and eastern Galicia, in which the number of Polish civilians killed is estimated by Polish scholarship at 40,000 to 60,000 in Volhynia and 20,000 to 40,000 in eastern Galicia — figures the Polish state treats as genocide — with Ukrainian deaths in Polish retaliatory operations put at 10,000 to 12,000 by the Institute of National Remembrance and at 17,000 to 24,000 by Ukrainian historians; the scale, the command responsibility and the characterisation are all actively disputed and the dispute is political in three countries at once. The formations the Soviet state fought from 1944 were those formations.

The war that followed ran for roughly a decade. In the summer of 1944 Moscow put some 30,000 NKVD troops into Volhynia and then a much larger force into Galicia; the insurgents at their height held ground across a region with several million inhabitants and tied down substantial garrisons. Between February 1944 and December 1946 the NKVD recorded 11,725 Soviet officers, officials and collaborators assassinated in Western Ukraine and a further 2,401 missing. Official Soviet figures for losses inflicted by Ukrainian nationalists across 1944–1953 give 30,676 killed, among them 687 state security personnel, 1,864 interior ministry personnel, 3,199 soldiers and border and interior troops, 241 party officials, 205 Komsomol officials and 2,590 members of self-defence units; the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council claimed 35,000 security personnel killed and the CIA's covert operations chief accepted that figure in 1951. Soviet documents for the same decade record 153,000 killed, 134,000 arrested and 203,000 deported on their own side of the ledger, most of it in 1944–45; independent estimates of insurgent dead run lower, near 99,000 or 56,600 depending on the compilation. In the countryside the campaign was conducted substantially through *strybky*, the destruction battalions of locally recruited auxiliaries, and through agent penetration; one report by Khrushchev's deputy for western Ukrainian affairs in 1946 concluded that of 42,175 operations and ambushes mounted by those battalions, some ten per cent produced a result.

Then, on 22 August 1947, the Minister of State Security Abakumov issued order No. 00430, on the eviction from the western regions of Ukraine of the families of the convicted, the killed, and those, in the order's phrase, in an illegal situation, together with active nationalists and bandits. A resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers of 10 September 1947 accelerated it, and stated the destination: the families were to supply workers to the coal industry. The Ukrainian interior minister Strokach approved the operational plan on 10 October. Secretaries of district committees learned of it two or three days before; most participants were told on the morning. Operation West began at two o'clock in the morning in Lviv and at six across most of the western oblasts on 21 October 1947, working from lists compiled in advance, and by the evening of the same day it had taken, on the figure supplied from the Ukrainian archives, 26,332 families — 77,791 people, mostly women, children and the elderly — from the Volyn, Drohobych, Stanisławów, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil and Chernivtsi regions. Snow stopped the operation in two oblasts and it resumed on 23 October. Eighty-seven railway stations were used. The first convoy left Kovel at 6.38 a.m. on 22 October carrying 1,293 people to Tomsk. Deportations continued at a lower rate

afterwards: 22,308 families, 80,209 people, between 1948 and 1952. Across the whole campaign against the families of insurgents, 1944–1952, the total is given as 66,438 families and 205,938 people.

Roman Shukhevych, the UPA commander, was killed near Lviv in March 1950. Organised armed resistance was effectively finished by the middle of the decade.

What the four counts have in common, and where they diverge

They are four operations of very different sizes and only one of them was a battle.

The conquest cost the Ukrainian Front under a thousand dead and delivered a territory of some seven million people in three weeks. Against that, the removals of 1940–41 moved a population somewhere between a third of a million and a million; the prison killings of one week in June 1941 took between nine and forty thousand; and the decade after 1944 produced, on the Soviet state's own accounting, a hundred and fifty thousand dead and two hundred thousand deported. The floor of this order was not laid by the army. It was laid by the security organs, over fourteen years, and the army's contribution to it was three weeks and a casualty return that would not have registered in any of the operations that followed.

The rule of liability, though, is not constant across the three police operations, and the change in it is the module's finding.

In 1940 the category was **what the previous state had made you**. A man was liable because he held a settler's grant, wore a forester's or policeman's uniform, or had a service record from 1920 — statuses conferred by the order the Soviets had just abolished, which is to say that the operation was the systematic clearing of the prior settlement's beneficiary class, and could be planned entirely from the prior state's own registers before a single interview took place in the territory.

In 1947 the category was **whom you were related to**. The eviction order names families: of the convicted, of the killed, of those in an illegal situation. No conduct is alleged against the person removed, and none is required; the household is the unit, and the seventy-eight thousand people taken in a day were overwhelmingly women, children and the old, because the men the category referred to were in the forest.

That is a different instrument reaching for a different thing, and what it is reaching for is worth stating plainly. An insurgency that lives in villages is fed, hidden, warned and mourned by households, and the household is the one structure a state cannot enter, audit or dissolve by decree, because there is no office in it to close and no register to seize. Faced with a formation it could not reach by any ordinary means, the state moved the households themselves — physically, in a night, to Karaganda and Tomsk. Deportation of kin is what a floor does when the thing it needs to break is not held in any institution it can raid.

The 1947 documents also do something the corpus should note without inflating it: the Council of Ministers resolution that ordered the eviction stated what the evicted were for, which was to man the coal industry. The security requirement and the labour requirement are written into the same instrument, and neither is disguised as the other.

Reading the floor against the framework

The standing instruction for a Soviet acquisition is to count twice — the ordinary military floor, then the second floor applied to the population afterwards by category rather than by conduct, with numbers frequently fixed centrally before anyone in the territory has been assessed — and to state which was larger. That holds here without qualification, and the second floor is larger by any measure available. Two refinements follow, and only the second is a contribution rather than a confirmation.

The first is a matter of proportion. In the colonial cases the army lays the floor at the founding and the police maintain it thereafter, and the founding violence is the large number in the file. Here the ratio inverts so far that the categories almost cease to be comparable: three weeks of fighting at under a thousand dead on the taking side, against fourteen years of police operations whose casualty and removal figures run into the hundreds of thousands. A conquest can be almost free and the order that follows it almost unaffordable, and the two facts are not in tension, because what was being purchased in the second case was not territory.

The second is the finding. **The second floor's rule of liability is not one rule, and the difference between its forms tells you what the state had failed to reach.** Where the incoming order is clearing out the previous order's beneficiaries, the category is a status the previous state conferred, and the operation can be run off inherited paperwork: the settler's grant, the service list, the pension roll. Where the

incoming order is fighting something that survives inside families, the category becomes kinship, and the unit of removal becomes the household — not because the household has done anything, but because the household is where the thing being fought is kept and there is no other door into it. A state that begins deporting relatives has conceded, in the drafting of its own order, that the thing it is trying to destroy is not lodged in any institution it can close.

Which suggests a test that can be run on any counter-insurgent floor in the corpus. Read the categories in the removal orders in sequence. Where they name offices, ranks, grants and titles, the state is dismantling a rival apparatus and believes the apparatus is the thing. Where they name wives, sons and brothers, it has stopped believing that, and the shift is dateable — here, to a document of 22 August 1947, eight years after the frontier was crossed and seventeen months after the state had dissolved the Greek Catholic church at Lviv and handed its parishes to the Moscow Patriarchate.

A note on sources. The exact quotations here are two. The text of Molotov's radio address of 17 September 1939 is quoted from the translation printed in the New York Times of 18 September 1939, a contemporary public-domain reproduction; the Potemkin note is summarised rather than quoted from its Russian text, which I have not seen. Grzybowski's reply is given as a translation circulating in Polish historical publication and should be read as such rather than as a transcript. Abakumov's order No. 00430 of 22 August 1947 is described from the account published by the Ukrainian Ministry of Culture and the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance, and the phrase rendered as "in an illegal situation" is a translation of a translation, retained here because the categorical structure it describes is corroborated by the operation's execution but flagged accordingly; I have not seen the Russian text.

Everything else is paraphrased from reference and secondary works: the military figures from standard compilations of the September campaign, which disagree among themselves and are given as ranges above; the election and assembly procedure from the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, the Lviv Interactive project and Polish reference material; the prison massacres from Polish and Ukrainian site studies, the National WWII Museum's account, and the museum tallies at the Lontskoho Street site; the deportation figures from Polish, Ukrainian and Russian compilations named at the point of use; and the Operation West documentation from Ukrainian state and museum publications drawing on the Institute of National Remembrance.

Every mortality and deportation figure in this module is contested and most are contested along national lines. The 1940–41 deportation total is given as roughly 330,000–350,000 by NKVD records and as 800,000 to 1.2 million by Polish institutional estimates; the June 1941 prison killings as roughly 9,000 in Soviet internal tallies for the republic, 20,000–30,000 in much Polish writing, and 10,000–40,000 in the wider scholarship; insurgent dead across 1944–53 as

153,000 in Soviet documents and between about 56,000 and 99,000 in independent compilations. The Volhynia figures are the most contested in the case and are stated above as each side states them, with the institutions named; nothing here adjudicates between them, and the accounting of that killing is not attempted in this module.

Two limitations weaken this and should be visible. First, the entire Soviet side of the ledger derives from records made by the organisation being described, which had reason to under-record its own operations and to over-record its opponents'; the countervailing sources are memoir, émigré publication and post-Soviet national commissions, each with a position of its own, and I have used both without being able to weigh them properly. Second, this module rests on English- and Ukrainian-language secondary and reference material; the operational orders, the transport manifests and the oblast NKVD reports exist and have been published in Ukrainian document collections, and reading them directly would firm up almost every figure quoted here and would probably change some.

ALL-PEOPLE'S PROPERTY

Module 2: the settlement — what was taken, what was granted, what was granted a second time, and what a man was left holding once the grants had been cancelled.

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

Four declarations in the Great City Theatre

The terms of the settlement were fixed in Moscow on 1 October 1939. At that session the Politburo determined what the assembly to be convened at Lviv would be for, and the historians who have worked the minutes list its tasks in order: to confirm the transfer of the landlords' lands to the peasant committees, to settle the character of the power being created, to bring Western Ukraine into the Ukrainian SSR, and to nationalise the banks and large industry. Three weeks later the elections were held, and on 26 October the People's Assembly of Western Ukraine convened in the Great City Theatre at Lviv.

Over three days it adopted four declarations: on the establishment of Soviet power in Western Ukraine; on entry into the USSR and reunification with the Ukrainian SSR; on the confiscation of the lands of landlords, monasteries and senior state officials; and on the nationalisation of the banks and of large industry, which were declared **all-people's property**. The report on the land confiscation was delivered by Yustyn Shkalubyna, presented to the hall as a peasant of the village of Synevidsko Nyzhnie, and formerly of the underground of the Communist Party of Western Ukraine — the party whose programme had been the incorporation of these lands into Soviet Ukraine, and which the Comintern had dissolved the previous year on the ground that provocateurs had penetrated its leadership. Within days of the assembly rising, the NKVD arrested Kost Levytsky, who had formed the government of the West Ukrainian People's Republic in November 1918, together with the editor Ivan Nimchuk and a number of other Ukrainian and Polish politicians.

Four declarations, then, and only two of them concern property. The first thing to notice about the pair is that they run in opposite directions. The banks and the factories were nationalised — taken upward into an owner with no face. The land was confiscated and handed downward, to committees of villagers, to be divided among men who would work it themselves.

The grant

It was a real transfer, and it was large. By the end of 1939 some 2.753 million hectares of agricultural land had been confiscated from Polish landowners, from monasteries and from state officials. Roughly half of it was passed to peasant committees and distributed among landless and land-poor peasants; the remainder was held back as the basis for the collective and state farms that would come later.

The fiction under which this was done was restoration. The land was not represented as being given to anyone; it was represented as being returned to those from whom it had been taken, which places the acting state in the position of a repairer of an old wrong rather than a distributor of a present asset. In Galicia and Volhynia that claim had unusual traction, because it was, in the shape it was offered, close enough to true. The estates had been Polish and the recipients were Ukrainian; the interwar land reform had increased the Polish share of ownership in the borderlands and the minorities had said so at the time; the military settlers planted since 1920 held ground the villages remembered as theirs. A story about class and a story about nation pointed at the same field, and a peasant did not have to accept the first in order to act on the second.

What is missing from the transaction is the part every settlement in the corpus otherwise has. Nothing was owed in return. No service was stipulated, no rent, no political duty, no compliance clause; and no instrument passed. There is no deed, no register of new proprietors, no title a man could produce or a court could enforce. He was told the land had always been his and that an injustice had ended, and he ploughed it.

The category, and how it was filled

Alongside the division of land ran a division of persons, and the second is the one that governed lives.

The instruments are dated and their categories are itemised. A resolution of the USSR Council of People's Commissars of 2 March 1940 ordered the removal from Western Ukraine and Belorussia of the families of imprisoned prisoners of war and of former officers of the Polish army, of policemen, landowners, factory owners and officials, of participants in insurgent and counter-revolutionary organisations, and of those refugees from the German zone who had applied to leave the USSR and whom the German government had declined to take. Each of those is a status, and none of them is an act committed after September 1939.

Two features of the filling are worth setting out, because they show the categories being adjusted to the quantity required rather than the other way about.

The first is that a category could be widened. The *osadnik* began as a precise legal thing: a veteran granted land under the Polish Sejm's act of 17 December 1920 on the granting of land to soldiers of the Polish army, of whom, with their families, close to 300,000 lived in eastern Galicia and Volhynia by 1938. In the operation of 10 February 1940 the term was extended to cover any former Polish citizen who had acquired land after 1918 — including local peasants who had bought a plot in a neighbouring village. Of the roughly 140,000 people taken that night, something near 115,000 were Polish, about 10,000 Ukrainian and about 11,000 Belorussian. In the Gulag's own paperwork they were filed as special settlers, in a bracket labelled "osadniks and foresters."

The second is that a class the doctrine required could be produced by arithmetic. On the account of Ukrainian deportation researchers working from the archives, a decision of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian party on 24 March 1940 set land-holding limits for the new oblasts of Volyn, Drohobych, Lviv, Rivne and Ternopil: five hectares in suburban areas, seven in villages, ten to fifteen in mountain and marsh districts. Above the line a household was liable to dekulakisation or eviction. Something close to a third of the local peasantry held more than that. The number and the size of the resulting class are the same fact: whoever chose seven hectares chose how many kulaks Galicia contained.

That is the settlement's real currency. What a man held after 1939 was not a plot but an entry, and the entry decided what he could be issued, where he could live, whether his children could study, and whether a train would come for him. An entry differs from a title in two respects that matter structurally. It can be revoked by administrative act, with no forum in the way. And it descends: a grandfather's seven hectares reclassify a grandson who never saw them.

The exchange of persons

The largest movement of property in the whole period was not a transfer of land to anyone. It was a transfer of people away from land, and it was done by treaty.

On 9 September 1944, at Lublin, Nikita Khrushchev for the Ukrainian SSR and Edward Osóbka-Morawski for the Polish Committee of National Liberation signed agreements providing for the evacuation of the Ukrainian population from Poland and of Polish citizens from Ukraine. The communiqué announcing them, as reported by the American ambassador in Moscow within the week, stated that they had been signed in an atmosphere of friendly mutual understanding, that they covered Polish citizens who had held that citizenship up to 17 September 1939, and that *"the evacuation will be carried out on a completely voluntary basis."*

By the time the transfers ended in 1946, some 483,000 Ukrainians had been moved east into Soviet Ukraine and about 790,000 Poles west into Poland. The Ukrainian Institute of National Memory describes the first phase, from October to December 1944, as largely voluntary; through 1945 the Polish forces conducting it moved to arrests, village raids and killings, and where nationality was disputed the German occupation identity card was frequently used to settle it. In 1947 Operation Vistula dispersed a further 140,000 to 150,000 Ukrainians from the south-east of Poland into the formerly German lands in the west, after which the Ukrainian settlement of the Beskids and the Bieszczady effectively ceased to exist.

Set beside this the demographic fact that had been established in between. The Jews of Galicia and Volhynia, about a tenth of the pre-war population, had been murdered under German occupation. Lviv's population went from roughly 318,000 to about 450,000, with something like 100,000 incomers arriving from the east and settling, in the main, into apartments and houses whose occupants were dead or gone.

The confiscations of the insurgency years ran through the same mechanism. A directive of Beria of 31 March 1944, numbered 7129, ordered that all adult members of the families of convicted OUN members and of active insurgents, whether arrested or killed in engagements, be exiled to remote districts of Krasnoyarsk krai and the Omsk, Novosibirsk and Irkutsk regions, and that their property be confiscated under an NKVD order of 10 December 1940. In 1944 alone, 4,724 families — 12,762 people — were sent from the six western oblasts under it. Exile and expropriation are joined in a single clause, and neither is presented as the reason for the other.

And in March 1946 the property of the Greek Catholic church — on the church's own count some 2,387 parishes, with the seminaries, the monastic houses and the cathedral of St George at Lviv — passed to the Moscow Patriarchate. It is the one grant in the entire settlement that was made to an institution, and it held for forty-three years.

The recall

The land settlement was performed a second time before it was cancelled. A resolution of the Ukrainian government and party of 9 March 1945 concerned the progress of work on returning to the working peasants the lands taken from them by the German invaders in the western, Izmail and Chernivtsi oblasts. The grammar is the grammar of 1939: not distribution but return.

The cancellation began three years later, and it is dateable to the month. Collective farms held 9.6 per cent of the farms of the western oblasts on 1 January 1948; 49 per cent on 1 January 1949; 92.7 per cent on 1 July 1950; and by early 1951, on the figure given in a Soviet decree of that year, about 7,190 collectives held some 1.6 million peasant households, or 95.6 per cent of them. The drive opened in the autumn of 1948, eleven months after the operation of 21 October 1947 had removed 77,791 people from these same districts in a day, and accounts on both sides record that the deportation had made the drive easier: households that had watched the trains leave joined more readily.

The man who received five hectares from a peasant committee in the spring of 1940 signed them into a collective in 1949 or 1950. In a great many cases it was the same man, and in a great many cases it was the same field.

What a man was left holding

At the end of the process the arrangement stood as follows.

The state held the land, the banks, the factories, the mines, the forests and the churches. No person held any of it, and the declaration of 1939 had said as much in terms: all-people's property.

The collective farmer held three things. He held a household plot, worked in his own time, which he could not sell. He held membership of the collective, which was

not heritable and could be lost. And he held his record — the line on the form recording social origin, which determined a great deal and which he could not amend.

He did not hold a passport. Collective farmers stood outside the internal passport system created by the decree of 27 December 1932; the statute of 21 October 1953 confirmed that rural residents could not be absent from their place of residence for more than thirty days, and even for that required a permit from the village soviet. They were brought into the system only by the statute of 28 August 1974, which was implemented from 1976 and completed in the early 1980s. As late as 1967 some 58 million rural adults across the Soviet Union, about 37 per cent of the population, held no such document.

So the account closes with a peasant holding a plot he could not sell, a membership he could lose, a classification he could not amend, and a residence he could not lawfully leave.

Reading the settlement against the framework

The instruction for a Soviet acquisition is that the settlement will be made in a different currency, that its fiction will be restoration rather than vacancy, recognition or divisibility, and that what is really divided is persons rather than land. All three hold here, and the categorical instruments quoted above are as clear an instance as the corpus is likely to find. But the case adds something to the fiction that the addendum states and does not explain, and the addition is this module's return.

Restoration is the only one of the settlement fictions that does not manufacture a proprietor, and that is precisely why it is the only one that can be run twice and then reversed.

Consider what the other three leave behind. A vacancy declaration produces freeholds and leases; a recognition produces confirmed estates; a divisibility statute produces individual shares that can be sold. Each ends with a named person holding an instrument, and the instrument is the point — it binds him to the order that issued it, because the order is now the only guarantor of a thing he could otherwise lose. That binding is the whole purpose, and it is why a conqueror pays the legislative cost of manufacturing property where none existed.

A restoration produces none of that. It ends with a man on a field he has been told was always his, holding nothing: no deed, no entry in a register, no consideration paid,

nothing that could be produced in a forum and nothing a forum exists to hear. He has been given a fact about the past rather than a right in the present. And a fact about the past can be asserted again whenever it is useful — in 1939 against Polish landlords, in 1945 against German occupiers — and withdrawn without anything having to be revoked, because there was never an instrument to revoke. When the collectives came in 1948 nothing had to be expropriated in law. The land had never stopped being all-people's property; only the arrangement for working it changed.

Which is the same finding seen from the other side, and worth stating in the terms the framework uses for the colonial case. There the conqueror's statute converts a relation between persons into a transferable thing, because his metropole believes in law and a thing can be lawfully bought where a relation cannot. Here the conversion runs in both directions at once. **Land was converted from a thing into a relation** — from an object held against the world into a use-right allocated by an office and lapsing with the allocation. **And persons were converted from relations into things** — from a bundle of kin, parish and village into a unit in a class that could be counted, given a district quota, and loaded onto a train. The instrument is the same instrument and the purpose is the same purpose: to render the country movable. What differs is what the taker needs to be able to move. A settler state needs alienable land, because the buyer is a private man. A state that intends to administer everything needs alienable people, because the mover is itself.

That suggests a test which can be run on any settlement in the corpus, and which does not require knowing anything about the doctrine involved. Ask what the recipient is left holding that he could take into a room and show to somebody. Where the answer is a document, the settlement has bound him and is expensive to undo. Where the answer is a story, it has bought him, and the purchase has a term.

A note on sources. One document is quoted here exactly: the communiqué on the Lublin agreements of 9 September 1944, in the English text reported by the American ambassador in Moscow on 14 September 1944 and printed in the United States diplomatic papers for that year, a public-domain government publication. The phrase rendered as "all-people's property" is the standard Ukrainian description of the fourth declaration of 27 October 1939 (*загальнонародна власність*) and is given here in translation rather than from the declaration's own text, which I have not read. Beria's directive No. 7129 of 31 March 1944 is paraphrased closely from a Ukrainian-language reproduction of its operative sentence and should be treated as a translation at one remove, not as the Russian text.

Everything else is paraphrased and credited at the point of use: the Politburo decision of 1 October 1939 from the work of the historians Volodymyr Baran and Vasyl Tokarsky as reported in Ukrainian publication; the assembly's proceedings and Shkalubyna's report from Ukrainian press and local-history sources; the land confiscation figure of 2.753 million hectares from a legal survey of restitution claims which cites it without giving its archival origin; the deportation categories from the Ukrainian *Encyclopedia of Modern Ukraine* and from the deportation research project at deportation.org.ua; the population transfer figures from academic accounts of the 1944–46 exchanges and from the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory; and the collectivisation series from the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* and from scholarship on the 1948–51 campaign.

Two figures are weaker than the rest and are flagged rather than relied upon. The land ceilings attributed to the Ukrainian party's Central Committee decision of 24 March 1940 — five, seven and ten to fifteen hectares — rest on a single Ukrainian source citing archival work, and I have not corroborated them elsewhere; the argument they support does not depend on the exact figures, but the figures themselves should be verified before they are quoted onward. The claim that close to a third of local peasants held above those limits comes from the same source. Similarly, the count of 2,387 Greek Catholic parishes transferred in 1946 is the church's own, and an interested party's inventory of what it lost should be read as such.

Contested figures are given as ranges. The Ukrainians moved east in 1944–46 are given as 480,000 to 483,000 and the Poles moved west as about 790,000, with wider figures in circulation for the whole Polish–Soviet border; Operation Vistula is given at 140,000 to 150,000, with some accounts saying 200,000. The 10 February 1940 wave is given at about 140,000, though figures up to 220,000 appear.

Finally, a gap. This module reconstructs the settlement from decrees, orders and aggregate figures, which is to say from the paperwork of the party that made it. What a peasant committee actually did in a particular village in the spring of 1940 — who sat on it, whose land it divided, and whether the division held — exists in oblast archives and in memoir, and I have not reached it. The distribution figures above are therefore what the state recorded distributing, not necessarily what anyone received.

THE ONLY TRUE WAY

Module 3: the robe — a legitimating claim addressed to the conquered rather than to the metropole, substantially true, and what a claim of that kind costs the state that makes it.

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

Addressed to the conquered

The story told over this conquest was told to the people conquered, about themselves, in their own language, and it was told from the first morning.

Molotov's broadcast of 17 September 1939 did not explain the crossing to a domestic public with an interest in the fate of distant strangers. It explained it to the strangers. The Soviet government could not remain indifferent to the fate of its blood brothers, the Ukrainians and Byelorussians inhabiting Poland, *"who even formerly were without rights and who now have been abandoned entirely to their fate,"* and it therefore deemed it a sacred duty to extend the hand of assistance to them. Five weeks later the assembly at Lviv adopted a declaration on the reunification of Western Ukraine with the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The operative word throughout was *vozz'ednannia* — reunification — and it names a nation, not a class.

This is the reverse of what the collection's other conquests do. A colonial legitimating story is cut for the audience at home whose belief funds the venture and whose law supplies the forms of ownership, and it is almost entirely wasted on the people underneath, whose belief the arrangement does not require. Here there was no second story for home, because the doctrine that governed at home already forbade the vocabulary a colonial story is made of. A state whose founding claim was that imperialism belonged to capitalism and had been abolished could not describe an acquisition as an acquisition, in public or in a file. What went out over the radio and what went into the security organs' internal traffic were written in the same words.

And the claim was, in the shape it was offered, substantially true. This is the part that makes it a harder object to handle than a lie would be.

Galicia had not been inside a Ukrainian state except for nine months in 1918 and 1919. Warsaw had refused a Ukrainian university and given the Lviv chair of Ruthenian language, when it opened one in 1928, to a Polish linguist. It had cut Galicia off from Volhynia by an internal administrative line to stop Ukrainian publications and institutions moving north. It had sent police and cavalry into sixteen counties in the autumn of 1930 and made villages feed the horses. In 1938 it had pulled down over a hundred Orthodox church buildings in the Chełm region and Podlasie and recommended that its officials stop using the words *Ukraine* and *Ukrainian*. Against that record, a state arriving to say that the Ukrainian lands were being made one, inside a republic bearing the nation's name, was saying something a Galician villager could check against his own life.

What it cost to say

Force does not pay for what it does not need, so the measure of a claim of this kind is what the order spent on the conquered's own language and institutions when nothing obliged it to spend anything. Here the spending began at once and is dateable to the week.

The Polish university at Lviv — Jan Kazimierz University, one of the largest in the Second Republic — was renamed Lviv State University on 1 December 1939, and by a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR of 8 January 1940 it was named for Ivan Franko. Its elected rector was dismissed; a party historian, Mykhailo Marchenko, was sent from Kyiv to replace him, with a group of some forty-five Soviet Ukrainian scholars from Kyiv and Kharkiv. The theology faculty was abolished and the medical faculty hived off into a separate institute. New chairs were established in October 1939, and the list is worth reading in full because both halves of the programme are in it: the history of Marxism-Leninism, dialectical and historical materialism, political economy, the history of the USSR — and Ukrainian language, Ukrainian literature, and the history of Ukraine. Instruction went over to Ukrainian. In 1940–41 the university had 2,230 students, of whom Ukrainians were 35.6 per cent.

Set that against what it replaced. Ukrainians had boycotted the Polish university until 1925 over the refusal to create a Ukrainian one; by 1925 Greek Catholics were 14

per cent of its students against 50 per cent Poles and 35 per cent Jews; the only legal Ukrainian institution of higher learning in interwar Poland was the Greek Catholic Theological Academy, founded in 1928. Within four months of the invasion, a university that had refused a Ukrainian chair for twenty years was teaching in Ukrainian and named for a Ukrainian poet.

The rest of the programme ran the same way. A branch of the republican Institute of Linguistics opened at Lviv in 1940. The four Galician scholars elected full members of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in 1929, and stripped of the title in 1934 during the repressions in Soviet Ukraine, had their academician titles restored in 1939. Ukrainian became the language of administration in a province where Polish had been. Publishing, theatre and the press were funded on a scale the interwar societies had never approached, and were funded from the budget rather than from subscriptions.

No European colonial administration in this collection spent anything comparable on the conquered's nationhood. That has to be recorded plainly, because a study that omits it has misdescribed the case.

And what it required to be destroyed

The same programme abolished every Ukrainian body in the province that the state did not own.

The Shevchenko Scientific Society had been founded at Lviv in 1873 and had functioned since 1892 as the unofficial Ukrainian academy of sciences — under Mykhailo Hrushevsky from 1897 to 1913, and afterwards under a succession of Galician scholars. Between 1892 and 1939 it published 591 volumes, among them 150 volumes of its *Zapysky*. Its library held over 300,000 volumes by 1939; it ran museums of history, ethnography, natural science and military history, an institute of psychology, and a bacteriological-chemical institute; it had lost its state subsidy under Poland and carried on by subscription. In 1940 the Soviet authorities compelled it to dissolve. Its property was expropriated and its assets were transferred to the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR.

Prosvita, which had run the reading rooms, went. Ridna Shkola, the Ukrainian schools society, which had 2,074 branches and 105,000 members in 1939, went. The audit union of Ukrainian cooperatives went. In March 1946 the Greek Catholic

church, with its seminaries and some two and a half thousand parishes, went to the Moscow Patriarchate.

In no case was the function withdrawn. There were still Ukrainian scholars, Ukrainian schools, Ukrainian reading rooms, Ukrainian cooperatives and Ukrainian churches in Galicia in 1950, and there were more of some of them than there had been in 1938. What changed in every case was who owned them. The claim required Ukrainian institutions and forbade Ukrainian institutions that belonged to Ukrainians.

One man stands at the junction of the two halves. Kyrylo Studynsky had been removed from his chair at Lviv University by the Polish authorities after 1919, along with other Ukrainian professors. He headed the Shevchenko Scientific Society from 1925 to 1931. He was elected a full member of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in 1929 and stripped of the title in 1934; it was restored to him in 1939. In October of that year he chaired the People's Assembly of Western Ukraine and led the delegation that carried its request to Moscow, and in 1940 he sat as a deputy in the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, using the position, on the account of those who knew him, to intervene for Ukrainians facing arrest. The society he had led was dissolved that same year. In June 1941, during the evacuation of Lviv, he was taken away, and the circumstances of his death are not established. He was seventy-two.

What could not be said

A claim that is largely true forecloses descriptions that a lie would not. Three foreclosures follow directly from this one, and all three cluster where the claim is strongest.

The opponent could not be Ukrainian. A state that has just reunified the Ukrainian people cannot describe itself as fighting Ukrainians. So the insurgents of 1944 to 1953 — men from these villages, in these forests, fighting for a Ukrainian state — appear in the record as Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists, as Ukrainian-German nationalists, and as *banderivtsi*, a term whose Soviet usage widened from the followers of one faction leader to the wartime underground, then to all Ukrainian nationalists, and finally to anyone in Ukraine who objected to Soviet nationality policy. The charge was never nationalism as such, which the order could hardly indict; it was the wrong kind of nationalism, and the qualifier did all the work. Where a colonial administration could call its opponents savages or fanatics, this one had to call them foreign.

The Ukrainian past could not be Ukrainian either. From 1946 the republican ideological apparatus opened a campaign against the vestiges of bourgeois nationalism in the arts and scholarship; through 1947 and into 1948 writers, composers and historians were required to give up what was described as a harmful preoccupation with the distant Ukrainian past in favour of contemporary Soviet themes. Lazar Kaganovich arrived as first secretary of the Ukrainian party in March 1947 to press it, and left in December. Serhy Yekelchyk's reading of the episode argues that the campaign largely failed to discipline the historians, and that the received picture of a terrorised profession submitting to an all-powerful state does not survive the archives; that qualification belongs in the record. But the shape is not in dispute. The state that had made the Ukrainian nation whole sent its most senior available troubleshooter to Kyiv to superintend what Ukrainian historians and poets were permitted to write about the Ukrainian past.

And the acquisition could not be described as an acquisition. There is no Soviet word for what happened in September 1939 other than reunification and liberation. The category that would make the event legible — a state took a territory — was unavailable in the only vocabulary the state possessed.

The one document with no doctrine in it

There is a single exception, and it is instructive because of what was done with it.

The secret additional protocol signed in Moscow on 23 August 1939 contains no doctrine at all. It has no liberation in it, no brothers, no nationhood, no historical wrong being righted. It has two governments, three rivers and a line, and a clause noting that whether an independent Polish state should be maintained can only be determined in the course of further political developments. It is written in the ordinary language of a partition, and it is the only text in the whole acquisition that is.

The Soviet Union denied that it existed for fifty years, and acknowledged it only in 1989.

That is worth setting beside what the internal traffic otherwise looks like. The security organs did not speak among themselves in the language of empire and then perform liberation in public; they wrote about Vatican agency, nationalist elements, and hostile aspirations in their own classified files, in the same doctrinal vocabulary as the newspapers. The robe was not something taken off in private. The one document

that could not be written in doctrinal language at all was therefore not concealed for the ordinary reason — that it was embarrassing — but for a stronger one: it had no available description.

The mature form

By the 1950s the claim had been re-anchored, and the shift is worth dating because it changes what the claim asserts.

In 1954 the tercentenary of the Pereiaslav agreement of 1654 was celebrated across the Union. The all-union Central Committee issued thirteen theses on the anniversary, arguing the irreversibility of the union of the two peoples. In the translation given by Orest Subtelny, they hold that *"the experience of history has shown that the way of fraternal union and alliance chosen by the Russians and Ukrainians was the only true way,"* that the union of the two great Slavic peoples multiplied their strength against external foes, serf owners, the bourgeoisie, tsarism and capitalist slavery, and that the unshakeable friendship of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples had grown and strengthened in that struggle. A three-volume documentary collection, *The Reunification of Ukraine with Russia*, had been published in Moscow the previous year, prepared jointly by the history institutes of the all-union and Ukrainian academies and the Ukrainian archives, containing 747 documents from 1620 to 1654. On 19 February 1954 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet decreed the transfer of the Crimean oblast from the Russian republic to the Ukrainian SSR, citing the economic commonalities, territorial closeness and cultural links between the peninsula and Ukraine; the announcement ran to eight lines in *Pravda* on 27 February, and several speakers in the Presidium, including its chairman Voroshilov, referred to the tercentenary.

The word is still *vozz'ednannia*, but its object has changed. In 1939 it named the joining of the Ukrainian lands to one another. In 1954 it names the joining of Ukraine to Russia, and the anniversary being kept is not 1939 but 1654. A claim that had been about the completion of a nation had become a claim about the permanence of a relationship, and the second is a weaker instrument in Galicia than the first, because a Galician had no share in 1654 and knew it.

Reading the robe against the framework

The standing expectation for a colonial case is that the legitimating story is cut for the metropole whose belief pays for the venture, with little addressed to the conquered, and that the diagnostic question is therefore what the story conceals from a distant public. The Soviet addendum inverts that: here the story is addressed to the conquered directly, it is not cynicism, and the diagnostic becomes what the order spent on the conquered's own institutions when under no compulsion, followed by the harder question of what the claim made unsayable. Both halves hold in this case, and the expenditures and the foreclosures are as clearly documented as the corpus is likely to get.

What the case adds is a mechanism the addendum names without explaining, and it is this module's return.

A legitimating claim addressed to the conquered, and substantially true, is not cheaper than a false one addressed to the metropole. It is far more expensive, because it can only be sustained by performance, and the performance has to be built out of the conquered's own institutions — after which the institutions are there, and they are not the state's to unmake.

A claim made to a distant audience is discharged by saying it. Nothing has to exist in the colony for a metropolitan public to believe that civilisation is being carried; the belief is maintained by newspapers at home, and the ground can be left as it is. A claim made to the people on the ground cannot be discharged that way, because they can check it out of the window. Saying that the Ukrainian nation had been made whole obliged the state to produce a Ukrainian university, a Ukrainian academy, a Ukrainian publishing apparatus, a Ukrainian language of administration and a republic with a name — and to go on producing them, annually, in front of the people best placed to notice if it stopped. That is the price, and it was paid in full.

The mechanism by which the payment was made survivable is the second half of the finding, and it is general enough to test elsewhere. **The claim permitted the function and forbade the ownership.** Every Ukrainian activity that the interwar societies had performed continued, and most were enlarged; not one of the bodies that had performed them survived. Scholarship passed from a subscription society to a state academy, schooling from a membership organisation to a ministry, the reading rooms from Prosvita to the House of Culture, the parishes from Rome to Moscow. The

nation was granted everything except the ownership of anything, and because the grant was real the claim was not falsified by the confiscation — it was fulfilled by it.

Which yields a test that can be run on any order making a national claim about a population it governs. Do not ask whether the national institutions exist; under a claim of this kind they will, and they may be better funded than they were before. Ask who may found one. Where the answer is that the state alone may found them, the claim is being performed rather than kept, and the difference will not be visible in any budget line — it will be visible only at the moment somebody tries to start something, and in the dates on which the old societies were dissolved.

There is a corollary the case supplies and cannot yet test. Institutions built to perform a claim are still institutions. A university, an academy, a language of administration and a republic with a foreign ministry are apparatus, and apparatus outlasts the reason it was built for. Whether the vessel constructed to hold this claim proved available, half a century later, to hold a different one is a question the evidence assembled here cannot answer and the events of 1990 can.

A note on sources. Three passages are quoted here rather than paraphrased. Molotov's broadcast of 17 September 1939 is quoted from the translation printed in the New York Times of 18 September 1939, a contemporary public-domain reproduction. The sentence from the thirteen theses of 1954 is quoted from Orest Subtelny's *Ukraine: A History*, which renders it in English; it is therefore a translation given by a modern scholar and not the Russian text, which I have not seen, and it should be cited as such rather than as the theses themselves. The eight-line Crimea decree of 19 February 1954 is described from a scholarly account summarising the *Pravda* text of 27 February; its operative phrase about economic commonalities, territorial closeness and cultural links is given in that account's wording.

Everything else is paraphrased and credited at the point of use. The Lviv University measures — the renaming of 1 December 1939, the decree of 8 January 1940, the new chairs, Marchenko's appointment, the group of scholars from Kyiv and Kharkiv, and the 1940–41 enrolment figures — come from the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, the university's own institutional history and the Lviv Interactive project; the interwar comparison, including the 1925 confessional breakdown of students and the 1928 chair of Ruthenian, from the same encyclopaedia. The Shevchenko Scientific Society's output, library, museums and dissolution are from the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* and from the society's own historical accounts, which are the fullest available and are written by the body describing its own suppression. Ridna Shkola's branch and membership figures are from the same encyclopaedia. Studynsky's career and disappearance are from its biographical entry. The 1946–48 ideological campaign is from a summary of the period at the

Michigan State Soviet history project and from Serhy Yekelchyk's article on Kaganovich and the Ukrainian historians, whose revisionist conclusion I have reported rather than adopted.

Two cautions. First, the sources on the destroyed societies are overwhelmingly written by the societies themselves or by their successors in emigration, and an interested party's account of what it lost will tend to be the fullest and the least sceptical account available; where I have been able to check a figure against a neutral reference I have, and where I have not I have said so. The Shevchenko Society's own history, for instance, gives the year of its dissolution as 1939, other accounts as 1940, and I have followed the 1940 date used by the encyclopaedia and by Britannica while noting the discrepancy. Second, this module makes a claim about relative expenditure — that no European colonial administration in this collection spent comparably on the conquered's own institutions — which rests on the other studies in the corpus rather than on any source cited here, and which a reader is entitled to test against them.

A gap remains at the centre. What ordinary people in Galicia and Volhynia made of the claim between 1939 and 1941, as against what they said about it later under a different regime or in emigration, is the one thing this module most needs and the one thing hardest to reach. The diaries, the parish records and the NKVD's own reports on popular mood exist in Ukrainian archives and are the correct evidence for it; I have worked instead from what the state did, which tells you what the state thought it had to pay for, and not from what anyone believed.

A DISH, A GOBLET, A JEWELLERY BOX

Module 4: formation — what the order offered in place of the belief it found, what it attacked without offering anything in place, and what happened in the forty-three years between the two.

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

What the doctrine forbade

The doctrine under which this was done had already ruled on it, in a text every party library held.

In May 1909, in *Proletary*, Lenin set out the position of a workers' party on religion. He is not equivocal about the materialism: religion is the opium of the people, that dictum of Marx's is the corner-stone of the whole outlook, and Marxism regards every religious organisation as an instrument of bourgeois reaction. But he then spends the greater part of the article warning against the thing that would be done in Galicia thirty-six years later, and he does it by quoting Engels.

Commenting in 1874 on the manifesto of the Blanquist Communards exiled in London, *"Engels called their vociferous proclamation of war on religion a piece of stupidity, and stated that such a declaration of war was the best way to revive interest in religion and to prevent it from really dying out."* And in *Anti-Dühring* three years later, against Dühring's proposal that religion should be prohibited in a socialist society, Engels answered that to declare such a war is to *"out-Bismarck Bismarck"* — which Lenin glosses for his readers as the folly of the *Kulturkampf*, *"the struggle Bismarck waged in the 1870s against the German Catholic party, the 'Centre' party, by means of a police persecution of Catholicism."* By that struggle, Lenin writes, *"Bismarck only stimulated the militant clericalism of the Catholics, and only injured the work of real culture, because he gave prominence to religious divisions rather than political divisions."*

The conclusion is that a workers' party must work patiently at organising and educating, which will lead to the dying out of religion, *"and not throw itself into the gamble of a political war on religion."*

A police persecution of a Catholic church, by a state, producing militant clericalism: the act, the agent and the outcome are all named, in the canon, forty years before the state existed. What happened at Lviv in 1946 is the specific case Lenin used as his warning, carried out by the party he was writing for.

Substitution

Set that aside for the moment, because the other half of the programme was very large and it largely worked, and a study that omits it has described a different case.

What the order offered in place of the formation it found was a complete one, and it was offered in Ukrainian. Schooling was made universal and free and taught in the language of the village rather than the language of the administration, which reversed the arrangement a Galician had lived under since 1772. The Polish university at Lviv became a Ukrainian-language university within four months and was named for Ivan Franko. A branch of the republican Institute of Linguistics opened there in 1940. Publishing, theatre and the press were funded from the budget at a level no subscription society had ever reached. And behind all of it stood the offer that mattered most to a household with four sons and seven hectares: a career open to a peasant's child, all the way up, without a fee, a patron or a confession.

The evidence that this took is not in any Soviet publication. It is in the biographies of the people who later opposed the order.

What the substitution produced

Ivan Dziuba was born in 1931 in the Donetsk region, into a family displaced by the famine of 1932–33. He grew up in a Russified environment, gave his nationality as Russian, spoke mainly Russian, and studied Russian philology at the Donetsk Pedagogical Institute. He is, as he himself put it, a product of the system, a man who organically grew out of it and never felt like its enemy, wanting only to bring it into line with its own ideal.

In August and September 1965 the security organs arrested some thirty members of the young Ukrainian intelligentsia in Kyiv, Lviv, Lutsk, Ivano-Frankivsk and Ternopil; wider counts put the total near a hundred. On 4 September, at the Kyiv premiere of Paradzhanov's *Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors*, Dziuba, the poet Vasyl Stus and the journalist Viacheslav Chornovil stood up in the cinema and told the audience what was happening. Between September and December, Dziuba wrote *Internationalism or Russification?* and sent it in December 1965 to Petro Shelest, first secretary of the Ukrainian party, and to Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, chairman of the republic's Council of Ministers, as a document for consideration.

The argument is made entirely from inside the doctrine. Dziuba does not attack Leninist nationality policy; he quotes it, at length, against the practice, and shows the state departing from principles it continued to profess. Shelest's response was to have the text circulated to the regional first secretaries so that they would know the arguments they were facing. It went into samizdat, was translated, and was published abroad in 1968. In 1972 Dziuba was expelled from the Writers' Union and arrested; the sentence is given as five years, and he was released after roughly eighteen months, having recanted — a fact that belongs in the record beside the rest of it.

This is the third movement the pattern predicts and it is present here as clearly as anywhere in the corpus. The formation the order built produced, within one generation, a class of people who were fluent in it, who took its own claims seriously enough to test them, and who were then imprisoned for the test. Nothing about Dziuba is imaginable without the Soviet school. He is what the substitution succeeded in making.

Assault

Against that, the other half.

The Greek Catholic church at the end of the war held, on the counts available, somewhere above two thousand parishes — the church's own figure for 1944 is 2,387, other accounts give over 3,000 parishes and 4,440 church buildings — with five seminaries, some 127 monastic houses, and between three and a half and four million faithful. It was, in a province where the state had never reached into the village, the institution that had reached into every one.

The bishops were arrested on the night of 11–12 April 1945. Fifty more priests followed by 25 April. An Initiative Group under Havryil Kostelnyk was constituted to conduct a reunion with the Russian Orthodox Church, and by March 1946 had gathered the signatures of somewhere between 986 and 997 of the roughly 1,270 Greek Catholic priests then present in Galicia. On 8–10 March 1946 a sobor in Lviv, attended by 216 clergy and 19 lay delegates and by no bishop of the church it was dissolving, abolished the Union of Brest and returned the metropolitanate to Moscow. In 1945 and 1946 alone, on the church's own reckoning, more than 800 Greek Catholic priests were arrested and sentenced to terms of ten to twenty-five years, into Vorkuta, Inta, Karaganda, Norilsk, Kolyma and Mordovia.

Note precisely what was and was not replaced. The building stayed, the iconostasis stayed, the Slavonic stayed, the Julian calendar stayed, and in most villages the priest at the altar the following Sunday was the same man who had been there the Sunday before — he had signed. Almost nothing a parishioner did changed. What changed was the name commemorated in the litany.

That is exactly what had been done in Volhynia in 1839, and there it had worked so completely that a century later nobody in Volhynia experienced their Orthodoxy as anything but their own. It did not work in 1946, and the reason is not that Galicians were more devout. It is that in 1839 the receiving church was the empire's own established faith at the height of its prestige, and in 1946 the receiving church was itself a supervised body, administered through a state council on the affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church whose chairman had drafted the secret instruction on the liquidation that Stalin approved on 15 March 1945. The substitute was visibly not a substitute. A man could see that he was not being transferred from one church to another but from a church to an antechamber.

One room

What survived, survived by getting smaller.

Vasyl Velychkovsky, a Redemptorist, served ten years in the Vorkuta camps and came out in 1955. From that year until his second arrest in 1969 he lived in a one-room flat in Lviv: a bed, a nightstand, an armoire, a breakfast table, a bookshelf, and a low dresser with some ordinary household things on top — a shallow dish, a goblet, a

jewellery box. Those were the paten, the chalice and the tabernacle. A relative in Croatia sent parcels with raisins in them, which he soaked to make wine.

In that room he heard confessions, said the liturgy, received back into the church priests who had signed in 1946, organised religious sisters into small house communities that became the catechists of the laity, prepared men for ordination and had them ordained. The security organs' own file describes him, in the Sectoral State Archive of the Ukrainian security service, as a kind of fanatic obsessed with the idea of reviving the Uniate church in Ukraine, not susceptible to influence, and given to provocative actions when cornered.

The line was kept. In 1963, in a Moscow hotel room, on his way out of the Soviet Union into exile in Rome after eighteen years in the camps, Metropolitan Josyf Slipyj consecrated Velychkovsky archbishop and handed him responsibility for the catacomb church. On 2 July 1964, expecting his own arrest, Velychkovsky consecrated a fellow Redemptorist, Volodymyr Sterniuk, whose identity was then kept secret and who did not function publicly as a bishop for twenty-five years. Others followed — Nykanor Deyneha in February 1972, who ran a clandestine seminary from the Studite house; Pavlo Vasylyk on 1 May 1974, consecrated by a single clandestine consecrator, Yosafat Fedoryk. Between 1945 and 1989 the church counts fifteen bishops ordained in secret.

The state could raid a cathedral, and did. It could arrest an episcopate in a night, and did. What it could not do was enter every kitchen in Galicia, and a church whose cathedral is a dresser and whose seminary is a breakfast table is a church that fits inside the one unit the state has no instrument for.

The seventeenth of September

The re-emergence was staged, and the date was chosen.

On 4 August 1987 twenty-three priests and faithful under Bishop Pavlo Vasylyk declared publicly that the church was leaving the underground. A Committee for the Defence of the Rights of the Ukrainian Catholic Church formed under Ivan Hel, a former political prisoner, and collected some 120,000 signatures over 1988 and 1989. Open-air liturgies began, small at first and then large: thousands at Hrushiv and Zarvanytsia for the millennium of the baptism of Rus' in July 1988. In May 1989 Sterniuk, three bishops and a group of priests sent an open letter to Gorbachev

demanding legalisation, and bishops sat down to a chain hunger strike on the Arbat in Moscow.

Then, on 17 September 1989, they marched through Lviv to St George's cathedral. The Washington Post's correspondent reported more than 150,000; other accounts and the Soviet authorities' own give close to 100,000. The marchers carried crosses and blue-and-yellow flags that were still illegal. Ivan Hel, looking at the crowd, said that the authorities had long insisted there were not very many Ukrainian Catholics, that this showed there were a lot of them, and that it was a complete moral victory.

The date was the fiftieth anniversary of the crossing of the frontier.

On 29 October a priest in the Church of the Transfiguration in Lviv commemorated the Pope instead of the Patriarch of Moscow, and the parish went over; others followed across Galicia within weeks. On 26 November more than 100,000 demonstrated for the return of St George's. On 28 November the Council for Religious Affairs issued the statement permitting Greek Catholic communities to register, and on 1 December Gorbachev met John Paul II in Rome. By March 1992 more than a thousand parishes in the Lviv eparchy and 530 in Ivano-Frankivsk had declared themselves Ukrainian Catholic, with over a thousand priests — among them 350 who had been serving as Russian Orthodox — 700 nuns and 400 seminarians.

Forty-three years after the dissolution, and roughly two years after the first parish changed the name in its litany, something over fifteen hundred parishes had declared — against the twenty-three hundred or more that had been dissolved.

Reading formation against the framework

The instruction for a Soviet case is to separate substitution from assault, because they produce opposite results and both are present. That holds exactly. The substitution was real, large, and successful on its own terms — it made Dziuba, and Dziuba is not a small thing to have made. The assault produced the opposite of its object. Both halves are in the record and neither cancels the other.

The finding this case returns concerns the inherited claim that a formation is stored not in its institution but in households. That claim is half right, and the half that is wrong is the more useful half.

Households did not preserve the Greek Catholic church on their own, and could not have. What a household transmits is practice: a fast, a name-day, a way of crossing

oneself, an account of what happens at a graveside. What a household cannot transmit is **allegiance**, because allegiance to this church consisted in the commemoration of a particular name in a liturgy said by a man ordained by a bishop in an unbroken line, and no grandmother can ordain. That is the same variable the earlier operation identified from the other side: in 1839 every practice stayed in place and only the allegiance moved, and the transfer took, because the allegiance was the one component that had never lived in the household to begin with. It lived in a chancery, and a chancery can be moved by moving a chancery.

What defeated the same operation in 1946 was that the chancery survived — not intact, but alive. Fifteen consecrations in forty-four years is not an institution in any ordinary sense; it is the thinnest thread by which one can be said to continue. It was enough. So:

A formation survives an assault to the extent that its institution can be shrunk to the size of a household without ceasing to be itself. The variable is not where the belief is stored but how small the carrying institution can get and still function.

This is testable and it discriminates. Ask, of any institution under assault, what the minimum apparatus for its reproduction actually is. Where the answer is a building, a landed endowment, a public liturgy, a printing house, a bureaucracy or a quorum, the state can reach all of it, and destroying the institution destroys the succession even where the practice continues in private — after which the belief persists as custom and comes back, if it comes back, as something without a line and without a leadership, taking decades to become anything organised. Where the answer is two men and ten minutes, the state cannot reach it at any price short of killing every candidate, and the institution goes on existing at a scale below the resolution of any instrument the state owns.

And here the specification was written in 1596, for entirely unrelated reasons. The terms on which the Ruthenian bishops came into union with Rome preserved the Eastern rite, the Church Slavonic liturgy, a married parish clergy and the local ordination of clergy. Those clauses were negotiated to protect a church's dignity against Latinisation. Three and a half centuries later they turn out to be survival specifications: a rite that needs no building, a clergy that needs no celibate institution to reproduce itself, a liturgy in a language the household already used, and an ordination performable in a rented room by one man on another. The settlement that made the

church made it portable, and nobody who signed at Brest could have known that this was the clause that mattered.

One qualification, stated because it complicates the finding rather than because it can be resolved. Among the priests who declared for the church in 1990 and 1991 were about 350 men who had spent their careers as Russian Orthodox clergy. Their return is evidence that the reunion of 1946 had converted the register and not the men — but it is also evidence that what came back was carried in a clerical estate rather than in the households of the laity, and a fuller account would have to weigh how much of the 1989 crowd was formed by grandmothers and how much by priests who had never really left. I have not been able to weigh it.

Finally, the timing. The prediction was that where an assaulted formation has carriers abroad — a metropolitan in Rome, a diaspora, a Vatican — its conversion into a national flag should be immediate rather than deferred. That is not quite what the record shows. The conversion was not immediate: for forty years there was nowhere to fly the flag, and the church's national meaning was carried privately, as it would have been anywhere. What the carriers changed was not the onset but the **speed once a channel opened**. From the first public declaration in August 1987 to legal registration was twenty-eight months, and from the first parish changing its commemoration in October 1989 to a thousand parishes was about two years. A formation with an external hierarchy does not convert sooner. It converts faster, and it converts as an organisation rather than as a mood.

A note on sources. The passages from Lenin are quoted exactly, from the English translation of "The Attitude of the Workers' Party to Religion" (*Proletary*, No. 45, 13 May 1909) published in the *Collected Works*, volume 15, and available in the public domain through the Marxists Internet Archive; the Engels formulations inside them — the "piece of stupidity", the best way to revive interest in religion, and "out-Bismarck Bismarck" — are Lenin's renderings of Engels's 1874 commentary on the Blanquist manifesto and of *Anti-Dühring*, and are quoted here as Lenin gives them rather than from Engels's own texts, which I have not consulted. The security service's characterisation of Velychkovsky is quoted from a scholarly article citing the Sectoral State Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine, fond 65, case S-9113, volume 21; I have not seen the file. Ivan Hel's remark at the demonstration of 17 September 1989 is quoted from the Washington Post's report of 18 September 1989. Dziuba's description of himself is given from a translation in Ukrainian online publication and should be read as a rendering rather than as his exact Ukrainian.

Everything else is paraphrased and credited at the point of use. The chronology of the liquidation and the underground comes from the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, from a study of the clandestine clergy published in *Studies in Church History*, from a peer-reviewed article on the underground church and the Second Vatican Council which works from the Ukrainian security-service archive, and from the church's own historical materials. Dziuba's case is from the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* and Ukrainian human-rights publication. The 1989 sequence is from the church's own account, from the Religious Information Service of Ukraine, and from contemporary Western press.

Three cautions, and they bear on the module's central argument. First, almost all the detail on the underground comes from the church, from its diaspora, or from an institute founded to record its survival, and a body writing the history of its own endurance is not a neutral witness to how much endurance there was; the counterweight I have used is the security service's own files as quoted in scholarship, which are the only sources here with an interest in the opposite direction. Second, the figure of fifteen secret episcopal ordinations between 1945 and 1989 is the church's own and I have not found it independently confirmed; the specific consecrations named above are separately attested, but the total should be treated as the church's count. Third, the pre-1946 size of the church is given differently in different places — 2,387 parishes on one reckoning, over 3,000 with 4,440 buildings on another, three and a half to four million faithful — and I have given the range rather than choosing.

The largest gap is on the substitution side. This module asserts that Soviet schooling in western Ukraine was universal, free and Ukrainian-language, and that it opened careers to peasants' children, but it does not quantify any of that for the western oblasts specifically, because I have not found the enrolment, literacy and higher-education series for those oblasts. The claim rests on the general pattern and on the biographies of individuals, which is weaker evidence than the numbers would be, and the numbers exist in Soviet statistical handbooks that a fuller treatment should use.

NOWHERE TO ARRIVE

Module 5: the cost column — what a Galician household counted in, what the order added and subtracted, and why the ledger came out against defiance for a man who could still walk into the forest.

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The units, and the door

The ledger a Galician peasant kept had three entries in it, and none of them was money.

The first was land. On the interwar figures for eastern Galicia, 52 per cent of peasant households held under two hectares, 37 per cent held between two and five, and only 11 per cent held more than five, in the province with the highest rural population density in Europe. The holdings were not in one piece: strip inheritance had fragmented them across a dozen or twenty separate parcels, so that a man with three hectares walked between them all day. Landowning peasants together held about 55 per cent of the land including forest and pasture, and around 80 per cent of the arable; the rest was gentry, church and state.

The second was sons, and the two entries were connected by subtraction. Every son who lived to marry took a share of the strips, and a holding under two hectares does not divide. Four sons on three hectares is four households of three-quarters of a hectare, which does not feed four households. This was not a grievance about fairness; it was an arithmetic problem with a fixed answer, and everyone in the village could do the sum.

The third was the priest, and it is not a sentimental entry. The parish priest was the one literate man in the village who was not an official of somebody else's state, the keeper of the register that recorded who existed, the arbiter of the marriage that determined the division of the strips, and the man who would bury you. He was also, in Galicia, the father of the schoolteacher and the lawyer, because the clergy were married and their sons went into the professions.

Against those three entries the province had, for sixty years, one standing answer. You left. Something close to a million Galicians went to the United States between the late 1880s and 1914; in 1913 alone some 400,000 left for other parts of the empire or for abroad; upwards of 70,000 of the poorest went to Brazil and Argentina; nearly 15,000 took a Russian offer of free land in 1892–3. The emigration continued between the wars, thinning to a trickle in the 1930s under American quotas and the Depression, and Ukrainian villages had families in Winnipeg and Pennsylvania who sent money.

That figure is the most exact price signal this case contains. For a very large number of Galicians, over two generations, the value of staying was less than the cost of a steamship ticket, and they paid it and went.

So the poverty is not what changed after 1939. Galicia had been poorer under Austria; contemporaries counted seven major famines between 1847 and 1889 and a nineteenth-century estimate put annual deaths from hunger at fifty thousand. What changed was that the ticket stopped being purchasable. People still moved after 1945 — in very large numbers — but only when somebody else decided they should, and it is the closure of the voluntary door rather than the depth of the poverty that has to carry the explanation of what followed.

One arithmetic question the sources do not settle, and it belongs here. The kulak ceiling set for the new oblasts on 24 March 1940 was five hectares in suburban districts, seven in villages, ten to fifteen in the mountains. Before 1939, on the figures above, roughly 89 per cent of Galician peasants held less than five hectares. The Ukrainian researchers who reproduce the March 1940 decision report that close to a third of local peasants were above the ceiling by then. If both are right, the land distributed from the confiscated estates in the winter of 1939–40 pushed households across a line that was drawn afterwards. I cannot establish that from what I have read, and I raise it as a question the archive should be able to answer.

The one lawful exit, and who could use it

Between 1944 and 1946 there was exactly one legal way out of Soviet Galicia, and it was a category rather than a route.

The agreement signed at Lublin on 9 September 1944 provided for the evacuation to Poland of Polish citizens from the Ukrainian SSR. Eligibility rested on a declaration

of Polish nationality, corroborated in practice by rite and by language: a Roman Catholic who spoke Polish was a Pole, and could go. Around 790,000 people used it.

A Greek Catholic could not. The rite that identified him as Ukrainian was the same evidence that would have been used to test a claim to be Polish, and it disqualified him. The confessional line that had been drawn across this ground by the Union of Brest in 1596 and completed by the Synod of Polotsk in 1839 therefore became, in 1944, an emigration control: on one side of it a door, on the other side none. Nobody designed it that way. It was the residue of two church settlements, operating three centuries later as a passport regime.

Those who did qualify priced it with care. As of 5 December 1944, of some 87,700 Poles registered for resettlement out of Lviv, 946 had actually gone. The rest had taken the category and were waiting on the move — hoping, in the recollection of those who stayed, for a change in the geopolitical situation, or determined to keep the city Polish. In January 1945 the security organs arrested 772 Poles in Lviv. By the time the commission closed in December 1946 the great majority had gone.

That is what an exit dial looks like when the door is a form rather than a border. The gap between 87,700 registrations and 946 departures, in the second month of the operation, is a population keeping an option open at no cost while it waits to see what the price of staying will turn out to be.

Two enforcers and no neutral square

From 1944 the ordinary calculation in a western Ukrainian village acquired a feature the corpus has not previously had to price: there were two armed organisations, either of which could kill a man, and no conduct that satisfied both.

The insurgents' targets were the people who made the state work at village level — the chairman of the village soviet, the schoolteacher, the collective-farm chairman, the men of the destruction battalions, and above all the informers. A top secret directive of February 1946, preserved in the security files at Lviv, upbraided regional commanders for failing to circulate a broadsheet in full; the broadsheet was addressed *to informers, denouncers, destruction-battalion men and the rest*. Against Soviet officials, officers and collaborators, the NKVD recorded 11,725 assassinated in Western Ukraine between February 1944 and December 1946, with a further 2,401 missing.

The state's instrument was the neighbour. Jeffrey Burds, working the Lviv oblast archive, describes an informant network — the *agentura* — dense enough that a small village might contain five agents, recruited through family and neighbourhood ties and deliberately including women, because women held the courier and supply roles in the underground. Alongside it ran the destruction battalions, the *strybky*, locally raised and locally hated; the deputy for western Ukrainian affairs reported in 1946 that of 42,175 operations and ambushes mounted by them, roughly a tenth produced a result. And behind that stood Beria's directive of 31 March 1944, which ordered the exile of all adult members of the families of convicted nationalists and of insurgents killed in engagements, and the confiscation of their property.

So the arithmetic a man faced was this. Feed a man from the forest at night and you are the family of an insurgent, liable to a train. Report him in the morning and you are a *seksot*, liable to a visit. And doing nothing was not a third option, because it satisfied neither party and both had lists. The two costs did not cancel; they compounded, and the neutral square was removed from the board.

This is why the resolution came the way it did. On 21 October 1947 the state removed 77,791 people in a day, by category of kinship, from the districts where the insurgency lived. Eleven months later the collectivisation drive opened, and the farms went from under ten per cent to ninety-three per cent in thirty months. When one of the two enforcers can deport the households the other depends on, the tie breaks, and after it breaks the ordinary calculation returns — with only one party left to satisfy.

What a day's work returned

Once the countryside was collectivised, the peasant's income was a residual share rather than a wage.

The mechanism is the *trudoden*, the labour-day. Jobs were graded into seven to nine categories: a job of the first category counted as half a labour-day, an average job as one, the operation of heavy machinery as up to four and a half, with additions for good work and deductions for bad. Members were required to accumulate a minimum number annually — in most places between one and two hundred — with fines, withheld distributions, expulsion or prosecution for failing. At the end of the year, after the farm had delivered its compulsory quota to the state at prices the state set,

whatever remained in kind and in cash was divided by the total labour-days accumulated on the farm, and each member drew his share.

The peasant's return therefore depended on the residue after the state had taken its part, and he could not know it until December. For Ukraine as a whole in the mid-1930s a labour-day is recorded at 33 to 75 kopecks and one to three and a half kilograms of grain. The household plot, which the model charter of 1935 permitted, was supposed to supply a quarter of a collective farmer's income and in practice supplied at least half. Payments in kind gave way to money payments through the second half of the 1950s, and the system was formally replaced by a guaranteed wage only in the 1960s, with pensions for collective farmers legislated in 1964.

I have not found the labour-day series for the western oblasts specifically, and the figures above are for Ukraine and for a period a decade before collectivisation reached Galicia; they should be read as an indication of how the instrument worked rather than as a measurement of what a Ternopil household received. The direction, though, is not in doubt. The household plot, which he could not sell and worked in his own time, was the part of the arrangement that fed him. The collective, which took his days, was the part that paid the state.

What the order put on the other side

None of this would explain compliance on its own, and the benefit column is not empty.

The land came first, in the winter of 1939–40, out of the confiscated Polish estates, and it was taken back in 1949. But the removal of the Poles was not taken back, and for a Galician peasant that was not a minor item. Burds records a Ukrainian actress telling a Soviet informer in 1945 that the arrests of Poles were the first intelligent step the Bolsheviks had taken since they came to Lviv, and that if they had begun there instead of with the Banderites there would not be a single Banderite left — they would all have crossed over to Soviet power. That is a Galician pricing the arrangement, in 1945, by who else it removes, and it is the frankest statement of the benefit column in the whole file.

Then, over the following two decades, the things the order had actually promised. Schooling in the village's own language, free and compulsory, in a province where the language of the school had been the language of the administration since 1772. A

university at Lviv teaching in Ukrainian. Medical provision reaching villages that had had none. Industrial work in a city that grew by a third. And behind those, the offer that mattered most to a household that could not divide its strips again: a place for a son that did not depend on land at all — a career open to a peasant's child, without a fee, a patron or a confession, all the way up. The problem that had been sending Galicians to Pennsylvania for sixty years was, for the first time, solvable without leaving.

By the 1960s the ledger for an ordinary man reads as follows. The cost of defiance had been demonstrated on his neighbours within living memory and did not need to be demonstrated again. The exit was closed, not by a wall but by the absence of a document. The benefits were real, were the first his family had been offered, and were collected by his children rather than by him. And the one thing he had lost that could not be replaced — the church — he could still have in a kitchen.

That is not a man who believes. It is a man for whom the arithmetic no longer poses a question.

Reading the cost column against the framework

The framework asks why a subject does not simply leave, and the answer it has carried from Carneiro is circumscription: he cannot leave because there is nowhere outside to go — the sea, the desert, the mountain wall. The second adjustment for a Soviet case is that the exit is abolished rather than made expensive, and that the evidence has to be found in the forms that remain.

Both hold here, but the case will not fit the first one as stated, and the misfit is the module's return.

Galicia is not circumscribed. It is the opposite: forest and mountain along its whole southern and western edge, the classic terrain into which a peasantry disappears. Tens of thousands of men did disappear into it, and stayed there for a decade — which is precisely why this is the only Soviet acquisition with a rural insurgency of that duration. Carneiro's variable, applied to this ground, predicts that flight should be cheap and the order therefore weak. Flight *was* cheap. The order held anyway.

What was circumscribed was not the terrain but the person. The frontier was sealed. Internal movement was licensed by residence registration. A collective farmer stood outside the internal passport system created in December 1932, could not be absent from his settlement for more than thirty days without a permit from the village soviet,

and was not brought into that system until the statute of 28 August 1974, implemented across the later 1970s; as late as 1967 some 58 million rural adults across the Union — about 37 per cent of the population — held no such document.

So:

Where a state cannot circumscribe the terrain, it circumscribes the person — and the signature of that operation is a population that can physically leave and has nowhere to lawfully land.

The forest stayed open the entire time. What closed was the far side of it. A man could walk out of his village on any night of the fifty years and be nowhere he was permitted to be by morning: unable to take lodging, take work, draw a ration, register a child or bury a parent, in any settlement in the Union, because the paper that would have allowed it named the village he had left. The door was not locked. There was simply no room on the other side of it.

Two consequences follow and both are testable elsewhere.

The first is that this method is *cheaper* than the older one and works on any geography. Holding a frontier against a peasantry that wants to cross it requires men on the ground in proportion to the length of the line. Making the peasantry non-portable requires a registry, a form and a clerk, and it costs the same whether the terrain is steppe, marsh or mountain. That is why it is the modern form of the mechanism, and why a corpus that looks for walls and mountain passes will systematically fail to find the exit dial in any twentieth-century case.

The second is that it explains the shape the resistance took. Where the exit is closed by terrain, a discontented population has no move at all. Where it is closed by paper, the population retains one move — to go somewhere the paper does not run, which is to say into the forest, into an unregistered life, or into the underground. The insurgency and the catacomb church are the same solution to the same problem, arrived at by different people: both consist in existing at a place the register does not reach. The state's answer to both was identical and it was not a wall. It was to remove the households that made an unregistered life sustainable — 77,791 in a day in October 1947 — after which a man in the forest had nobody to feed him and a priest in a flat had one fewer place to say mass.

One observation which is not a second revision but should be recorded. The presence of an armed insurgency does not lower the cost of compliance for the

population caught between; it doubles the cost column and abolishes the option of doing nothing, and it resolves when one of the two enforcers acquires the ability to remove the households the other depends on. That is a proposition about counter-insurgency generally, and this case supports it without being able to prove it alone.

A note on sources. Nothing is quoted here from a document I have seen; the two quoted formulations — the OUN broadsheet addressed to informers, denouncers and destruction-battalion men, and the actress's remark of 1945 — are both taken from Jeffrey Burds's article on Soviet informants' networks in Galicia, which cites them from the State Archive of Lviv Oblast (fond 3, opys 1), and they should be read as his translations from files I have not consulted.

The interwar landholding distribution, the emigration figures and the pre-1914 famine estimates are paraphrased from the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* and from secondary accounts of Austrian Galicia; the emigration totals in particular vary between sources and the round figures given above should be treated as orders of magnitude rather than counts. The *trudoden* mechanism is from the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*'s entries on the workday and the collective farm; the payment figures of 33–75 kopecks and one to three and a half kilograms of grain are that source's, for Ukraine in 1934–37. The passport and residence rules are from standard accounts of the Soviet passport system. The population-transfer registration figures for Lviv are from the Lviv Interactive project's account of the postwar relocations. Burds's findings on informant density and on the recruitment of women are summarised from his published articles and their abstracts, not from the underlying archive.

Three weaknesses, stated because they bear on the argument rather than to discharge an obligation. First and largest: **there is no western-oblast labour-day series in this module**, because I could not find one. The figures used are for Ukraine as a whole and predate collectivisation in Galicia by more than a decade. What a household in Ternopil or Drohobych actually received per labour-day in 1952 is the single most concrete number the cost column needs and it is missing; Soviet statistical handbooks and the oblast archives hold it. Second, the interwar landholding distribution is given for eastern Galicia and does not describe Volhynia, where holdings were larger and the confessional and land structures both differed, so the ledger reconstructed here is a Galician one and should not be read as covering the whole territory. Third, the claim that close to a third of peasants exceeded the 1940 ceiling rests on the same single Ukrainian source flagged elsewhere in this study, and the arithmetic puzzle it creates is therefore only as good as that source.

Finally, a structural limitation. This module reconstructs how people priced their situation almost entirely from what the state and the insurgency did to them, and from the few first-hand remarks that survive because an informer wrote them down. What a Galician household actually said to itself across the table in 1949 exists in memoir, in oral-history collections made since 1991, and in the security organs' own reports on popular mood, and I have used almost none of it. The

ledger above is therefore inferred from prices rather than read off anybody's own accounting, which is a weaker thing.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.

SOME DAYS OF THE WEEK

Module 6: extraction — the instrument by which the surplus was lifted off the producer, what it took, where it went, and the year in which two halves of one republic could be compared.

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

What was taken, and by what instrument

Two flows came out of this ground and they ran through different machinery.

The first was underground and it was taken by nationalisation. The Boryslav oilfield near Drohobych had been the largest in Europe by the end of the nineteenth century and produced 2.075 million tonnes in 1909, when Galicia stood third in the world behind the United States and Russia. The Dashava gas field, discovered in 1921, was the largest in Europe at the time and had been in commercial production since 1924, feeding pipelines to Stryi and Drohobych in 1927, to Lviv in 1929, and to Tarnów in Poland in 1937. In 1939 the whole Carpathian gas industry was nationalised, and by 1940 production from the newly developed Opary field had roughly doubled against 1938. Then, in the autumn of 1948, the Dashava–Kyiv pipeline was commissioned: 509 kilometres, half a metre in diameter, about two billion cubic metres a year, the most powerful gas main in Europe. In August 1949 Stalin issued a decree extending it, and from the early 1950s the line ran Dashava–Kyiv–Bryansk–Moscow. A field in Lviv oblast heated the capital of the Union.

The second flow was above ground and it was taken by an institution. That institution reached the villages of Galicia and Volhynia in the autumn of 1948 — the same season the pipeline opened — and by the middle of 1950 it held 92.7 per cent of the farms.

There was a third flow, and its instrument was an eviction order. The resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers of 10 September 1947, which accelerated the removal of the families of insurgents, stated what the families were for: they were to supply

workers to the coal industry. Some 77,791 people went east on 21 October 1947, and a further 80,209 between 1948 and 1952.

The rest of this module concerns the second instrument, because it is the one that touched almost everybody and because its design is the thing worth examining.

The arithmetic of the days

Before 1848, a peasant household in Galicia tilled on average two hectares of the lord's land. It owed 78 days of corvée a year on state lands and 133 days on private estates, and in some places as much as 300. Corvée made up 68.2 per cent of a household's total obligation; money payments were 26.6 per cent and other services and fees 5.2. Depending on the period and the locality the labour ran from three to six days a week from one or more members of the household. The Austrian reforms of 1772 to 1790 capped it at three days a week and 156 days a year, with a lower scale for the poorer villagers and a strict prohibition on any exaction beyond the statutory service. Stadion's patent of April 1848 abolished it, and the indemnity payments to the former landowners ran until 1898.

A century later the same villages were placed under an arrangement measured in the same unit.

Work on a collective farm was accounted in labour-days. Jobs were graded into seven to nine categories: a job of the lowest category counted half a labour-day, an average job one, the operation of heavy machinery up to four and a half, with additions for good work and deductions for bad. A joint resolution of the party's Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of 27 May 1939 fixed a compulsory annual minimum of 60 to 100 labour-days by region. A further joint resolution of 13 April 1942 raised it to between 100 and 150 for every able-bodied member; issued as a wartime measure, it was not repealed, and the party plenum of February 1947 confirmed as much. Members aged twelve and over owed at least fifty. A member who failed the minimum without good cause was to be expelled from the collective and to forfeit his rights as a member — which is to say his plot.

Actual performance ran well above the minimum. The average able-bodied collective farmer accumulated 295 labour-days in 1953 and 317 in 1954; at the prevailing conversion of about 1.4 labour-days to a calendar day, that is 209 and 225

days of work. In 1958 the average was 342. Into the 1980s some farms were requiring 200 to 250.

At the end of the year the farm delivered its compulsory quota to the state at prices the state set, and whatever remained in kind and in cash was divided by the total labour-days accumulated on the farm. The member's return was therefore a residual share of a residue, and he did not learn its size until December. For Ukraine in the mid-1930s a labour-day is recorded at 33 to 75 kopecks and one to three and a half kilograms of grain. Payment in kind fell to 25 per cent of farm income by 1965 and 8 per cent by 1975; a guaranteed wage was legislated only in the 1960s, and pensions for collective farmers by the law of 15 July 1964.

The grandfather owed 133 days to the estate. The grandson worked 225 for the collective.

The plot, and what was owed from it

The other half of the arrangement was the household plot, and it is the half that fed people. By the late 1960s collective farmers across the Union were producing on their own plots almost all the potatoes, vegetables, fruit, meat and milk they consumed, buying from the state only bread and sugar, and paying for much of that from the proceeds of selling plot produce.

Three features of the plot are worth setting out precisely, because together they define the tenure.

It could not be sold, and what could be grown on it was restricted: the model charter directed members to abstain from raising field crops such as rye or wheat on their private plots.

Its size could be made conditional on labour service. A decree of the Central Committee and Council of Ministers of 7 March 1956 on the charter of the agricultural artel devolved to individual farms a discretion over their own distribution rules, and moved at the same time to cut the number of privately owned livestock a member might keep. What some farms did with the discretion is on record: at three collectives named New Life, Red Ploughman and Red Worker, plots were differentiated on this schedule — 0.4 hectares to a household where every able-bodied member worked in the collective; 0.3 where one able-bodied member worked elsewhere; 0.2 where two did; 0.15 where three or more did — with fulfilment of the

fixed minimum of labour-days as the necessary prerequisite in every case. That is three farms and not a universal rule, and it should be read as an instance of what the arrangement permitted rather than as a description of the whole; but it shows what the instrument could be made to do once the body owed the days also decided the size of the plot.

And its produce was taxed. Compulsory deliveries of meat, milk, eggs and wool were owed to the state from the household economy, and an agricultural tax was levied on the plot's imputed income, raised sharply by the ukase of 13 July 1948. The scale of it can be read off its removal: after Malenkov's address of 8 August 1953 the tax was recalculated against farm size, and the total fell from 9.5 billion roubles in 1952 to 4.1 billion in 1954. In September 1953 the procurement prices on compulsory deliveries were raised — five and a half times for livestock and poultry, twice for butter and milk, two and a half times for potatoes. Whatever a household had accumulated in cash before that had already been reduced by the currency reform of December 1947.

So the two halves of the week were not symmetrical in the way the older arrangement's had been. Under corvée the days owed to the lord were the lord's and the remaining days were the peasant's, and what he grew on his own strips in his own time was his to eat or to sell. Here the days owed to the collective were the collective's, and the produce of the days that remained was subject to delivery quotas and to a tax on its imputed value, at a rate the office set.

Where it went

The colonial question is whether the flow ran outward to a metropolitan account, sorted by caste. On this case the question mostly returns nothing, and the nothing is worth stating rather than forced into an answer.

The extraction was not sorted by nationality. A Galician was pumped by the collective farm at the same rate and by the same instrument as a peasant in Poltava or Ryazan; the sorting variable was sector, not caste. The countryside was extracted from and the town was built with the proceeds, everywhere in the Union alike, and Galicians were on the losing side of that transaction because they were peasants and not because they were Galicians.

Nor was there a separate account for the surplus to land in. The taker and the spender were the same office, and a substantial part of what came off the western

Ukrainian countryside went back into the western Ukrainian provinces as factories, schools, clinics and roads. Lviv acquired industry it had never had. So the ledger question — was the periphery drained? — has no determinate answer, because there is no second set of books to compare against the first.

Two columns do run in one direction and should be named. The gas went to Moscow from the early 1950s. And the families deported in October 1947 went to the coalfields because a resolution said they should. In the sub-surface and in the labour columns there is a flow with a destination; in the agricultural column there is a pump between sectors that happens to sit in Galicia.

The year the instrument was visible

In 1946 the Soviet grain harvest came in at 39.6 million tonnes against 47.3 in 1945 and 95.5 in 1940. Drought had hit Moldavia, most of Ukraine and parts of the black-earth and lower Volga regions. On 15 October 1946 Khrushchev wrote to Stalin reporting that yields had fallen by half against the estimates, and asked that the procurement plan be curtailed. He recalled the answer: a telegram calling him a dubious person for writing notes arguing that Ukraine could not fulfil its procurements while requesting a large number of ration cards to feed the population.

The quotas were not curtailed in time and in some regions were raised to compensate for shortfalls elsewhere. Requisitioned foodstuffs were exported to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and France. Seed loans and soup kitchens followed, administered inconsistently and late.

The estimates of the dead vary widely and along predictable lines. For the Ukrainian SSR they run from 100,000 to upwards of a million; Cormac Ó Gráda's figure is 300,000 for Ukraine within a Union-wide 900,000; Veniamin Zima has proposed as many as two million across the USSR and Isupov no more than 800,000 in 1947; at least 70,000 to 80,000 died in Moldavia on the conservative reckoning, and other estimates put it at 100,000. Child mortality was very high. The Soviet government did not acknowledge that a famine had occurred.

It did not occur in western Ukraine. The collective farm had not yet been introduced there, and the insurgency was making procurement difficult. Through the summer of 1946 the trains running west were crammed with starving people from the central and eastern oblasts, and hundreds of thousands came into Galicia and Volhynia

to exchange their belongings for bread, porridge and potatoes, to buy food with money, or to be taken on as labour. The insurgents issued appeals urging western peasants to help them. The authorities tried to stop the movement by police methods: western Ukrainian peasants were forbidden to sell food to the newcomers, and rumours were put about of epidemics and of poisoned food in the western oblasts.

Two years later the collective farm arrived in the western oblasts, and by July 1950 it held ninety-three per cent of their farms.

Reading extraction against the framework

The standing questions for this module are what was taken, from whom, by what mechanism, and where it went; and the colonial expectation is a flow running outward to a metropole and sorted by caste. The Soviet adjustment is that extraction may be sorted by category rather than by caste and that the flow may not be outward at all. Both adjustments hold. The direction question returns indeterminate for the agricultural surplus and outward for gas and for deported labour, and the sorting question returns sector rather than nationality.

Which means the framework's usual instruments are answering the wrong question about this case, and the module's return is a different one.

Extraction systems should be sorted first by whether the producer is provided with land or dispossessed of it, and that variable predicts more about the arrangement than the direction of the flow does.

Where the producer has been dispossessed — the plantation hand, the wage labourer, the mine gang — his subsistence appears on the extractor's books as a cost. Somebody must feed him, house him, and keep him alive to the next season, and that entry, however meanly it is set, is a floor. It is a floor made of self-interest rather than of mercy, and it holds only as long as the labourer is scarce or expensive to replace, but it exists and it can be read in an account book.

Where the producer is provided with land, his subsistence is his own problem and appears nowhere. The extractor takes a quantity — days, or a quota — and what the household eats afterwards is not a line in anyone's ledger. There is no floor of that kind at all, because the arithmetic that sets the quota never has to pass through the arithmetic that feeds the family. The procurement plan of 1946 was set against a harvest estimate. It was not set against the number of people who would have to eat out

of what remained after it was met, because in a system built this way that number is not an input.

That is the discriminating feature, and this study's own ground demonstrates it twice, a century apart, in the same villages and by name. Marx describes labour rent as ground-rent in its simplest form: the direct producer cultivates his own soil for part of the week with implements that are actually or legally his, and works the remaining days on the lord's estate without compensation, so that rent and surplus-value are the same thing and how much the serf keeps depends only on how his time is divided. Lenin, in 1899, sets out the three conditions of a corvée economy: that surplus labour is separated in space and time from necessary labour, so that "for the landlord they worked some days of the week and for themselves others"; that the method rests on the producer being *provided with* land rather than dispossessed of it, the allotment serving "as wages in kind... or as a means of providing the landlord with hands"; and that it requires personal dependence, because a man with his own plot and his own farm cannot otherwise be compelled to work another's.

Each of the three was rebuilt on this ground within a century of its abolition — the divided week by the labour-day, the subsistence allotment by the household plot, and personal dependence by a residence regime that gave a collective farmer no document with which to be anywhere else. The arrangement's own founding texts name the form and place it before the one they were written to supersede.

One refinement follows, and it is the reason the newer version is a stronger instrument than the older. **The conditional plot makes the subsistence half revocable, which the corvée allotment was not.** A Galician serf's rustical holding was hereditary tenure; the lord could take it only by a process, and the peasant's claim to it was old enough that even an unsympathetic administration had to acknowledge it. A collective farmer's plot was an allocation. Expulsion for failing the minimum removed it altogether, and where a farm chose to exercise the discretion it was given, the plot could be scaled down by administrative act in fixed proportion to the labour withheld. So the half of the arrangement that keeps a household alive is held on the same terms as everything else it holds: as an entry, adjustable at an office, with no forum in the way. That is the difference between a tenure and an allocation, and it is what a corvée becomes when the party owed the days also controls the register.

A note on sources. Two texts are quoted here rather than paraphrased and both are in the public domain. The description of labour rent is from Marx's *Capital*, volume three, chapter 47, section II, in the standard English translation. The three conditions of corvée economy, and the phrases about working for the landlord some days of the week and about the allotment serving as wages in kind, are from Lenin's *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* (1899), chapter three, in the English text of the *Collected Works* available through the Marxists Internet Archive. Khrushchev's account of Stalin's telegram is quoted from his memoirs as reproduced in secondary compilation, not from the memoir text itself, and should be treated as a recollection recorded years afterwards by an interested participant.

Everything else is paraphrased and credited at the point of use. The Galician corvée figures — two hectares of the lord's land, 78 days on state and 133 on private estates, the 68.2/26.6/5.2 division of obligations, the three-to-six-day range — are from the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*'s entry on serfdom; the Austrian caps of three days a week and 156 days a year are from Ivan L. Rudnytsky's essay on the Ukrainians in Galicia under Austrian rule. The labour-day mechanism, the 1939 and 1942 minima, the payment figures for the 1930s and the shift to money payment are from the same encyclopaedia's entries on the workday and the collective farm, cross-checked against a legal survey of kolkhoz law. The 1953, 1954 and 1958 averages, the conversion ratio of about 1.4 labour-days to a calendar day, and the plot schedule at the three named farms are all taken from Tony Cliff's compilation, which cites them to Soviet statistical handbooks and to a 1955 handbook on kolkhoz law that I have not seen; Cliff is a committed partisan of a particular reading of the Soviet Union, and the figures should be checked against the handbooks before being quoted onward. The plot schedule in particular is evidence from three farms and is presented above as such. The tax figures are from a summary of Malenkov's agricultural reforms, the 1953 procurement price increases from a contemporary account in *Foreign Affairs*. The pipeline chronology is from the Ukrainian transmission operator's own history, from Naftogaz, and from a scholarly survey of the Ukrainian gas sector; these agree on 1948 for the Kyiv line but differ on whether Moscow received gas in 1951 or 1952, and I have given the early 1950s.

Contested figures are given as ranges with the estimators named. The 1946–47 mortality for the Ukrainian SSR is given as 100,000 to more than one million, and the divergence is not a matter of arithmetic but of what is counted and over which months; the Union-wide range runs from about 900,000 to two million. The Galician corvée figures are averages across a province with very unequal holdings and should not be read as any particular household's obligation.

Three limitations. First, and as in the previous module, **there is no western-oblast labour-day series here** — the payment figures are for Ukraine as a whole and predate collectivisation in Galicia by more than a decade, and what a household in Ternopil actually drew in 1952 remains unestablished. Second, the comparison between corvée days and labour-days is a comparison of two differently constructed measures: the corvée figure counts days owed by a household, the labour-day figure counts units accumulated by an individual and converted to calendar days at a ratio drawn from a Soviet handbook. The orders of magnitude are robust; the precision is not,

and the comparison should be read as one of structure with an indicative arithmetic rather than as a measurement. Third, this module does not attempt the accounting of the 1946–47 mortality, which requires the demographic literature and a treatment of its own; what is set out here is the instrument and the two halves of one republic in one year, and nothing beyond that should be read into it.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.

THE MUSEUM OF ANTIQUITIES

Module 7: information and suppression — why the censor was indispensable here when the collection has found him idle almost everywhere else, and what becomes of a fact that a doctrine has no room for.

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

Where the collection's finding does not hold

The general result this collection has reached about colonial information control is that the censor existed and was not needed. Across a long run of European overseas conquests the apparatus of concealment was looked for at the metropolitan end and largely was not found, because nothing had to be hidden: the facts travelled, were printed in official reports, argued in parliaments and published in books that went through several editions, and they moved nothing. What censorship there was faced inward at the conquered. The register at the paying end was not suppression but inattention.

That result does not hold here, and the reason is structural rather than moral.

A colonial administration whose legitimating story was addressed to a public three thousand miles away could afford to be found out, because being found out cost it very little; the story was about the character of the people telling it, and a scandal in a distant province is survivable by a national self-image built on many other things. This order's legitimating story was addressed to the people it governed, was substantially true, and was load-bearing in a way the colonial version never had to be. It asserted not that a nation was benevolent but that a set of propositions about history and society was correct — demonstrably, as a matter of science. A claim of that kind cannot absorb a contradicting fact the way a claim about national character can. It has to do something with it.

So the apparatus here was enormous, permanent, and faced in both directions at once. And it operated in two modes which are worth separating, because the second is the interesting one and the framework has not had it before.

Ten March 1939

Six months before the frontier was crossed, the question of whether the apparatus would ever be dismantled was put and answered in public, at length, in the report on the work of the Central Committee delivered to the Eighteenth Party Congress.

Stalin poses the objection himself, in the objector's own voice, twice. *"We have abolished the exploiting classes; there are no longer any hostile classes in the country; there is nobody to suppress; hence there is no more need for the state; it must die away. — Why then do we not help our Socialist state to die away? Why do we not strive to put an end to it? Is it not time to throw out all this rubbish of a state?"* And again: *"Now, the Marxist doctrine of the state says that there is to be no state under Communism. — Why then do we not help our Socialist state to die away? Is it not time we relegated the state to the museum of antiquities?"*

He then quotes the passage from *Anti-Dühring* in full — the state is not abolished, it withers away — and asks whether it is correct. *"Yes, it is correct, but only on one of two conditions"*: that one studies the socialist state in isolation from the international situation, or that socialism has already won in most countries. Neither obtains. Engels, he says, was not investigating a specific socialist state in a specific country and therefore did not set himself this question and could not have answered it.

The answer follows: *"Will our state remain in the period of Communism also? Yes, it will, unless the capitalist encirclement is liquidated, and unless the danger of foreign military attack has disappeared."*

That is the vanguard declining to stand down, in the published record, with a reason. And the reason is a condition that no domestic action can satisfy, because it is located outside the state's own borders. The temporary emergency has been made permanent by the simple device of siting its cause abroad.

Two further things in the same document matter more for this module than the headline does.

The first is the reasoning that gets him there, which is an admission of institutional failure converted into an institutional expansion. The blunder, on his account, was the

failure to notice until 1937 and 1938 that the Trotskyite and Bukharinite leaders had — as he asserts — been in the service of foreign espionage organisations since the first days of the revolution; and the blunder is *"to be explained by an underestimation of the role and significance of the mechanism of our Socialist state and of its intelligence service, by an underestimation of this intelligence service, by the twaddle that an intelligence service in a Soviet state is an unimportant trifle."* The party's tasks accordingly include: *"Never to forget that we are surrounded by a capitalist world; to remember that the foreign espionage services will smuggle spies, assassins and wreckers into our country; and, remembering this, to strengthen our Socialist intelligence service and systematically help it to defeat and eradicate the enemies of the people."*

The second is a sentence in the middle of the theoretical section which governs everything that would later be said about Galicia. Describing the second phase of the socialist state, Stalin writes: *"The function of military suppression inside the country ceased, died away; for exploitation had been abolished, there were no more exploiters left, and so there was no one to suppress."*

Read that against what the state would spend the next fourteen years doing in the western oblasts. If there is no one inside the country to suppress, then a man with a rifle in a Carpathian forest cannot be an internal opponent — the category has been closed by doctrine. He must therefore be something the doctrine still permits: an agent of a foreign power, a hireling of a foreign espionage service, a bourgeois nationalist in the pay of somebody. The vocabulary that would be applied to the insurgency from 1944 — *Ukrainian-German nationalists*, *Banderites* — was not chosen for propaganda convenience. It was the only vocabulary the theory had left available.

There is one more passage in the speech worth noting for its date. Mocking the Western press for predicting a German move on Soviet Ukraine, Stalin observes that it would be absurd for the gnat of Carpathian Ukraine to annex the elephant of the Soviet republic, and that *"if there really are such lunatics in Germany, rest assured that we shall find enough straitjackets for them in our country."* He said it on 10 March 1939. On 23 August the protocol was signed, and on 17 September the frontier was crossed.

Censorship

The ordinary instrument was present in industrial quantity and needs only to be described.

Glavlit — from 1922 the Main Administration for Literary and Publishing Affairs, and from 1946 the Administration for the Protection of Military and State Secrets in the Press under the Council of Ministers — cleared all publication and broadcasting for state secrets. Goskomizdat handled the political content of fiction and poetry, Goskino the cinema, Gosteleradio the broadcasts. First Departments inside ministries and agencies, including the state statistical committee, controlled who saw what internally. Pre-revolutionary and foreign books and journals were destroyed in bulk from libraries; what survived went into *spetskhran*, special collections accessible on a permit from the security organs, holding émigré publications, banned names, foreign material and classified technical literature — with, in the case of foreign scientific journals, the offending pages cut out of the general-issue copy and the intact version held in the restricted stack. Libraries were registered and an inspectorate saw to compliance. And a great deal of the destruction was done by citizens to their own shelves, pre-emptively, because being connected to a book was itself a hazard.

Facing inward at this territory, the instrument's targets can be listed by name. Ivan Dziuba's *Internationalism or Russification?*, an argument made from inside Leninist nationality doctrine and sent to the republic's first secretary as a document for consideration, circulated in typescript and was published abroad. Viacheslav Chornovil's *Woe from Wit* was a compilation of documents about the trials of 1965 — that is, an accurate record of proceedings the state had itself conducted. Valentyn Moroz's essays followed. In the summer of 1972 a schoolteacher in Ukraine was tried in camera for possessing all three and for remarks made in a staffroom about the intervention in Czechoslovakia, and was given five years of strict-regime camps.

He went to a camp for five years for holding a truthful account of what had happened in a Soviet courtroom.

Annulment

The second instrument is different in kind, and the framework did not have it.

Censorship concedes that a fact is a fact and forbids its circulation. Annulment rules that the fact was never a fact. The count is declared to have been improperly conducted; the people who produced it are prosecuted not for a political offence but for professional wrongdoing; and the instrument is redesigned so that the observation can no longer be made.

The paradigm case is a census. On 6 January 1937 the Soviet Union counted itself and returned 162,039,000 people including military personnel — modest growth on the 147 million of 1926, and far below what had been publicly asserted. The shortfall was the unacknowledged mortality of the preceding decade, of which the famine of 1932–33 in Ukraine was the largest part.

The results were suppressed and the count was annulled. Olimpiy Kvitkin, head of the census bureau, was arrested on 25 March 1937; Ivan Kraval, head of the central statistical administration, on 31 May; the head of the population sector Mikhail Kurman, the deputy Lazar Brand and others followed. The charge was not that they had told an inconvenient truth. Kvitkin's indictment records that within the statistical administration there had existed a Right-Trotskyist counter-revolutionary terrorist organisation led by Kraval, that the organisation had chosen Kvitkin to head the census bureau precisely in order to obtain artificially lowered and misinterpreted figures, and that the purpose was to furnish those figures to counter-revolutionary organisations for use in their struggle against Soviet authority. Kvitkin was shot; Kraval was shot; others were shot or sent to camps from which few returned. A new census was taken in January 1939, redesigned so that certain answers could no longer appear, and was brought up to the required total by a general upward adjustment and by the reallocation of prisoner forms between regions.

And on 10 March 1939, in the report quoted above, Stalin stated in passing that *"the Soviet Union has a population of 170,000,000."*

So the loop closes inside a single document. The speech that makes the security organs permanent, on the ground that the danger is external and unending, contains the population figure that a census had to be annulled and re-run to produce.

The mechanism is worth stating flatly because it is general. Where a governing claim cannot be revised, a result that contradicts the claim cannot be an error in the claim. It must therefore be an error in a person. That converts an epistemic problem into a personnel problem, and a personnel problem generates an unbounded demand for investigators — which is the same demand the doctrine of permanent external threat generates, arriving from the other direction.

The smallest illustration of the operation is also the clearest. When Beria was arrested in 1953, subscribers to the second edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia were sent a replacement page carrying an extended article on George Berkeley, to be

pasted in over the entry on Beria. Not a correction. A substitution, delivered to the home, with instructions.

What could not be counted in Galicia

The case's own instance of the operation is quieter than a census and more durable, and it is the reason the module ends where it does.

After the sobor of March 1946 the Greek Catholic church did not exist. Not that it was small, or declining, or in error: it did not exist as a legal category. Its parishes had been transferred, its clergy were Orthodox or in camps, and the confession was gone from the register of religious associations. From that date, no Soviet instrument could record a Greek Catholic, because there was no line on which one could be entered.

The consequence is the thing to notice. Every subsequent count was accurate. No statistician had to be arrested, no return had to be suppressed, no figure had to be adjusted upward by one per cent, because the forms were filled in honestly and added correctly and returned zero — which was the true answer to the question the forms asked. The state's information about the religious life of Galicia was not falsified. It was made incapable of representing the thing that was there.

What the state did continue to count was practice, and those counts were classified. The plenipotentiaries for religious affairs measured rite participation by oblast and by year — baptisms against births, funerals against deaths, church weddings against marriages. In the least observant town of Rivne oblast in the 1960s, the best figures the authorities had, baptism was performed for 28.6 per cent of newborns and burial for 39.5 per cent of the dead, and the countryside ran far higher. Those numbers said something. They did not say what confession the priest belonged to, because the instrument had no way of asking.

On 17 September 1989, on the fiftieth anniversary of the crossing of the frontier, somewhere between one hundred thousand and a hundred and fifty thousand people walked through Lviv to St George's cathedral. Ivan Hel, looking at them, said that the authorities had long insisted there were not very many Ukrainian Catholics, and that this showed there were a lot of them.

The register had said none for forty-three years, and had never once been contradicted by any instrument the state possessed.

Reading information against the framework

The standing finding of this collection is that colonial censorship faced the wrong way and was mostly unnecessary, because the metropolitan public was not lied to and did not much mind. This case breaks that finding, and the break is not marginal. The apparatus here was permanent, expensive, staffed at every level of publication and broadcasting, and directed as heavily at the order's own population as at anyone else — because the thing at risk was not a government's reputation but a set of propositions the order had staked its right to rule on, and propositions of that kind cannot survive being disproved.

The addendum's second instrument, annulment, is confirmed here in its documented form and traced: what was measured, what came back, what the charge was, what happened to the measurers, and what changed in the instrument. What this case adds is a cheaper version of the same operation, and it is the version that ran on this territory for forty-three years.

The durable form of information control is not the suppression of an answer but the deletion of the question, because after the deletion every measurement is accurate and every measurer is honest.

Annulment as performed on the census of 1937 is expensive and conspicuous. It requires arrests, a suppressed return, a redesigned instrument, a fabricated conspiracy to hang the discrepancy on, and a willingness to repeat the whole operation the next time anybody counts. It leaves a trail: interrogation files, an unpublished census, a visible discontinuity in a series. It is the act of a state that has been caught out by its own apparatus and must break the apparatus to escape.

Deleting the category costs nothing and leaves nothing. Nobody has to lie; nobody has to be shot; no series shows a break, because the series never had the line in it. The apparatus goes on functioning correctly and producing true statements indefinitely, and the true statements do not include the fact. This is why it is worth distinguishing from censorship and from annulment both: it is not the concealment of a fact from a public, nor the reclassification of a fact as a fabrication. It is the removal of the *capacity to state* the fact, from the instruments of a state that then continues, quite honestly, to measure everything else.

The price is the one this case pays at the end. A state that has deleted a question cannot answer it either. It does not know what it has removed; it has no instrument

that could tell it, and its blindness is a property of its own forms rather than of anybody's dishonesty, which makes the blindness invisible from inside. Everything the authorities in Lviv knew about Greek Catholics on 16 September 1989 came from a register that had been reporting zero, correctly, since 1946. The people who walked to St George's the next day did not need an instrument to know how many of them there were. They could see each other.

Which suggests a test that can be run on any order, and one that a search for banned books will miss entirely. Do not ask what a state has forbidden its newspapers to print. Ask what it has removed from its forms — what boxes were deleted, in what year, and by what instrument — because that is where a fact goes when a claim cannot accommodate it, and unlike a prohibition, a deletion does not have to be enforced.

A note on sources. The passages from Stalin's report to the Eighteenth Congress of 10 March 1939 are quoted exactly, from the English text in volume fourteen of the *Works*, available in the public domain through the Marxists Internet Archive; the Engels formulation on the withering of the state appears there as Stalin quotes it from *Anti-Dühring*, and is given here as he gives it rather than from Engels's text. Ivan Hel's remark of 17 September 1989 is quoted from the Washington Post's report of the following day. Kvitkin's indictment is paraphrased closely from an English translation of the NKVD document published online by a translation project; I have not seen the Russian original, and while the substance is corroborated by the scholarly literature on the census, the specific wording should not be quoted onward from here.

Everything else is paraphrased and credited at the point of use: the structure of the censorship apparatus, the *spetskhran* regime and the Beria encyclopaedia page from standard reference accounts of Soviet censorship; the 1937 census figures, arrest dates and consequences from the scholarly literature on the 1937 and 1939 censuses, including a chapter-length treatment working from the Russian state archives whose authorship I have not confirmed and therefore do not name; the 1972 Ukrainian trials from *A Chronicle of Current Events*, the samizdat bulletin, in its English edition — a source produced by the people being prosecuted and therefore partisan, though its record of names, dates, charges and sentences has generally held up; and the Rivne rite statistics from a publication of the Rivne oblast state archive.

Two cautions. First, the estimate of the 1989 demonstration is given as a range because the sources differ substantially: the Western press reported more than 150,000, other accounts and the authorities' own figures put it near 100,000, and neither number can be checked. Second, this module's central claim about the deletion of the Greek Catholic category rests on an inference rather than on a document: I have not found a Soviet instruction stating that the confession be struck from the registers, and the argument rests on the legal fact of the church's dissolution together with the absence of the category from subsequent enumeration. That is probably right

and it is not proven, and the instruction, if it exists, would be in the files of the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults.

One gap that bears on the whole. This module describes the apparatus and two of its operations, but says almost nothing about what people in Galicia and Volhynia actually knew — what came in over foreign radio despite the jamming, what circulated by hand, what the parish network carried, and what the security organs' own reports on popular mood recorded about the gap between what was published and what was believed. Those reports exist in the Ukrainian archives and are the correct evidence for the question this module is named for; what is set out here is the machinery, which is a different thing from its effect.

TWO LISTS

Module 8: elite coordination and the default — what a position actually was, how it was held, what it cost to lose, and why an appointed hierarchy defends an arrangement more reliably than a landed one.

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

What a position was

The question of how the positions were defined has a precise and slightly startling answer: they were defined by being written down.

The *nomenklatura* was not a class, a rank or a title. It was a list — or rather two lists, kept at every level of the hierarchy by every committee that had one. The *osnovnoi spisok*, the basic list, enumerated the posts in the political, administrative, economic, military, cultural and educational apparatus that a particular committee was responsible for filling. The *uchyotny spisok*, the registration list, enumerated the persons deemed suitable to fill them. Every institution in the Union had its own pair, covering all the positions of authority within it, however small, and all their holders. In 1985 there were some 9.3 million such posts across the USSR, of which around 2 million sat on the lists of the Communist Party itself.

The system evolved out of the personnel records of the Uchraspred, the registration and distribution department set up in 1919, and was formalised in 1923. The Twelfth Party Congress in April 1923, at Stalin's urging, called on the Central Committee to select not only party leaders but officials across the economy, the co-operatives and local government; a commission under Molotov and Kaganovich drafted the resolution. Two lists emerged at the top: List No. 1, requiring final approval from the Central Committee itself, and List No. 2, requiring coordination with the Uchraspred. The volume was substantial from the start — over ten thousand assignments processed in 1922, nearly twice that by the end of 1923. Stalin, whose attention to this machinery

was close and unremitting, was known in the apparatus as *Tovarishch Kartotekov*, Comrade File Cabinet.

Three features of the arrangement matter for what follows.

The first is that **a post's standing was determined by whose list it was on, not by what the work was.** The head of a department of a republican Central Committee and the head of a department of a district executive committee hold the same title and are not the same kind of man, because the first sits on the republican Central Committee's nomenklatura and the second on a district committee's. Rank in this system is not seniority within a profession; it is altitude in a filing system.

The second is that each level had grades within it. In the main nomenklatura, appointment and dismissal required the approval of the relevant party committee. In the accounting nomenklatura, the committee merely had to be informed. Party bureaus and secretariats kept their own lists on top of that.

The third is the one that governs everything else. **Neither entry belonged to the man.** The post was on somebody else's list, and his eligibility for it was on somebody else's other list, and both could be amended by a decision taken in a room he was not in.

The circle

What holds a man in an arrangement is what he would lose by leaving it, and here what attached to a position was very nearly everything a person could have.

Medical care ran through the Fourth Main Directorate of the Ministry of Health — a separate network of clinics, hospitals and sanatoria for senior party and government officials, with a permanent attending physician assigned to a family, standards of treatment and supply that had no relation to the ordinary hospitals, and a share of the health budget wildly disproportionate to the number it served. Housing was larger and better sited. Senior figures had dachas in designated compounds. Goods came from closed shops supplied by the Council of Ministers' administrative department, which also allotted the summer cottages and handed out holiday benefits. There were cars, drivers, workshops that made clothing to order, cheap canteens with stock nobody else could obtain, holiday vouchers that ordinary citizens queued years for, and personal pensions.

None of it was owned. None of it was heritable. All of it was attached to a post, and forfeit with the post.

That the entitlement was to a *post* rather than to a person can be seen most clearly where the system was under strain, and the western oblasts supply the example. In 1947 Rivne oblast was allocated 191,000 roubles for nomenklatura "limits" — the cash entitlements of officials — which on one Ukrainian scholarly account was barely enough to cover six Soviet and six party leaders, leaving close to thirty other senior officials in the region unpaid. The postwar apparatus in the newly acquired territory had more men on the list than the list could fund. On 27 December 1947 the Council of Ministers and the Central Committee abolished the issuing of limits and the free provision of food at dachas, opened the special shops to all customers, and required officials to pay for their lunches at work. The entitlements moved because a decision moved them, and nobody had a claim.

Around this ran a closed circuit of authority, and it is the mechanism the author's question is really about. A first secretary at any level controlled, through his committee's nomenklatura, the appointment of the secretaries below him. Those secretaries controlled the selection of delegates to the conference that formally elected the committee that formally elected him. Approval ran downward; confirmation ran upward through men the approver had approved. There was no point in the loop at which a person's tenure depended on anyone he had not helped to place, and no point at which it depended on anyone below him whom he could not remove.

Set that against the landed elite of the colonial cases. A co-opted aristocracy defends the conquering order because the order guarantees its estates, and the guarantee is worth having precisely because the estate exists independently of the guarantor — if the order falls, the family still owns the land, and can look for a new guarantor. This elite defends the order because it *is* the order. There is no estate behind the position. Remove the position and there is a man in a flat that is not his, with no car, no clinic, no shop and no pension, and a work record that qualifies him for nothing outside the apparatus that has just dismissed him.

That is why the default here is stronger rather than weaker than in a landed hierarchy, and it is worth being precise about why. It is not that these men believed more. It is that they had less.

The two costs, and the year one of them changed

The cost of losing a position was not constant across the period, and the change is the most consequential fact in this module.

The Ukrainian party's own history supplies the first schedule. Oleksander Shumsky was removed in 1927 for a national deviation. Mykola Skrypnyk shot himself in 1933. In the purges of 1936–38 the republic's party membership was roughly halved and 99 of the 102 members of its Central Committee were shot; Pavel Postyshev and Stanislav Kosior, who had run Ukraine, were removed and executed. The Communist Party of Western Ukraine was dissolved by the Comintern in 1938 and its leadership destroyed. Under that schedule the cost of losing a position included one's life, and reached one's family, and the default was held by terror.

Terror is an expensive way to hold a default and it has a known defect: it produces men who tell their superiors what the superiors have said they expect. The census of 1937 is one consequence of that defect and the procurement plan of 1946 is another.

After 1953 the schedule changed, and it changed by negotiation from within. The elite that had survived the terror removed the terror from itself. What remained was demotion. Under Brezhnev the principle became explicit as the stability of cadres, and tenure in a post became something close to permanent — which produced, alongside great stability, an apparatus that did not move.

The effect on the default is the point. Under the first schedule a man defended the arrangement because departing it might kill him. Under the second he defended it because departing it left him with nothing, and because there was nothing else to depart to. The second is a weaker sanction and a stronger hold, since a man who fears for his life will occasionally take a desperate step and a man who simply has nowhere to go will not.

And it is worth noting what this did to the factional conflict, because the conflict was real and did not weaken the arrangement at all. The Kharkiv men around Shelest and the Dnipropetrovsk network around Shcherbytsky and Brezhnev disliked each other, fought each other, and denounced each other to Moscow. The republic's KGB chief took one side against the republic's first secretary. Ideological officials and industrial managers had incompatible interests and knew it. Every one of those fights was a fight over position *within* the lists. None of them was a fight about whether there should be lists. A man who wins a factional struggle in this system wins a better entry,

and the entry is worth having only if the system that maintains it continues. The conflict presupposed the structure and reinforced it, which is exactly what a default looks like when it is working.

What the ladder looked like from Galicia

The recruitment question has to be answered honestly and the honest answer is partial.

The western oblasts were, in the first postwar decade, administered by men sent in. Party and state cadres were dispatched from the eastern and central oblasts in large numbers to staff the obkoms, raikoms and executive committees of a territory that had never had a Soviet apparatus and whose own educated class had been deported, killed, driven west or was in the forest. Local recruitment followed, from below, over the following decades.

The ceiling can be described by naming who ran the republic. Khrushchev, a Russian who made his career in the Donbas. Oleksii Kyrychenko. Mykola Pidhorny. Petro Shelest, born in Kharkiv province. Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, born at Verkhnodniprovsk in Dnipropetrovsk province and promoted from the party organisation there. The route to the apex of the Ukrainian party, and beyond it into the all-Union leadership, ran through the industrial east and south. It did not run through Lviv.

There is one exception and he is from this study's ground. Leonid Kravchuk was born in January 1934 at Velykyi Zhytyn in Rivne county — Volhynia, then Poland — and rose through the republican party's agitation and propaganda apparatus to become its secretary for ideology in 1989 and its second secretary in 1990.

Whether that constitutes a pattern — Galicia administered from outside, Volhynia recruited from — or a single career that happens to be Volhynian, I have not been able to establish, and the oblast personnel records would settle it. What can be said is that the ladder was formally open to a man from the acquired territory and that at least one man climbed the whole of it.

What happened to a man who developed a position of his own

Petro Shelest was first secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine from June 1963 to May 1972, and within the arrangement he pushed as far as the arrangement allowed.

He pursued a limited cultural and educational Ukrainisation and a measure of autonomy in administration and economic development. At the Fifth Congress of the Writers' Union of Ukraine in November 1966 he promised party support for those who cultivated, in his phrase, our beloved wonderful Ukrainian language. In March 1968 he made Fedir Ovcharenko, who was relatively sympathetic to the Ukrainian intellectuals, secretary for ideology. In 1970 he published *Ukraïno nasha radianska* — O Ukraine, Our Soviet Land — a popular book which presented the republic's development in the spirit of Leninist nationality policy, extolled the Cossack period, approved the Ukrainisation of the 1920s, and did not praise the Russians very much.

The act that appears to have finished him touches this study's territory directly. At the plenum of the Central Committee in November 1971 he intervened to save V. Kutsevol, first secretary of the Lviv obkom, whom Suslov wanted removed for failures in the internationalist and atheistic education of the masses. Shelest won the moment. Shortly afterwards he lost control of the republic's KGB, whose chief Fedorchuk joined Shcherbytsky in sending complaints to Moscow.

From 12 January 1972 the security organs ran a wave of arrests through the Ukrainian intelligentsia, in Kyiv and Lviv above all — 193 people convicted. On 19 May Shelest was removed and transferred to Moscow as deputy premier, a largely symbolic post, and pensioned off eleven months later. In October Valentyn Malanchuk, who had previously done ideological work in the Lviv region, was made secretary for ideology and spent two years purging the Academy of Sciences, the universities, the editorial boards and the writers', artists' and film-makers' unions. A party purge in 1973–75 struck between one and a half and five per cent of the members off the rolls. Ukrainian-language periodicals were cut back and the journals started under Shelest closed.

He was not shot. He was moved sideways, then out, and his successor undid his work. That is the post-1953 instrument operating on a first secretary of a union republic, and it worked without a single arrest at the top.

Nineteen ninety-one

The test the framework wants is available here more cleanly than anywhere else in the collection: whether the same men held the same positions in the same buildings after the legitimating claim evaporated.

In March 1990 the republic held its first competitive elections. By July, ninety-two of the deputies elected as communists had declared themselves independents; the remaining 239 formed a majority group called For a Soviet Sovereign Ukraine, and are known by that number. On 16 July 1990 the parliament adopted a Declaration of State Sovereignty, 355 in favour. On 18 July the group of 239 elected Leonid Kravchuk — the party's chief of ideology — as chairman of the parliament.

On 19 August 1991 the attempted coup in Moscow began. Kravchuk declined to support it. On 24 August, with a large crowd outside, the parliament adopted the Act of Declaration of Independence: 346 votes of 362 deputies present. On 30 August it banned the Communist Party of Ukraine and nationalised its property; the party's caucus in the parliament had already dissolved itself. On 1 December independence was confirmed by referendum with around 92 per cent in favour, and Kravchuk was elected president. On 8 December he signed the declaration at Belovezha that the Soviet Union had ceased to exist as a geopolitical reality.

The communist majority of the republic's parliament voted the Union out of existence. The Communist Party's secretary for ideology became the first president of the independent state. The buildings did not change.

Reading the default against the framework

The expectation for a Soviet case is that the elite will be appointed rather than landed, that it will therefore be more dependent than any co-opted aristocracy in the collection, and that — counter-intuitively — this makes the default stronger rather than weaker, because nobody has an independent base from which to sustain a dissent. All of that holds, and the events of 1991 return the predicted answer to the predicted test: the same men, the same offices, a different flag.

What the case adds is the mechanism, and the mechanism turns out to be one this study has already found operating at the other end of the hierarchy.

What holds an appointed elite is not belief and not privilege but the non-portability of what it holds.

A landowner who breaks with an order takes his land with him. So does a merchant with his capital, a bishop with his flock, a chief with his lineage. Each has something that exists independently of the arrangement and can be carried into a different one, which is why co-opted aristocracies bargain, defect, hedge and occasionally rebel: they retain a base to bargain from. A nomenklatura official has no such thing. His flat is assigned, his clinic is attached to his post, his car has a driver on an establishment, his shop admits him by his entry on a list, and his pension is a decision. If he steps out of the arrangement he steps out of all of it simultaneously and arrives outside with nothing but a work record that qualifies him only for the apparatus that has just dismissed him.

Which is the same instrument, at a different altitude, that held the peasant. A collective farmer had a plot he could not sell and a residence he could not lawfully leave; an obkom secretary had an apartment he did not own and a post he could not take with him. Both were held not by a wall but by the fact that nothing they possessed could be carried out. **An order in which no one at any level owns anything transferable does not need to make anyone believe anything, and it does not need to guard its frontiers against its own elite.** That is a very cheap way to hold a hierarchy together, and it is why this arrangement, for four decades, produced almost no elite defection worth the name.

The corollary is the reason the end looked the way it did, and it is a prediction rather than merely a description.

An arrangement held together by non-portability cannot be left one at a time. It can, however, be left all at once — and it can be left at no cost to anybody, provided the departure does not require anyone to vacate a position. That is precisely what was on offer in August 1991. The men of the group of 239 were not being asked to give up their offices, their apartments, their clinics or their pensions. They were being asked to change the name of the state whose lists those things sat on. Nothing they held had to move. The letterhead moved.

So the same variable explains both halves of the record: an elite that could not defect individually for fifty years, and then abandoned the arrangement unanimously in an afternoon without a shot fired in its defence. Non-portability makes individual exit

impossible and collective exit free, and an order built on it will therefore look unbreakable until the moment it looks like nothing at all.

Which yields a test, and one that does not require knowing anything about what anyone believed. **Ask what a member of the elite takes with him if he leaves.** Where the answer is land, capital, a name or a following, expect individual defection to be a live possibility, expect the order to spend heavily on binding its elite, and expect collective abandonment to be difficult because each member has a separate position to protect. Where the answer is nothing, expect the reverse: no defection at all, no expenditure on loyalty beyond the maintenance of the lists, and then — if a form of departure is ever offered that lets everybody keep their office — a change of regime that meets no resistance from the people who ran the old one, because for them nothing has changed except the name at the top of the page.

A note on sources. Nothing in this module is quoted from a document I have seen. Shelest's phrase about cultivating the Ukrainian language is given as the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* renders it from his November 1966 speech, and is a translation at one remove.

The mechanics of the nomenklatura — the two lists, the 1923 formalisation, the Uchraspred, the volume of early assignments, the 9.3 million posts of 1985 and the roughly 2 million on the party's own lists, and the distinction between the main and accounting grades — are paraphrased from the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, from standard reference accounts, and from a study of Baltic party privilege published by an institute of national remembrance which is explicit about its position. The scholarly literature on the early years cautions that the system did not function as designed before the end of the 1920s, and the description above is of the mature arrangement rather than of 1923. The privileges are from the same sources together with a Ukrainian academic account of nomenklatura finances in the postwar republic, which is also the source for the Rivne oblast allocation of 1947 and for the measures of 27 December 1947; that figure and its interpretation come from a single publication and I have not corroborated them.

Shelest's career, book, removal and the intervention over Kutsevol are from the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* and from a Slavic Review article of December 1975 on Ukrainian nationalism and his fall; the account of the Kutsevol episode comes from a source that article is itself reporting, and should be treated as a plausible reconstruction rather than an established chain of causation, since the reasons for a Politburo removal are rarely on the record. The purge figures for 1972–75 are given as a range because sources differ between roughly 1.5 and nearly 5 per cent of party members. The 1990 and 1991 parliamentary sequence is from reference accounts of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet election and of the Declaration of Independence, and the vote of 346 of 362 present is as those accounts give it.

Two gaps. First, the recruitment ceiling for western Ukrainians into the republican apparatus is described here impressionistically rather than measured. The oblast and republican personnel files would show, year by year, what proportion of the Lviv, Ternopil and Volyn nomenklatura was locally born, and that series would settle a question this module can only raise. Second, this module says almost nothing about the security organs as a separate hierarchy with its own lists and its own interests, though the Fedorchuk episode shows they were both — and an account of how the party's nomenklatura and the KGB's related to each other in the western oblasts, where the KGB's weight was greatest, would materially change the picture drawn above.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.

PRINTING PRESSES, STOCKS OF PAPER

Module 9: plurality or foreclosure — what the written liberties said, where their guarantee was located, which single group held an enforceable one, and what happened to a man who tried to use the largest of them.

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

What the text said

On paper this was a federal order with an entrenched right of exit, which is more than most constitutions offer.

The Constitution of 1936 provided at Article 16 that each union republic had its own constitution, and at Article 17: *"To every Union Republic is reserved the right freely to secede from the U.S.S.R."* Article 18 added that a republic's territory could not be altered without its consent. Article 123 guaranteed equality of rights irrespective of nationality or race in all spheres of economic, state, cultural, social and political life, and made the advocacy of national exclusiveness or hatred punishable by law. Article 124 separated church from state and school from church. Article 125 guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly including mass meetings, and of street processions and demonstrations. The Constitution of 1977 restated the exit right at Article 72.

Beneath that, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic had the full apparatus of a state. Its own constitutions of 1937 and 1978. A Supreme Soviet, a Council of Ministers, a supreme court, an Academy of Sciences. From 1944 a foreign ministry of its own, and from 1945 a seat at the United Nations, separate from the Union's.

Nobody in Galicia in 1950 would have described any of this as liberty, and the reason is not that the documents were ignored. It is that two clauses in them did the work, and both are in plain sight.

Where the guarantee was located

The first is a matter of one word appearing on one side of a balance and not the other. Article 124 reads that in order to ensure freedom of conscience, church is separated from state and school from church, and that *"freedom of religious worship and freedom of antireligious propaganda is recognized for all citizens."* Worship is free. Antireligious propaganda is free. Religious propaganda is not named — which is to say that one party to the argument may argue and the other may only practise. The asymmetry is not concealed in an implementing regulation. It is in the sentence.

The second is Article 125, and it repays reading in full rather than in summary. It opens with a condition: *"In conformity with the interests of the working people, and in order to strengthen the socialist system, the citizens of the U.S.S.R. are guaranteed by law"* — and then the four freedoms. That much is the ordinary device by which a right is made to depend on an authority's view of its purpose, and it is common enough in constitutions of the period.

The sentence that follows is not ordinary, and it is the one that matters:

"These civil rights are ensured by placing at the disposal of the working people and their organizations printing presses, stocks of paper, public buildings, the streets, communications facilities and other material requisites for the exercise of these rights."

That locates the guarantee in supply. A freedom of the press whose guarantee is the provision of presses and paper is not a restraint upon the state at all; it is a service the state undertakes to render. And a service can be declined. Declining requires no statute, no court, no prohibition and no explanation — only a decision, somewhere in an allocation office, that a particular quantity of newsprint is going elsewhere this quarter. Whoever holds the paper holds the right, and the constitution says so.

Article 126 closes the remaining aperture by providing that the most active and politically conscious citizens unite in the Communist Party, which is the leading core of all organisations of the working people, social and state alike. The 1977 constitution made this Article 6, the leading and guiding force of Soviet society. Under either wording, an organisation that is not led by the party is not a lawful kind of organisation.

So the three things a faction would need in order to become a counterweight — money, force, and a means of addressing the public — were all obtainable only from

the same source, and the constitution did not disguise the fact. It recorded it as a guarantee.

The one group with a real liberty

There was, nevertheless, one enforceable liberty in this order, and identifying who held it answers the inside-and-outside question exactly.

The Ukrainian constitutions of 1937 at Article 103 and of 1978 at Article 32 proclaimed the equality of all citizens before the law irrespective of position or profession. The party's own charter provided otherwise. A party and government decree of 1938 required the consent of the party organisation before a communist or a candidate member could be arrested. Article 12 of the party charter of 1952 provided that a member who committed offences punishable by law should be expelled from the party and the administrative and judicial authorities notified. The 1961 charter narrowed the wording to offences punishable by criminal procedure, with the effect that a communist could not be prosecuted for misconduct unless he had first been expelled — and expulsion was decided by his own organisation and confirmed by the committee above it, both of them bodies within the same apparatus he belonged to.

The state's own chief law officer described the result. In a report to the Central Committee shortly before Stalin's death, the Procurator-General of the USSR wrote that in fact there were two criminal codes, one for communists and another for everyone else, and that there were many instances in which, for the same offence, party members remained at liberty while non-party members went to prison.

It is worth being precise about what that is. It is not corruption, or not only corruption. It is a procedural protection — a requirement that a particular tribunal pass on a person's status before the criminal law may reach him — and it is the only genuine due-process right in the whole arrangement. It was formally constituted, written into a charter, and enforced. And it belonged to one group.

Two other lines can be drawn across the population by the same test.

The collective farmer stood outside the internal passport system and could not lawfully be absent from his village for more than thirty days without a permit from the village soviet; townsmen held the document and moved. In 1967 some 58 million rural adults, about 37 per cent of the population of the Union, had no passport. Freedom of movement was a liberty of a category, not of a citizen.

And access to what could be known was similarly graded. Foreign and pre-revolutionary publications sat in restricted collections open on a permit; officials of appropriate rank received bulletins containing foreign reporting that was not published; everybody else had the newspapers. The information monopoly was not held by one man. It was held by one apparatus, and shared downward in rations by rank.

The right that had no procedure

The exit right sat in the constitution from 1924, was restated in 1936 and again in 1977, and for the whole of that period no law existed by which it could be exercised. The Union legislation regulating secession was not enacted until the state's final years.

It came on 3 April 1990. Its provisions are worth setting out because they are the whole argument of this module in one instrument.

A referendum could be called by the republic's own Supreme Soviet, on its own initiative or on the demand of ten per cent of the permanently resident citizens entitled to vote. It had to be held by secret ballot not earlier than six months and not later than nine months after that decision. No agitation on the subject of the referendum was permitted during the referendum. The decision to secede was carried only if not less than two-thirds of the citizens permanently resident on the republic's territory and entitled to vote voted in favour — two-thirds of the electorate, that is, and not two-thirds of those voting, so that every abstention counted as a no. Where the republic contained autonomous republics, autonomous regions or autonomous territories, separate referendums were to be held in each, and the people living there were to decide independently whether to remain in the Union or go with the seceding republic. The results were then reviewed by the republic's Supreme Soviet, jointly with those of the autonomies. If the Supreme Soviet of the USSR found the law had been violated during the referendum, it could order a repeat within three months; and if fewer than two-thirds voted in favour at the repeat, the decision to secede was deemed repealed and the procedure terminated.

Ukraine never used it. The Act of 24 August 1991 does not invoke the procedure, and the referendum of 1 December 1991 was not the referendum the law describes.

Seventy-two days

Levko Lukianenko was born in 1928. After an evening school for military officers he was admitted to the Faculty of Law of Moscow State University, graduated in 1958, and was assigned to Lviv oblast as a party propagandist.

There, with Ivan Kandyba and others, he organised a group called the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Union. Its draft programme held that its ideal was an independent Ukraine with a highly developed socialist political system, and its method was the one the constitution provided: the right of a union republic freely to secede, exercised by lawful means. He was a party member with a Moscow law degree proposing to use Article 17.

The group was betrayed before the draft could be revised and adopted. Lukianenko was arrested on 21 January 1961, expelled from the party, and charged with advocating separatism, undermining the credibility of the Communist Party, and defaming the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. On 20 May 1961 the Lviv oblast court sentenced him to death under Articles 56-1 and 64 of the criminal code of the Ukrainian SSR. He waited seventy-two days for the sentence to be carried out. It was then commuted to fifteen years in corrective labour camps.

He was released in 1976, became a founding member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, was arrested again in 1977 and sentenced to ten years' camp and five years' exile. He served twenty-seven years in all, in Mordovia and Vladimir and in exile, and was pardoned and freed on 30 November 1988.

In March 1990 he was elected a deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR. He co-authored the Declaration of State Sovereignty adopted on 16 July 1990. On the night of 23 to 24 August 1991 he wrote the Act of Declaration of Independence, which the parliament adopted the following day by 346 votes of 362 deputies present, and which was signed by the party's former secretary for ideology.

Turning the signature back

The Helsinki Final Act was signed by the Soviet Union in 1975. On 9 November 1976 a group formed in Kyiv to monitor Soviet compliance with the human-rights commitments in it — the Ukrainian Public Group to Promote the Implementation of

the Helsinki Accords, of which Lukianenko was a founder member and the writer Mykola Rudenko the head.

Their method was the residue mechanism in its purest form. They had no base of any kind: no property, no organisation the law would recognise, no press, no access to a court that would hear them, and no faction behind them. What they had was a document their own government had signed, and an external forum which that signature obliged to receive complaints. So they wrote memoranda and sent them out.

During 1977 and 1978 five members — Rudenko, Oleksa Tykhy, Mykola Matusevych, Myroslav Marynovych and Lukianenko — were sentenced to terms of twelve to fifteen years. The group was replenished from among new members and from political prisoners still in the camps, and was led in effect by Oksana Meshko. On the evidence of samizdat documents several thousand people were involved in the Ukrainian dissident movement in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Members of the group continued to be arrested for as long as it existed.

What that produced was not protection. Every one of them went to a camp. What it produced was a record, lodged in a forum that could not enforce anything, held for thirteen years, and available when the ground shifted. The founding congress of the successor body, the Ukrainian Helsinki Association, met on 29 and 30 April 1990; it became the Ukrainian Republican Party; Lukianenko was elected its head, and was elected to the parliament that abolished the Union.

Reading liberty against the framework

The expectation carried into this module is that liberty is not a matter of what is written but of whether the three monopolies — over wealth, over force, and over what may be trusted as true — are held by one hand or shared among rivals; and that where they are shared, factions defending themselves against each other deposit protections which harden into rights nobody intended to create. The corresponding expectation for a Soviet case is that the republican architecture will be found intact and captured, that the exit right will be found unusable, and that the excluded will be found turning the order's own legitimating language back on it.

All of that holds and can be dated. But the case supplies something the general expectation does not, and it comes from taking the objection seriously rather than dismissing it.

The three monopolies were not held by one hand here. They were divided by function and the functions were genuinely distinct. The party appointed and decided; the security organs watched, informed and arrested; the economic ministries produced and allocated; the procuracy supervised legality; the soviets legislated. These bodies had different interests and knew it, and they fought each other continuously and in earnest. The chairman of the republic's KGB sent complaints to Moscow about the republic's first secretary and helped bring him down. A secretary of the all-Union Central Committee tried to remove the first secretary of the Lviv obkom and was blocked by Kyiv. The Kharkiv network and the Dnipropetrovsk network fought for a decade over the same posts. There was no shortage of factions and no shortage of conflict.

And no liberty came of it. Not a single protection was deposited by any of those fights that reached anyone outside the apparatus.

So the finding is a condition the framework has been assuming rather than stating:

Liberty's residue does not require that factions exist, or that they fight, or even that they be evenly matched. It requires that a defeated faction can survive its defeat. Where losing a contest means ceasing to exist, factional conflict produces no rights — only casualties, and a stronger centre.

The reason a baron extracts a charter is not that he is strong but that he is still there afterwards. He loses a battle and retires to his own land, which is his whether or not the king approves; he can be beaten this year and be a party to a negotiation the next. Protections accumulate because the loser keeps returning, and each return costs the winner something. A guild, a congregation, a chartered company, a newspaper with its own presses and its own subscribers — each is a body that can be defeated without being dissolved, and each therefore has a reason to bargain for terms that will hold when it is weak.

No Soviet faction met that condition, because every one of them existed only as an arrangement of posts on somebody's list. Shelest defeated is not a diminished Shelest with a base in Kharkiv; he is a pensioner. Kutsevol removed is not the Lviv interest in reduced circumstances; he is nobody. A faction whose whole existence is its current occupancy of offices cannot bargain for protections against future defeat, because after a defeat there is no one left to be protected.

Which explains, exactly, where the one real liberty in this order was found. The Communist Party was the single body in Soviet society that could lose an internal contest and go on existing, because it owned the procedure by which its own members

were removed and no one else could operate it. Being the only body that met the condition, it did what such bodies do: it wrote itself a due process. Expulsion before prosecution, decided by its own organisation, confirmed by its own committee — the requirement of a hearing before a particular tribunal, which is the oldest liberty there is. The Procurator-General's two criminal codes were not a defect in the system. They were the system's only genuine rights instrument, generated by its only genuine faction, and extended to nobody else because nobody else qualified.

Two consequences follow, and the second is the one that bears on more than this case.

The first is that separating powers by *function* achieves nothing if the separated bodies share a *base*. This order had a division of labour that would satisfy any textbook — legislature, executive, judiciary, security service, press, all formally distinct — and it produced not one protection, because every one of them drew its personnel, its budget, its premises and its authority from the same list. Institutional separation is cheap and can be conceded by anybody. Independent standing is expensive and is never conceded voluntarily.

The second is what it implies about the claim the order made for itself. The doctrine held that liberal freedoms were formal and hollow, and that a state which abolished private ownership would deliver a fuller liberty than any parliament could. On the mechanism above, abolishing private ownership is not neutral with respect to liberty and it is not merely insufficient: it is the specific act that removes the condition under which liberties accumulate. Land, capital, an endowment, a printing works and a congregation are the things a defeated party stands on while it waits. An order that has taken them all into a single ownership has not distributed them; it has abolished the standing ground, and with it the only mechanism by which a right has ever been extracted from anyone. That the doctrine did not intend this is not in question, and does not alter it.

The test that falls out is short and does not require reading any constitution. **Ask what happens to a faction that loses.** Where the answer is that it retreats to something it still holds and returns, expect rights to accumulate over time regardless of what the founding documents say, and expect them to leak outward from the contending parties to everybody else, because a faction seeking allies will extend its protections to whoever can be recruited. Where the answer is that it disappears, expect

nothing to accumulate at all — however many institutions exist, however genuinely they quarrel, and however generous the text.

A note on sources. The constitutional passages are quoted exactly from the English text of the 1936 Constitution of the USSR, a public-domain government document available in several reproductions; Articles 17, 124, 125 and 126 are given as they appear there. The Procurator-General's remark about two criminal codes is quoted from an English-language Ukrainian scholarly publication which cites it to an archival report of the early 1950s; I have not seen the report, and the wording should be treated as a translation at one remove. The provisions of the secession law of 3 April 1990 are paraphrased closely from published English translations of the text.

Everything else is paraphrased and credited at the point of use. Lukianenko's career, charges, sentence and the seventy-two days are from the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*'s biographical entry and its entry on the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Union, cross-checked against contemporary and later press reporting; accounts differ marginally on whether the sentence fell in January or May 1961, and the May date given by the encyclopaedia's entry on the group is followed here. The party charter provisions of 1938, 1952 and 1961 governing the arrest and expulsion of members are from the same Ukrainian scholarly source as the Procurator-General's remark, which is a study of nomenklatura abuses of office working from Ukrainian archives. The Ukrainian Helsinki Group's founding, membership and sentences are from the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*'s entry on the dissident movement; the estimate of several thousand participants is that source's, drawn from samizdat, and cannot be independently checked.

Three cautions. First, this module rests heavily on constitutional and charter texts and on the biography of a small number of people, which is a thin evidentiary base for a claim about how an entire population stood in relation to the law; what an ordinary Galician actually experienced when he had a dispute with an official — whether he went to a court, a procurator, a party committee or nowhere — is the missing middle, and it exists in the complaints files of the oblast soviets and the procuracy. Second, the claim that no protections were deposited by elite factional conflict is a negative and I have not searched exhaustively for counter-instances; the reforms of the criminal law in the later 1950s, which abolished the extra-judicial boards and restored some procedural guarantees, are the strongest candidate for one, and a fuller treatment would have to weigh whether those were a residue of factional bargaining or a decision taken from the top for other reasons. Third, the framing of the closing section is the framework's own and the case has been used to test it; a reader should note that a study designed around a proposition is a poor instrument for refuting it, and treat the finding as a proposition sharpened rather than as one demonstrated.

ACTIONS BY IRRESPONSIBLE PERSONS

Module 10: change and collapse — why a state with millions of men under arms did not use them, and what had happened at the centre to make an intact instrument unusable.

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The question is not asked in Kyiv

In the summer of 1991 the largest concentration of Soviet armed force outside Russia stood in Ukraine: three military districts, the Black Sea Fleet, strategic rocket forces, and a nuclear arsenal. Against that, the Ukrainian national movement had a parliamentary caucus, a popular front founded two years earlier, a legalised church, and crowds. Nothing in that column beats anything in the other one, and no account of what happened which begins with the crowds can be right.

So the question is the one the framework insists on asking, and it is not asked in Lviv or Kyiv. This state had killed on this ground for fourteen years to hold it, by a method it had refined and never renounced. Why did it not do so again? Something had changed at the apex, and the change has to be located there, in the same way that the European withdrawals of the 1950s and 1960s have to be explained by what happened in London, Paris and Brussels rather than by the strength of the movements that received the handover — since in almost every case the metropolitan army remained capable of winning and the metropolitan government declined to have it try.

Two things changed in Moscow. The first was a bill. The second, and the one that actually mattered, was that the state killed three times in twenty-two months and then refused to say it had ordered it.

The bill

The Soviet Union's hard-currency position turned over sharply in the middle of the 1980s and never recovered.

On the CIA's retrospective accounting, hard-currency export earnings ran at about $32 billion in 1983–84 and fell to $25.1 billion in 1986; oil earnings alone collapsed from an average of $15.2 billion across 1982–84 to roughly $7 billion by the end of 1986. Gross hard-currency debt nearly doubled, from about $22 billion in 1984 to $41.2 billion by the end of 1987, and external borrowing is put at around $30 billion in 1986 and $50 billion by 1989. The budget deficit, which had run at 2 or 3 per cent of GNP, blew out to something near 10 per cent and stayed there; hidden deficits of 7 or 8 per cent of GNP were accompanied by inflation that showed itself not in prices but in empty shelves.

Two further charges fell in the same years. The war in Afghanistan ran from 1979 to 1989. And on 26 April 1986 the fourth reactor at Chernobyl exploded, on Ukrainian territory, at a cost in money that has never been satisfactorily totalled and a cost in the state's credibility that was visible immediately.

The clearest single index of the repricing is what Moscow did to its own clients. Through the 1970s and early 1980s it supplied Eastern Europe, Cuba and others with oil at well below world prices, which is what an imperial subsidy looks like on a balance sheet. As the hard-currency squeeze tightened it began diverting that oil to markets that paid in dollars, and the share of Soviet oil sales going to the Comecon countries fell from 46 per cent in 1980 to 16 per cent in 1990. The centre started starving its own periphery of the subsidy that held it, before it lost the periphery. That is a repricing, and it can be read off a series.

The decision, and its date

The decision that followed was announced in public, at length, before anybody in Ukraine had moved.

On 7 December 1988, at the forty-third General Assembly of the United Nations, Gorbachev announced a unilateral reduction of 500,000 men and 10,000 tanks, including the withdrawal of assault river-crossing formations from Eastern Europe, and set out freedom of choice as a universal principle admitting of no exceptions. He had

told a small circle of advisers on 31 October that the speech should be an anti-Fulton — Fulton in reverse. Ten and a half months later, on 25 October 1989, the foreign ministry spokesman Gennadi Gerasimov told an American television programme that the Brezhnev Doctrine was obsolete and had been replaced by the Sinatra Doctrine: they do it their way.

The dates matter more than the words. Rukh held its founding congress in September 1989. The Ukrainian Helsinki Association's founding congress met in April 1990. The Ukrainian parliament declared sovereignty in July 1990 and independence in August 1991. Every one of those events postdates the announcement at the United Nations. The demonstration of a hundred and fifty thousand people that walked to St George's cathedral in Lviv on 17 September 1989 was possible because the repricing had already occurred; it did not cause it.

That has to be said plainly, because the temptation to write the sequence the other way round is strong and the sequence does not support it.

What happened when they did kill

The proposition that Moscow stopped killing is false, and the falsity is the most useful thing in this module. It killed three times in twenty-two months, on the periphery, against demonstrations.

At Tbilisi, in the early hours of 9 April 1989, troops under Colonel-General Igor Rodionov cleared a peaceful rally on Rustaveli Avenue with entrenching shovels, truncheons and gas. Twenty-one people died, sixteen of them women; a hundred and eighty-three were hospitalised in the first hours; several hundred were affected by the gas.

At Baku, on the night of 19–20 January 1990, after the central television station had been destroyed and the telephone and radio lines cut, some 26,000 troops entered the city through the barricades. Estimates of the dead run from 131 to 170, with 700 to 800 injured; Azerbaijan's official figure is 147 civilians killed.

At Vilnius, in January 1991, at least 14 people were killed and more than 700 injured at the television tower.

Then came the part that had never happened before. Gorbachev attributed the deaths at Tbilisi, in the reporting of the time, to actions by irresponsible persons. A commission of the Congress of People's Deputies under Anatoly Sobchak investigated,

and reported in December 1989 that the demonstration had been peaceful and had posed no immediate threat to public order or to state institutions, that the local authorities had exaggerated the risk in order to justify intervention, and that the force used had been excessive and unauthorised — naming the sharpened entrenching spades and the chemical agents. Shevardnadze criticised the military. The government of the Georgian republic resigned.

An organ of the Soviet state had investigated an operation of the Soviet army and found against the army; and the head of the state had described his own troops' action as the work of irresponsible persons.

The consequence acquired a name at the time, and the name is the finding of this module. *Tbilisi syndrome* was the term for the reluctance of officers and soldiers thereafter to take tactical decisions, or to obey orders at all, without a clear trail of responsibility running to a higher authority — a reluctance that arose specifically because the leadership had refused to take responsibility for the order to clear the square and because the commission and the foreign minister had blamed the men who executed it. It spread further after Baku and after Vilnius.

Nothing had happened to the instrument. The divisions existed, the special-forces units existed, the ammunition existed, and the men were the same men. What had been withdrawn was the indemnity: the guarantee, which every previous holder of that office had provided without needing to state it, that an officer who used lethal force on orders would find the order acknowledged above him and no forum convened to examine it. Once that was withdrawn, a colonel facing a square had to run a calculation about his own position, and the calculation came out the same way every time.

August

The plotters of August 1991 had every physical asset a coup requires and could not make any of it move.

The State Committee for the State of Emergency was formed on 18 August, comprising the vice-president, the chairman of the KGB, the minister of defence, the prime minister, the minister of the interior, the deputy head of the Security Council and others. Gorbachev, at Foros, refused to endorse a state of emergency. Several hundred thousand people gathered at the Russian parliament building over the following days. A plan to storm it, using tanks and the Alpha and Vympel special-forces

units, was drafted; the Defence Minister Yazov never gave the order to execute it. Army and KGB officers declined to carry out orders to storm the building. The Moscow police did not enforce the committee's edicts. By 21 August it was over, and the committee's members were arrested.

The Georgian syndrome is credited, in the accounts of the period, with contributing directly to that refusal.

What Kyiv did

On 24 August 1991, three days after the collapse, with a large crowd outside the building, the Ukrainian parliament adopted the Act of Declaration of Independence by 346 votes of 362 deputies present, on a text written the previous night by a man who had spent twenty-seven years in Soviet camps. The same session moved to place the military formations on Ukrainian territory under the republic's own authority and to create a ministry of defence. On 30 August the Communist Party of Ukraine was banned and its property nationalised. On 1 December a referendum returned about 92 per cent in favour of independence on an 84 per cent turnout, carrying every region including Crimea, and Leonid Kravchuk was elected president. On 8 December, outside Minsk, he signed the declaration that the Soviet Union had ceased to exist as a geopolitical reality and a subject of international law. From 6 December the armed forces on Ukrainian soil began swearing an oath to Ukraine.

Not a shot was fired in defence of the arrangement by anybody at any point in that sequence.

Both halves of that have to be held at once. The referendum of 1 December was a real vote and 92 per cent is a real number; the departure was chosen and not merely permitted, and Ukraine's departure is what made the continuation of the Union impossible for anyone else. And it was survivable only because the apparatus that had spent fourteen years killing on this ground to hold it was, by then, an apparatus nobody would give an order to.

Reading the collapse against the framework

The expectation for a case of this kind is that the end comes from the centre's will emptying rather than from the ruled overcoming the floor, and that expectation holds

exactly, with dates: the repricing is visible in the hard-currency accounts from 1986 and the decision is on the record from December 1988, before the movements that are usually credited with causing it existed.

But "the will emptied" is a description rather than a mechanism, and this case supplies the mechanism, which is finer-grained and considerably more useful.

The will at the top did not empty. Gorbachev did not want the Union to end; he spent his last two years trying to preserve it, and the men who tried hardest to preserve it by force went to prison in August 1991 for the attempt. The instrument failed anyway, in the hands of people who wanted very much to use it. So the change cannot have been a change of preference at the apex. It was something else, and it is dateable to a press statement in April 1989.

A floor of force does not rest on the state's capacity to kill. It rests on the state's willingness to own the killing, and the two are separable. An order that kills and then disowns the killing has not merely lost an argument about its reputation — it has withdrawn the indemnity that made its own instrument operable, and from that moment the instrument is unusable at scale, however many men remain under arms.

The mechanism is the same one that governs everybody else in this study, applied to the man holding the rifle. An officer ordered to clear a square is doing arithmetic about his own position exactly as a peasant does arithmetic about his plot. Under a state that signs its orders, his exposure is nil: the order came from above, the responsibility sits above, and no body exists that could be convened to examine it. His compliance is therefore very cheap, and the state gets it without paying anything. Under a state that will attribute the operation to irresponsible persons, seat a commission of deputies to examine it, and leave his name as the only one in the file, his exposure is total. His compliance becomes expensive, and no amount of equipment reduces the price. Nothing material changed between the tanks that went into Prague in 1968 and the tanks that sat in Moscow in 1991. What changed was who would be named afterwards.

The sequencing is what makes this a mechanism rather than an observation, and it runs the opposite way to intuition. **The disavowal was not a symptom of weakness. It was a cause of it.** Gorbachev disowned Tbilisi in order to protect the reform programme from the odium of twenty-one deaths, and in that immediate purpose it worked. The price was paid two years later by men who had nothing to do with the reform programme: a plan to storm a parliament building, drawn up by a Defence

Minister who commanded five million men, which was never issued because issuing it meant signing it.

Which yields a test, and one that can be applied to any order while it still appears entirely intact. **Do not measure a floor by the size of the force. Measure it by whether the last order to kill was signed.** Search the record for the first occasion on which lethal force was used on authority and then attributed by the state to excess, error, or the irresponsibility of the men who used it — with no one above them acknowledged, and a body of some kind convened to examine their conduct. That date is the date on which the floor became unusable, and it will generally precede the visible collapse by two to three years, during which every parade and every order of battle will continue to look exactly as it did before.

One corollary is worth recording because it bears on the other studies in the collection. The colonial withdrawals are conventionally explained by exhaustion, expense and a change in metropolitan opinion, all of which are real and all of which are present here. But the finer mechanism may be present there too, and it would be visible in the same place: in the moment when a metropolitan government first responded to a massacre in a colony by disowning the officers rather than defending them. What that does to the next officer is not a matter of opinion, and it does not require any change in what the public wants.

A note on sources. Nothing here is quoted from a document I have seen. Gorbachev's attribution of the Tbilisi deaths to actions by irresponsible persons is taken from the standard reference account of the events, which reports it from contemporary sources; it is a translation at one remove and I have not found the Russian original, so it should not be quoted onward from here as his exact words. His remark to his advisers on 31 October 1988 about an anti-Fulton is given as a published translation of the meeting record. Gerasimov's Sinatra formulation is reported consistently across sources, though they differ on whether he first used it in Helsinki or on American television and on the exact date in late October 1989.

The economic figures are paraphrased and are of uneven quality. The CIA retrospective figures for hard-currency earnings, oil earnings and gross debt, and the movement of the budget deficit from 2–3 to about 10 per cent of GNP, come from a secondary compilation citing declassified CIA assessments which I have not read; the external-loan figures of roughly $30 billion in 1986 and $50 billion in 1989 come from a journal article of variable reliability; the Comecon oil-share figures of 46 per cent in 1980 falling to 16 per cent in 1990 come from the same compilation as the CIA figures. Anyone building on the economic argument should go to the underlying assessments rather than to this module. Per-barrel oil prices have been deliberately omitted

because the published figures differ by a factor of several depending on whether they are nominal or inflation-adjusted, and the confusion is not worth importing.

The casualty figures for Tbilisi, Baku and Vilnius are given as the ranges that appear in the sources: 21 dead at Tbilisi with 16 women among them, from Georgian and international accounts that agree closely; 131 to 170 at Baku with an Azerbaijani official figure of 147; at least 14 at Vilnius. All three of these events are commemorated by states with an interest in the figures, and the Soviet-side accounts differ; the Baku range in particular should be read with that in mind. The findings of the Sobchak commission are summarised from reference accounts of its December 1989 report, which I have not read.

The description of Tbilisi syndrome, including its extension to Baku and Vilnius and its contribution to the refusals of August 1991, is paraphrased from reference and analytical accounts of the period. It is a term of art rather than an official designation, and the causal claim embedded in it — that the disavowal produced the later refusals — is one those accounts assert and I have adopted; it is plausible, it is widely held, and it is not proved by anything cited here.

Two gaps. First, this module says almost nothing about what the Soviet military command in Ukraine specifically did or considered between August and December 1991 — who was approached, what was discussed in the Kyiv, Odesa and Carpathian military district headquarters, and on what terms the officer corps transferred its allegiance. That material exists in Ukrainian and Russian memoir and archive and would test the argument above at exactly the point where it is weakest. Second, the resolution of 24 August 1991 concerning military formations on Ukrainian territory is described here from general accounts rather than from its text, which I have not read, and its precise terms should be checked before the description is relied upon.

TRAINS GOING WESTWARD

Module 11: the grim accounting — the columns of the dead and the displaced, the credit that also has to be entered, and a test of whether the note this land owed fell due in the way conquest usually makes it fall due.

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The columns

Every figure below is contested and most of them are contested by governments. They are set out by agent and by period, with the ranges and the estimators, and nothing here is netted against anything else.

The taking, September 1939. The Soviet official return for the Ukrainian Front was 972 killed or missing and 1,741 wounded. Polish losses to the Soviets across both fronts are put at 3,000 to 7,000 killed; prisoners at 200,000 to 250,000 on the lower reckonings and as high as 450,000 on others.

The removals, 1940–41. Four waves out of the annexed Polish territories. NKVD accounting gives some 330,000 to 350,000 people; Polish institutional estimates run from 800,000 to over a million, with 1.2 million in common circulation. Around 500,000 Polish citizens were imprisoned before June 1941. Some 22,000 prisoners of war and officials were shot in the spring of 1940 on the Politburo's decision, including a list of prisoners held in the western Ukrainian prisons given as 3,435.

Mortality in exile is not separately recorded for this group and has to be inferred from comparable operations. Soviet archival data record 309,521 deaths in the special settlements between 1941 and 1948 and a further 73,454 in 1949–50, across all deported categories. Death rates for other deportations run at 14 per cent among the specially displaced in 1933, 19.3 per cent for those removed from Crimea, and 24.7 per cent for the North Caucasus deportations. For the Poles taken in 1940–41 the deaths are generally put in the tens of thousands. The NKVD itself reported that 10 to 13 per

cent of those moved in the final wave of May and June 1941 were killed by bombardment in transit and 12 to 15 per cent injured.

The prisons, June 1941. Between about 9,000 on Soviet internal tallies for the republic and 40,000 in the wider scholarship, with much of the Polish literature at 20,000 to 30,000. Ukrainians were something near 70 per cent of the identified victims and Poles around 20 per cent.

The occupation, 1941–44. This is the largest column and it is not close.

When Germany invaded in June 1941, the Ukrainian SSR including the newly annexed western territories held a Jewish population of 2.3 to 2.45 million. Between 1.4 and 1.5 million were murdered, the great majority within eighteen months, in mass shootings, close to home. The western regions were destroyed almost entirely: in eastern Galicia a few per cent of the Jewish population survived, and in Volhynia fewer. By October 1942 the Germans and their auxiliaries had killed approximately 247,000 Volhynian Jews, some 97 per cent of the Jews of that province. In Stanyslaviv on 12 October 1941, security police and a police battalion killed 12,000 of the town's Jewish inhabitants in a day. On Alexander Kruglov's estimate, the average daily Jewish death toll in Ukraine exceeded 2,600 in 1941 and remained above 2,000 in 1942.

A community that had been on this ground since the Middle Ages, and had been about a tenth of its population, was not on it in 1945.

The Polish–Ukrainian killing, 1943–46. Estimates of Poles killed by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and associated formations in Volhynia and eastern Galicia run from 50,000 to 100,000. Timothy Snyder gives 40,000 to 60,000 in Volhynia and a further figure for Galicia; Grzegorz Motyka gives 40,000 to 60,000 in Volhynia and 30,000 to 40,000 in Galicia, for 80,000 to 100,000 including the eastern Polish lands; Grzegorz Hryciuk gives 35,700 to 60,000 for Volhynia and 20,000 to 24,000 for Galicia; Ivan Katchanovski considers the lower bound of 35,000 for Volhynia the more likely. The peak was July and August 1943, and most of the victims were women and children. Ukrainian deaths in Polish retaliatory operations are given as 10,000 to 12,000 by the Polish Institute of National Remembrance and 17,000 to 24,000 by Ukrainian historians.

The counter-insurgency, 1944–53. Soviet documents record 153,000 killed, 134,000 arrested and 203,000 deported, most of it in 1944–45; independent compilations put insurgent dead lower, near 56,600 or 99,000. Official Soviet figures for their own losses across the decade give 30,676 killed, including 687 state security

personnel, 1,864 interior ministry personnel, 3,199 soldiers and border troops, 241 party officials and 2,590 members of self-defence units. The removal of insurgents' families ran to 66,438 families and 205,938 people between 1944 and 1952, of whom 77,791 went in a single day on 21 October 1947.

The exchanges, 1944–47. Some 483,000 Ukrainians moved east and about 790,000 Poles west by 1946; Operation Vistula dispersed a further 140,000 to 150,000 Ukrainians within Poland in 1947.

The largest column

The single largest number in this accounting was produced by neither the order this study concerns nor the order it displaced, but by the occupation that fell between them for three years.

That has two consequences for the account and both should be stated plainly rather than left to be inferred.

The first is that the population of this territory in 1946 was not the population of 1939 minus the deportations. It was a different population. The Jews were gone, murdered. The Poles were gone, moved by treaty into a country whose borders had been shifted west. What remained was overwhelmingly Ukrainian, in a region that had been three-fold for six centuries, and the homogeneity that the Soviet order administered from 1944 was not a thing that order created — it inherited it, complete, and then finished it by agreement with Warsaw.

The second is a matter of property. The incomers who arrived in Lviv after 1944 — something near a hundred thousand of them, in a city that grew from roughly 318,000 to about 450,000 — moved into housing whose occupants were dead or departed. No conquest in this collection acquired a vacancy of that kind, and the Soviet settlement did not have to make one.

The note, and where it fell due

There is a standing expectation about what conquest does to a populous land, and it is worth testing here rather than assuming.

An advanced order raises the population above what the ground unaided would carry. It does this by coordination: seed distributed, granaries held against a bad year,

water moved, marshes drained, roads and rails that carry grain from a surplus district to a deficit one. The surplus population that this supports is, in effect, a debt held against the apparatus. Break the apparatus by conquest or revolution and the note is called in the only currency available, which is people. The pattern is familiar enough that it can be treated as a default: the famine that follows a conquest is often larger than the conquest.

That is not what happened here, and the exception is instructive.

The Soviet arrival of 1939 did not break a coordinating apparatus in any way that produced famine. It confiscated estates, redistributed land, requisitioned, and imposed shortages; it did not produce mass starvation. The German occupation of 1941–44 destroyed a great deal and was accompanied by a policy explicitly designed to starve, but the mass hunger of those years fell hardest in the cities and in the eastern administration, and Galicia under the General Government did not experience it in the same form.

And when famine did come to Ukraine, in 1946 and 1947, it came to the collectivised centre and east and did not come to the western oblasts at all.

Through the summer of 1946 and into 1947, trains running west were crammed with starving people from the collectivised provinces. Hundreds of thousands came into Galicia and Volhynia to exchange their possessions for bread and potatoes, to buy food with money, or to be taken on as labour. The insurgents issued appeals urging western peasants to help them. The authorities responded by forbidding western Ukrainian peasants to sell food to the newcomers and by putting about rumours of epidemics and poisoned food in the west. Estimates of the dead in the Ukrainian SSR run from 100,000 to over a million, with Cormac Ó Gráda's figure at 300,000 within a Union-wide 900,000, and Union-wide estimates elsewhere reaching two million.

The reason the west was exempt is on the record and it is not a natural one. Collectivisation had not yet been introduced there, and the insurgency was obstructing procurement. The two features of the western oblasts that most reduced the state's coordinating reach are the two things that kept people fed in the worst agricultural year of the century.

Two years later the collective farm arrived in those oblasts, and by July 1950 it held ninety-three per cent of their farms.

What was added

An accounting that runs only one way is not an accounting, and the other column here is substantial.

Across the Soviet Union the health and living conditions of infants and children improved dramatically from about 1940 to 1969, and then stopped improving or began to deteriorate through the 1970s. Life expectancy is given at 68.4 years in 1960, 70.0 in 1970 and 70.4 in 1975. By 1989 the figure for Ukraine was 70.89, and among the highest oblast figures in the republic were Volyn and Ivano-Frankivsk — two of the provinces this study concerns. Schooling became universal, free, and conducted in the language of the village. Electricity, clinics, trained midwives, vaccination and antibiotics reached settlements that had had none of them.

The published Soviet infant mortality figures need a correction and it is not small: the Soviet definition excluded live-born infants of under 28 weeks' gestation, under 1,000 grams, or under 35 centimetres who died within seven days, and adjusting to the WHO definition would raise the rates by an estimated 22 to 25 per cent. The improvement remains after the adjustment; its size is smaller than the published series implies.

Set against that the ground's own baseline. Galicia before 1914 was among the poorest provinces in Europe, with the highest rural population density on the continent and holdings that could not be divided again; contemporaries counted seven major famines between 1847 and 1889, and a nineteenth-century estimate put annual deaths from hunger at fifty thousand. Close to a million people left for the United States between the late 1880s and 1914, four hundred thousand in 1913 alone, because the land could not carry them.

By 1970 nobody in these villages was emigrating because the land could not carry them, and nobody was dying of ordinary hunger in an ordinary year. The order that produced the columns above also produced the first sustained period in this land's recorded history in which its population was not periodically thinned by want.

Both of those things are true. Neither reduces the other, and an account that reports one and suppresses the other has misdescribed the case in a way that a reader can check.

Reading the accounting against the framework

The metabolic expectation — that a populous land is carrying a debt against its coordinating apparatus, and that conquest calls the note — does not hold here, and the reason it does not hold is the module's return.

Coordination is not one thing, and only one kind of it creates a metabolic debt. The distinction that matters is between coordination that buffers and coordination that skims.

Buffering coordination raises the number of people the ground can support above what it would support unaided. A granary holds this year's surplus against next year's failure. A canal makes a dry field wet. A rail network moves grain from a province with a good harvest to one with a bad. Each of these adds carrying capacity that did not exist, and the population that grows into it is genuinely held up by the apparatus. Destroy the apparatus and the addition is subtracted, in people. That is a metabolic debt, and it is what makes the famine of conquest.

Skimming coordination does nothing of the kind. A procurement quota set against a harvest estimate and collected before anything else adds no capacity at all. It does not store against a bad year; it takes the same claim in a bad year as in a good one, which is the opposite of storing. And because it is levied on the producer's own accumulation, it removes the buffer the household had been keeping for itself and puts nothing in its place. Such an apparatus does not raise the ceiling. It lowers the floor.

From which two consequences follow, and both are visible in this case.

An order built on skimming produces famine **while it is functioning**, not when it is destroyed. The starvation of 1946 and 1947 was not a note falling due on a broken apparatus; the apparatus was working exactly as designed, and the design contained no provision for the number of people who had to eat out of what remained after the quota was met. The proof is on the other side of the line: where the apparatus had not yet been installed, in the western oblasts, there was food in the same year, under the same drought, among the same nation.

And the direction of a famine is therefore diagnostic. **Read the date of a famine against the condition of the apparatus.** Where mass starvation follows the *destruction* of a coordinating system, the population had been living on a debt and the note has been called; the apparatus was carrying something. Where mass starvation follows the *installation* or intensification of one, the apparatus was never carrying anything — it

was taking — and what looks like a debt falling due is an extraction that has exceeded the residue.

The second consequence bears on the larger question of whether states are parasitic, and the answer this case gives is that the question is put at the wrong level. Both kinds of coordination were present in this order at the same time, in different departments, run by the same officials out of the same budget. In agriculture the state skimmed, and the skimming killed. In public health it buffered — the vaccination, the clinic, the trained midwife, the antibiotic and the piped water raised the number of people this ground could carry quite as genuinely as any granary ever did, and the demographic series show it. The same apparatus that removed 205,938 people to Siberia also ended the periodic hunger mortality that had emptied these villages into Pennsylvania for two generations.

So the grim accounting cannot be a single column and cannot be netted. It is two ledgers kept by one institution, and the institution's character is not settled by adding them, because they are not denominated in the same units and nobody chose to trade one against the other. What can be said is narrower and firmer: an order that buffers in one department and skims in another will produce, in the same decade and among the same people, both the largest famine and the largest fall in infant mortality in their recorded history — and any account that reaches for a single number to describe it has decided in advance what it wanted to find.

A note on sources. Nothing here is quoted. Every figure is paraphrased from a secondary or reference source and attributed at the point of use, and the whole module should be read as a compilation of other people's counts rather than as a count.

The 1939 campaign figures, the deportation totals, the prison massacres and the counter-insurgency series are drawn together from the same sources used earlier in this study and carry the same uncertainties. The Holocaust figures are from the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, from the European Holocaust Research Infrastructure's teaching materials, and from a Polish institutional history of the Volhynian killings; Kruglov's daily averages are as the EHRI materials report them. The special-settlement mortality data — 309,521 deaths 1941–48, 73,454 in 1949–50, and the comparative rates of 14, 19.3 and 24.7 per cent — are from compilations of the post-1991 Soviet archival releases. The Polish–Ukrainian estimates are given from a published comparative table of historians' figures, with the historians named; that table is itself maintained on a contested topic and its entries should be checked against the originals. The Soviet health and demographic data are from a working paper on Soviet living standards, from the Human Mortality Database's documentation for Ukraine, and from published oblast life-expectancy series; the Human

Mortality Database's own documentation warns that Soviet population data before 1970 overstate the older age groups, which means the earlier life-expectancy figures are less secure than they look.

Three cautions bear directly on the argument. First, the ranges here are not statistical uncertainty but disagreement between national historiographies, and in the Polish–Ukrainian and famine columns the disagreement is currently instrumentalised by more than one government; the ranges are reported as each side states them and nothing here adjudicates. Second, I have not found mortality figures for the specific population deported from the western Ukrainian oblasts in 1940–41 and 1944–52, and the rates above are borrowed from other operations; the inference is reasonable and it is an inference. Third and most important, the claim that the western oblasts escaped the famine of 1946–47 rests on Ukrainian scholarly accounts which are consistent with one another and which I have not been able to check against a source with a contrary interest; if that finding is wrong, the central argument of this module fails, and it is the first thing a reader should test.

A gap remains where a study like this most needs evidence. The columns above are counts of people made by institutions. What the loss of a third of a village's households did to the households that remained — to marriages, to inheritance, to who worked whose land, to what was said at a funeral — exists in oral history collected since 1991 and in parish registers, and none of it is here.

A REPUBLIC WITH A NAME

Module 12: convergence and divergence — what this case shares with the collection, where it genuinely differs, what the difference isolates, and the strongest case against this whole account, stated at full strength and answered.

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

Where the case converges

Set beside the European conquests in this collection, the structure holds at every load-bearing point, and it holds in detail rather than by analogy.

A floor of force was laid, and the police application was many times larger than the military one — three weeks of fighting at under a thousand dead on the taking side, against fourteen years of removals and killings running into the hundreds of thousands. A settlement was made under a fiction, redistributed downward, and then withdrawn: land confiscated from Polish estates and handed to peasant committees in 1939, land signed into collectives by the same men in 1949. Extraction ran through an instrument that had been abolished on this exact ground in April 1848 and was reinstalled from the autumn of 1948 — days owed to somebody else's fields, off-days on a subsistence plot, the plot inalienable and its size at the disposal of the body owed the days. The exit was closed, and its closure is measurable in the collapse of a voluntary outflow that had run at hundreds of thousands a decade for two generations.

A legitimating claim was made and prohibitions clustered precisely where it was strongest: the state that had reunified the Ukrainian lands sent its most senior available troubleshooter to Kyiv to superintend what Ukrainian historians and poets might write about the Ukrainian past. An elite was held in place by a structure of positions rather than by belief, and defended the arrangement by defending its own place in it, through factional wars that never once became a war about whether there should be places. Liberty was foreclosed, with the single enforceable procedural protection in the entire order accruing to the only body that could lose an internal contest and continue

to exist. And the end came from the centre's repricing, announced at the United Nations in December 1988, before the movements usually credited with causing it existed.

Beneath all of it, the recursion the collection expects: the order this conquest met was itself a naturalised former conquest, and here it was two of them, being two stages of the same operation performed on two halves of one people a century apart.

Where it genuinely differs

The differences are real and several of them are large. Naming them at full strength is not a concession; a reader who wants a handle will take the one left lying about, and the way to leave none is to pick it up first.

The legitimating claim was addressed to the conquered, and it was substantially true. Every colonial story in this collection is cut for the audience at home whose belief pays for the venture, and is largely wasted on, and largely false to, the people underneath. Here there was no separate story for home, because the doctrine that governed at home forbade the vocabulary a colonial story is made of. And the claim itself — that the Ukrainian lands were being made one, inside a republic bearing the nation's name — was a claim a Galician villager could check against his own life, and it checked out.

Formation was maximised rather than withheld. The colonial pattern is that forming the conquered would mean admitting them, so the formation is withheld and the old order simply holds the field. That pattern is absent here. Schooling was universal, free and in the village's own language; the Polish university at Lviv became a Ukrainian-language university within four months of the invasion; and the admission was real, all the way to the apex.

Extraction was sorted by sector rather than by caste, and had no metropolitan account to flow into. A Galician was pumped by the same instrument at the same rate as a peasant in Poltava or Ryazan, because he was a peasant and not because he was a Galician; and the taker and the spender were the same office, so that much of the proceeds returned to the same province as factories and clinics.

The elite held nothing transferable. Not a co-opted aristocracy with estates that would survive the order's fall, but an appointed one whose apartments, clinics, cars and pensions were all attached to posts on somebody else's list.

And the conquest could not be named. There is no Soviet word for what happened in September 1939 other than reunification and liberation. The category that would make the event legible was unavailable in the only vocabulary the state possessed — and the one document written in the ordinary language of a partition, the protocol of 23 August 1939, was denied to exist for fifty years.

The fork is worth stating precisely, because it is the thing that most tempts a reader to say this was a different kind of thing altogether. A settler conquest wants the ground and the people on it are an obstacle, so it runs toward removal. A plantation conquest wants the labour and the people are the asset, so it imports them and works them to death. This order wanted neither the ground alone nor the labour alone: it wanted a territory as a component of a security perimeter and a population as producers, soldiers and citizens inside a single administered system that made no distinction of kind between this province and any other. That is a genuinely different object, and it produces genuinely different policy — which is why the schools were built rather than withheld.

The structure survives the fork intact. The same floor, laid twice; the same settlement under a fiction; the same corvée; the same foreclosure; the same default; the same collapse from the centre.

Reading the collection against this case

Every other module in this study has returned a refinement to the framework. This one returns something to the collection instead, and it is the thing the European cases structurally could not supply.

The truth of a legitimating claim is an independent variable. It changes the price of the claim, the shape of what must be built to sustain it, and what is left standing afterwards. It does not change the floor, the exit, the extraction, the default, or the foreclosure of liberty.

No case in this collection could establish that before, because none of them had a true claim to test. The European stories — civilisation, protection, the burden — were false in the colony and were not meant to be checked there, so the collection has never been able to separate the effect of *having* a legitimating story from the effect of the story being a lie. This case separates them, because here the story was true, was addressed to the people best placed to test it, and was tested annually for fifty years.

What follows from its truth is considerable. It cost far more: a claim discharged by saying it is cheap, and a claim that has to be performed in front of its audience must be paid in universities, academies, publishing houses, a language of administration and a republic with a name. It bound its maker: having said reunification, the state could never unsay it, had to keep acquiring, had to keep performing, and could never admit that a Russification policy existed. And it left a residue, because institutions built to perform a claim are still institutions, and apparatus outlasts the reason it was built for.

What does not follow from its truth is anything at all about the other five variables. The floor was laid and re-laid on a categorical rule that reached wives, sons and brothers. The exit was abolished rather than priced. The extraction ran on labour rent with a conditional subsistence plot. The default held because nobody in the hierarchy owned anything they could carry out of it. And liberty produced no residue whatever outside the party, because no faction in the system could lose a contest and still exist.

A true robe, then, is not a softer robe. It is a more expensive one, a more binding one, and one that leaves more behind — worn over the same floor.

The strongest case against this account

The strongest objection is not that the study has been unfair. It is that the study has misclassified its object, and that every finding above is an artefact of the misclassification. It runs as follows, and it deserves to be put at full strength.

A conquest takes a people into a state that is not theirs. September 1939 took Ukrainians into a republic bearing the Ukrainian name, administered in Ukrainian, with a Ukrainian government, a Ukrainian academy, a Ukrainian-language university, and by 1945 a foreign ministry and a seat at the United Nations. Nothing in the European collection resembles that, because nothing in the European collection was ever offered.

The alternative in September 1939 was not independence. Nobody was offering independence. The choice was between two occupiers, and what the other one did to this ground between 1941 and 1944 is on the record: some 247,000 Volhynian Jews killed by October 1942, 97 per cent of the province's Jews, and eastern Galicia's Jewish population reduced to a few per cent of itself. The order that had preceded both had refused a Ukrainian university for twenty years, sent police and cavalry into sixteen counties in 1930, kept Galicia and Volhynia apart by administrative line to stop

Ukrainian institutions moving north, and in 1938 pulled down over 127 Orthodox church buildings while recommending that officials stop using the word *Ukrainian*.

Against those, the Soviet order delivered in substance the programme the Ukrainian national movement had demanded for a century: the unification of the lands, the land itself to the peasant, the end of Polish landlordism, universal schooling in the vernacular, and a career open to a peasant's son without a fee, a patron or a confession. The study's own diagnostic — what did the order spend on the conquered's institutions when nothing compelled it to spend anything — returns a larger figure here than for any conquest in the collection, and the study says so.

And the outcome settles it. Ukraine emerged in 1991 with defined borders, an administration, industry, an army, an educated class that spoke the national language, a seat at the United Nations it had held for forty-six years, and a parliament capable of voting the empire out of existence. Almost no European colony emerged from conquest with anything comparable, and many emerged with the opposite.

The sharpest form of the objection is this. On the study's own evidence, the men who voted independence on 24 August 1991 were the party's own men, educated in its schools, holding its posts, sitting in its parliament. Its former secretary for ideology wrote nothing and signed everything. The Soviet Union did not merely fail to prevent Ukrainian statehood; it manufactured the borders, the institutions and the personnel of it. To describe that as a conquest is to use a word that has stopped doing any work — and a framework that classifies it alongside the Congo Free State has told you more about the framework than about the case.

What that case does not cover

Nearly all of it is true and most of it this study has itself established. What it does not do is displace anything, because the two accounts are not answering the same question: the objection is about what an order produced, and the account is about how it worked. Both can be true at once, and here they are.

So the answer is not a rebuttal. It is the rest of the arithmetic, which the objection leaves out.

None of the achievement required any of the following, and all of them happened.

A directive of 31 March 1944, numbered 7129, ordering that all adult members of the families of convicted nationalists and of insurgents killed in engagements be exiled

to Krasnoyarsk, Omsk, Novosibirsk and Irkutsk, and their property confiscated. Under that instrument and its successors, 66,438 families — 205,938 people — were removed between 1944 and 1952, of whom 77,791 went in a single day on 21 October 1947, mostly women, children and the old, because the men the category named were in the forest. The resolution that accelerated the operation stated what the families were for: they were to supply workers to the coal industry.

A church of some two and a half thousand parishes dissolved in March 1946 by a sobor of its own clergy, 986 to 997 of whom had signed under pressure while the whole of its episcopate sat in prison, and at which no bishop of the church being dissolved was present. More than eight hundred of its priests sentenced in 1945 and 1946 to terms of ten to twenty-five years.

A famine in 1946 and 1947 that killed somewhere between a hundred thousand and a million people in the Ukrainian republic, produced by an apparatus that had not yet reached the western oblasts — so that the starving travelled west to buy bread, and were forbidden by the authorities to be sold any. That apparatus arrived in the western oblasts in the autumn of 1948.

A man sentenced to death in May 1961 by the Lviv oblast court for having proposed to exercise, by the lawful means it specified, the right of secession written in Article 17 of the constitution. He waited seventy-two days for the sentence to be carried out and served twenty-seven years.

And the machinery still running a generation later: 193 people convicted in the purge of 1972 and 1973; a schoolteacher given five years of strict-regime camps in the summer of 1972 for possessing an accurate documentary record of a Soviet trial.

Two further things the objection passes over, both of which are the study's findings rather than its opinions.

The institutions were not a gift. They were the price of a claim, and the claim was addressed to people who could check it. The same programme that funded the Ukrainian university and the Ukrainian academy dissolved the Shevchenko Scientific Society, which had been the Ukrainian academy in fact since 1892 and had published 591 volumes, and transferred its assets to the state; and dissolved Prosvita, and Ridna Shkola with its 2,074 branches and 105,000 members, and the cooperative audit union, and finally the church. Not one Ukrainian function was withdrawn. Every Ukrainian body that Ukrainians owned was abolished. The claim permitted the function and

forbade the ownership, and a nation granted everything except the ownership of anything has not been given a gift; it has been given a lease.

And the manufacture of Ukrainian statehood was neither benevolence nor accident. It was the mechanical consequence of having made a true claim to an audience that could audit it. A state that says a nation has been made whole must produce the nation's institutions annually, in front of the nation, and after fifty years of producing them the institutions exist. What the men of the group of 239 did in August 1991 they did without vacating a single office, because everything they held sat on lists whose heading could be changed. That is why nothing had to be fought for and nothing had to be given up — and it is also why the vessel was there to be picked up.

The last of the arithmetic is the count itself.

On 1 December 1991, 31,891,742 people voted, 84.18 per cent of the registered electorate. Between 90.32 and 92 per cent of votes cast — 28,804,071 ballots — confirmed the Act of Independence. A majority of those voting said yes in every one of the twenty-seven regions. Ternopil returned 98.67 per cent, Ivano-Frankivsk 98.42, Lviv 97.46, Volyn 96.32. Kharkiv returned 86.33, Donetsk 83.90, Luhansk 83.86. Crimea returned 54.19 and Sevastopol 57.07, and in those two alone the yes vote was not a majority of the registered electorate.

The president elected on the same day, with about 62 per cent against a former political prisoner's 23 per cent and another's 4.5 per cent, was the Communist Party of Ukraine's former secretary for ideology: born in January 1934 at Velykyi Zhytyn in Volhynia, a citizen of Poland, son of a man who had served in the Polish cavalry, in a household that worked for the Polish settlers whom the NKVD deported in February 1940.

A note on sources. Nothing is quoted in this module. Every figure and every event referred to has been set out with its sources in the modules that established it, and the attributions and ranges given there apply here unchanged; nothing has been tightened for the sake of a closing argument, and where a range was given earlier it is given again.

The referendum figures are from the published results as reported by Ukrainian state media and by reference compilations drawing on Nohlen and Stöver's data handbook: turnout 84.18 per cent, 31,891,742 voting, 28,804,071 in favour. The headline percentage is given as a range because the sources differ — 90.32, 90.92 and 92 per cent all appear in reputable places, the discrepancy apparently turning on whether spoiled ballots are counted in the denominator, and I have not resolved it. The oblast figures are from a compilation on a partisan Ukrainian site, cross-

checked against the reference entry where that entry carries them; the observation that Crimea and Sevastopol did not return a majority of the *registered electorate*, as distinct from a majority of votes cast, comes from the reference entry and is the kind of distinction that a study of this sort is obliged to make rather than to smooth. The presidential percentages are from a contemporary report of the election by an international observation mission and from reference sources, which give Kravchuk at 61.59 or about 62 per cent.

One limitation governs the whole module and should be visible. The comparison drawn here between this case and the European conquests in the collection rests on those studies rather than on any source cited in this one. A reader who wants to test the claim that no colonial administration in the collection spent comparably on the conquered's own institutions, or that the ratio of police to military violence is unusual, has to go to those studies and check; the claim is not established here and is not intended to be.

And a final caution which belongs to the reader rather than to the sources. Every number in this study is currently in use. The mortality figures, the deportation totals, the Volhynian estimates and the referendum percentages are all being deployed, at the time of writing, by governments with interests in what they are taken to show, in a war being fought over this ground. That is a reason for exactness about ranges and about who is counting, which this study has tried to observe; it is not a reason for the counting to stop. A reader is in a position too — formed somewhere, standing somewhere, with things it would cost him something to conclude. The arithmetic is above. The sum is his.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.